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A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Europe 
Concept – Problems – Chances 
Harald Müller/Giorgio Franceschini/Aviv Melamud/Daniel Müller/Anna Péczeli/Annette Schaper 
ABSTRACT 
The nuclear weapon free-zone (NWFZ) concept has been explored thoroughly in the decades since its 
introduction, and several regions throughout the world have succeeded in the challenging task of es-
tablishing such a zone and thus promoting nuclear non-proliferation and peace.  
The 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) called on all states to 
establish additional NWFZ in regions, where such zones do not exist. The possible establishment of a 
NWFZ in conflict areas where the threat of nuclear weapons is present, such as the Middle East or 
South Asia, has already been at the center of much diplomatic and research effort for some time.  
This study takes on a new challenge and explores the idea of establishing a NWFZ in the heart of Eu-
rope, a region least likely to be associated with this concept: three major European states (France, Rus-
sia and the UK) are official nuclear weapon states and an extra-regional nuclear weapon state (the US) 
is heavily present through its practice of nuclear sharing with its European NATO allies.  
In this study, the various objectives that a NWFZ in Europe could achieve are enumerated. These in-
clude, inter alia, both narrow security objectives for zonal members (e.g. reducing their chances of 
involvement in a nuclear exchange), as well as political-symbolic objectives (e.g. strengthening the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime). This study sets out under the assumption that despite political and 
strategic challenges, the exploration of the idea to establish a NWFZ in Europe would have multifold 
advantages. Most notably, it will serve to awaken the debate on nuclear weapons in Europe, and thus 
maintain and rejuvenate the discourse on disarmament. Likewise it would contribute substantially to 
the delegitimation of nuclear weapons. 
In practical term, this study discusses the elements and content of a possible NWFZ in Europe, while 
presenting both opportunities and challenges that different ways of establishing such a zone would 
entail. Based on a thorough review of the NWFZ concept and its application in regions where such 
zones have been established, coupled with an analysis of the current situation in Europe, this study 
offers an evaluation of central provisions which could be included in a NWFZ arrangement in Europe, 
including members’ rights and obligations, verification mechanisms, and treaty protocols, and it fur-
ther proposes innovative mechanisms to broaden support for such an initiative on the sub-state level. It 
analyzes and assesses the obstacles and objections – political, organizational, and technical – that a 
NWFZ in Europe would face, and explores ways to diffuse them. 
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
US President Barack Obama has changed the international debate on nuclear weapons in 2009 by 
committing unambiguously to the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons as enshrined in the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To achieve this final objective is not only the duty of the 
nuclear weapon states (NWS). Article VI establishes the undertaking of all NPT parties to work to-
wards nuclear disarmament.  
Some may maintain that the present international climate – the serious crisis in Europe on Ukraine 
that puts NATO and Russia at loggerheads, the stagnation in nuclear arms control between the United 
States and Russia, the rivalry and incipient arms race in East and Southeast Asia – indicate that it is not 
the time for any new consideration or initiatives in this field. But such reasoning contradicts the spirit 
and basic purpose of the NPT and is not conducive to fostering peace. The preamble of the NPT puts 
the Treaty squarely in the context of world peace. It establishes the intimate mutual relationship be-
tween nuclear disarmament and a peaceful and non-violent foreign policy as indispensable ways to 
both prevent nuclear war and secure international peace. For that reason, the current international 
situation, and most of all the Ukrainian events that take place in the shadow of nuclear armed oppo-
nents, call even more than before for strong and innovative efforts in this field. As stated, this is not a 
burden that lasts exclusively on the shoulders of the nuclear weapon states, but the duty of all parties.  
In “Action 9” of the plan for action in its final document, the 2010 NPT Review Conference empha-
sized one way for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to implement this undertaking: It encouraged 
states to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in regions where no such zone yet exists. To-
gether with Northern America, the Middle East, South Asia, the heart of the Eurasian landmass that is 
Russia, and East Asia, Europe is one of the regions without a NWFZ treaty. This study explores the 
road towards the establishment of such a zone in Europe, for NPT member states who want to imple-
ment the mandate enshrined in “Action 9”. 
NWFZs are a well-established concept, and indeed a political and legal reality in many areas of the 
world. Attempts to install such a zone proved elusive in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, the 
three regions most bothered by nuclear proliferation in the present era. Europe, once the place with the 
densest deployment of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, has not become nuclear-weapon-free 
as well. Proposals for zones in Europe have been put forward the earliest, namely already in the fifties, 
but failed on the rocks of the Cold War. Despite recurrent efforts to re-open the debate by new pro-
posals, including some after the end of the East-West conflict, a broad discussion has not occurred ever 
since, even though the political reason for its erstwhile failure – the antagonistic conflict between the 
two blocs and their alliances – was put to the dustbin of history more than two decades ago. Forces of 
nuclear inertia proved formidable. 
This study takes a fresh approach to the issue. It does so motivated by the risk that the process of nu-
clear disarmament might stall and revert into a nuclear arms race, this time not of a bipolar but a mul-
tiple nature, involving established nuclear powers, nuclear weapon possessors not party to the NPT, 
and maybe even emerging ones that are still within the NPT. Such a nuclear competition would be 
harder to control but easier to destabilize, with sombre prospects for upholding the taboo against nu-
                                                           
 
1  The authors wish to thank the Governments of Austria and Switzerland for supporting this study, and the participants in an 
workshop at Vienna in July 2013, who diligently and thoughtfully scrutinized the study and engaged in an enriching and 
challenging discussion: Heinz Gärtner, Gerard Keown, Rebecca Johnson, Alexander Kmentt, Benno Laggner, Patricia Lewis, 
Sverre Lodgaard, Benoît Pelopidas, William Potter, Marco Roscini, Tom Sauer, Nicolai Sokov, Elena Sokova, Roland Sturm, 
Reto Wollenmann.  
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clear weapon use that has prevailed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A revived multiple arms race would 
most probably multiply and accelerate proliferation processes around the world for security and status 
reasons, engendering additional risky consequences for nuclear conflagration and escalation. To fore-
stall such a scenario which is distinctly possible but by no means inevitable, thinking out of the box is 
required. Europe is a place where nuclear thinking has been in the box for all too long, guarded by four 
NWS and the formidable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bureaucracy. The nuclear issue 
has receded into the background in Europe for long, but has witnessed a certain revival in the course of 
the Ukraine crisis. The enhanced tension between Russia – a nuclear armed state – and NATO – a 
nuclear armed alliance with three nuclear weapon states as members has not only re-emphasized deter-
rence as a security strategy, but Russia in particular has explicitly articulated the role of nuclear weap-
ons in its defence posture through repeated hints at the deployment of Iskander short range missiles in 
the Kaliningrad district, provocative manoeuvres of its bomber fleet near NATO air space, nuclear 
threats against the NATO Member Denmark or the placement of nuclear capable aircraft in the freshly 
annexed Crimea peninsula. 
These worrying developments have been unfolding while a cornerstone of European security – the 
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) – has come under pressure due to US accusa-
tions of non-compliance directed to Russia (July 2014), which were rebuffed by Moscow. At the same 
time, several experts within the Russian strategic community have been questioning the value of the 
INF over the last years; and the US DoD is already evaluating its options to counter Russian intermedi-
ate-range nuclear forces.2 In the extreme case, a collapse of the INF could lead to a renewed nuclear 
arms race in Europe. 
Exploring the idea of a NWFZ in the region under these new circumstances definitely requires think-
ing out of the box. It is an attempt to find ways and options for states who want to prevent the re-
emergence of a nuclear confrontation and competition in Europe in a situation in which such (preven-
tive) policies are most needed but less probable. The project opens the possibility to look for new, bold 
ways to bring movement into both nuclear debates and nuclear politics in Europe and to open new 
roads for political action which could change the landscape of nuclear politics for the better.  
“Action 9” of the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s plan for action, as indicated above, opens an interest-
ing road for European NNWS to foster the cause of nuclear disarmament and to implement their relat-
ed undertaking under Article VI of the NPT to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”, to 
which NWFZs are a significant contribution. Such an activity would fit the re-emphasis since 2010 on 
the active role of NNWS in nuclear disarmament. We see increasing activities on their side, e.g. the 
initiative to re-introduce the humanitarian aspect into the debate, or the engagement of the Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) on nuclear transparency. Especially the popularity of 
the humanitarian initiative has generated renewed momentum for nuclear disarmament, not least due 
to a widely noticed “Austrian pledge” to “cooperate with all relevant stakeholders … in efforts to stig-
matise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian conse-
quences and associated risks.” “Action 9” offers another, particularly salient opportunity to realize this 
undertaking. 
Of course, the project is facing formidable obstacles. Europe is a continent in which three NWS reside 
and a fourth is powerfully present, all of which regard nuclear weapons to a larger or lesser extent as 
part of national identity and certainly of the national security posture for the time to come. NATO, the 
most powerful alliance of democracies, calls itself a “nuclear alliance” and deploys sub-strategic nuclear 
                                                           
 
2  http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/ash-carter-russia-vladimir-putin-defense-115421.html 
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weapons of the superior alliance partner, the United States, on the territories of several NNWS mem-
bers. All NATO member states subscribe to the role of nuclear weapons in their security, some with 
great conviction and emphasis, and others with great reluctance and even resentment. The present 
enhanced feeling of a threat from Russia felt in the Alliance’s easternmost member states has enhanced 
the felt need for a continued nuclear umbrella and the continuing presence of US nuclear weapons on 
European soil. This is the case although there are arguments that the crisis demonstrated the lack of 
utility of these weapons and thus would even present another argument for their withdrawal in favour 
of more conventional investments.3 Nevertheless, for all NATO members, there is presently an obvious 
political contradiction between NATO membership and the project of a NWFZ. One of the purposes 
of this study is assessing how formidable these obstacles really are, and if there are ways and means 
either to overcome or to circumvent them. In an ironic twist, taking up a very old and almost forgotten 
idea from the distant past forces us to engage in an original, creative and almost revolutionary endeav-
our. And while some people might be quite sceptical how realistic this approach may be, the authors 
are ambitious enough to aim at practical, operative steps to start the long road to realization. But they 
do so in an analytical, not an advocacy mood. 
We begin in Chapter two with a review of the concept and the historical experiences with the zone 
approach. The objectives of NWFZs are recalled, and the crucial question whether they have value 
added over global regimes is visited. This is not just discussed in abstract, but inquired and demon-
strated with examples from existing zones. The chapter closes with a reminder of past approaches for a 
European NWFZ. 
Chapter three states the objectives of a political initiative to bring such a zone into life in the present 
political landscape in Europe and globally. These objectives include confidence-building in the region, 
a diminished risk for zone members to become involved in nuclear crises and exchanges, a push for the 
process of nuclear disarmament, a move to contribute to the delegitimation of nuclear weapons, and 
the awakening of the sleepy public opinion on this issue by stimulating a debate across borders. In the 
present situation, it is also aimed at building down the tensions emerging from the Ukraine crisis. This 
will not be possible without a strong parallel effort on all sides to heed the Minsk agreement. Political 
and nuclear confidence-building has to go hand in hand.  
Chapter four addresses the difficult issue of how to negotiate. On the one hand, there are experiences 
from other regions on which we can draw, hoping for some enlightenment on how to proceed here. On 
the other hand, the European situation is unique given the presence of a nuclear alliance, including 
NWS that are, of course, unwilling to join such negotiations: how to reconcile this condition with the 
prescription that NWFZs are to be based on “arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the 
region concerned”, as the UN Disarmament Commission repeated in its report from 1999 as a princi-
ple in its guidelines for establishing such zones? The guidelines, while not legally binding, are the most 
important reference text and cannot be easily ignored. However, they also state that NWFZs are “the 
product of the specific circumstances of the region concerned” and take account of “the diversity of 
situations in the different regions”. This creates space to accommodate the uniqueness of the European 
constellation. In addition, the guidelines note that the “establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is a 
dynamic process”. This recognizes that it might be an extended process in which membership shifts 
and expands from the beginning to the end as might well be the case in the European theatre. This 
reminds us that, in any case, promoters of the project have to be in for the long haul and need to think 
strategically rather than focus on the short term. The policy should thus enjoy some degree of supra-
                                                           
 
3  Kulesa, Łukasz (2014). Careful What You Wish For: Nuclear Reductions and Conventional Deterrence in Europe after 
Crimea. PISM. Strategic file No. 15 (51). Warsaw; Kristensen, Hans M./Mount, Adam (2014). Why NATO should eliminate 
its tactical nukes, despite Russian belligerence. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
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partisan consensus in the countries concerned and be firmly anchored in the set of national objectives 
which practitioners in the ministries concerned pursue as a self-explanatory part of their duties. 
The fifth chapter goes into the main provisions which a zone treaty might contain such as, inter alia, 
obligations or verification. This seems to be familiar ground as existing zone treaties are a treasure of 
stimulation. However, defining the necessary mixture of rights and duties for a zone in Europe is tricky 
at the same time, as the conditions mentioned in the last paragraph may also impact upon the under-
takings of the parties and other items to be addressed, such as accession. A particularly interesting issue 
concerns protocols: The zone is not only divided into the dichotomy of nuclear and non-nuclear 
weapon states, but includes in addition alliance members with and without a nuclear role. Being popu-
lated by democracies with an active population and political entities (such as provinces and communi-
ties) below state level with an elected self-government, and being placed in an institutional environ-
ment in which “multilevel governance” has become a respected term in both the academic and the 
political debate, considering the possibilities of protocol relations to the zone by sub-state entities 
might prove worthwhile. We are entering new territory here for international law, but it is worth delib-
erating about such possibilities in an era when lawyers, political scientists, and practitioners note that 
states have ceased to be the only relevant actors on the international scene. 
Chapter six visits the politics of zone-making by anticipating the political reactions of several types of 
actors to a zone initiative, and discusses possibilities of addressing their objections, concerns, but also 
ways to marshal and organize support. The conclusions in chapter seven summarize the findings and 
pull together operative options to a strategy which leads to suggestions for the first useful steps. 
We want to be clear about the character and purpose of this study. It does not present a draft treaty, 
but discusses – in non-legal language – elements for the content of a zone treaty. It is not a strategy 
paper for zone promoters, but identifies opportunities as well as impediments on the road towards a 
NWFZ in Europe. And it is not a decision-making blueprint, because weighing of the pros and cons, 
the trade-offs between a zone and other political goals, the diplomatic risks and promises of the debate 
which will inevitably follow, and their own domestic contexts, is genuinely in the purview of the initia-
tors and beyond the competence – and purpose – of the authors. 
2. NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES: CONCEPTS AND EXPERIENCES 
2.1 Objectives of nuclear weapon-free zones 
In the late 1950’s, the groundwork for the nuclear non-proliferation regime was laid with parallel ef-
forts on both the global and the regional fronts. These endeavours resulted in the institution of the 
global regime with the NPT at its core, and the elaboration and establishment of NWFZs as a regional 
mechanism, one of which – the Treaty of Tlatelolco – even predated the NPT.4  
NWFZ are regional multilateral agreements intended to isolate specifically designated territories in the 
world from the presence of nuclear weapons. The NPT does not require the complete absence of nu-
clear weapons territorially, because it does not explicitly prohibit stationing of nuclear weapons by 
NWS in the territories of NNWS.5 NWFZs extend therefore beyond the NPT in “freeing” entire re-
                                                           
 
4  William Epstein, “The Making of the Treaty of Tlatelolco”, Journal of the History of International Law, Vol. 3 (2001), pp. 155–
156. 
5  Although the NPT does not explicitly prohibit stationing, the interpretation according to which nuclear stationing and 
nuclear sharing under NATO arrangements in Europe do not constitute a violation of the NPT is highly controversial and 
contested, as these arrangements provide for the transfer of weapons to the air forces of some NATO NNWS when the 
decision to use them is taken, while the preamble of the NPT declares it as the goal of the Treaty to prevent nuclear war. 
People have argued that thus, NATO plans are in contradiction of the core objective, and thus of spirit and letter, of the NPT. 
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gions from nuclear weapons, and offer a localized way of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. 
Since the establishment of the NPT, which mentions the zone concept favourably in its Article VII, 
such zones are considered a complementary element of the non-proliferation regime: they allow states 
to address shortcomings of the NPT regime and go beyond its undertakings, while supporting its nor-
mative structure.6 
In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) accepted Resolution 3472 – “A Comprehen-
sive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects”.7 The resolution present-
ed its definition for a NWFZ:  
“A 'nuclear-weapon-free zone' shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of states, in the free exercise of 
their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby (1) the statute of total 
absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the de-
limitation of the zone, is defined, (2) an international system of verification and control is estab-
lished to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute”. 
The key obligations of NWS to parties to a NWFZ were also defined – NWS should undertake, via a 
legally binding international instrument, to respect the status of total absence of nuclear weapons, to 
refrain from contributing to violations, and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
against state parties to the zone.  
The comprehensive study by an ad hoc group of governmental experts, on which this Resolution is 
based, discussed at length the historical background and concept of NWFZ, as well as the obligations of 
states within and outside of the zone.8 It emphasized that NWFZs enhance national, regional and also 
global security, constitute an important disarmament measure9 and make an important contribution to 
strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. State parties to a NWFZ, according 
to the study, should not develop, test, produce, possess or acquire nuclear weapons, nor permit anyone 
to store, install or deploy them in territories under their jurisdiction. Furthermore, they should not 
give, seek or receive assistance in development or production of such weapons. The zone’s viability will 
depend on an effective system of verification and control to ensure its nuclear weapon free status. 
In 1999, the UN Disarmament Commission submitted to the UNGA a condensed report on the 1975 
study, entitled “Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones on the Basis of Arrangements Freely 
Arrived at Among the States of the Region Concerned”.10 The study consists of non-binding guidelines, 
meant to assist regional states in the development of a NWFZ in their region. 
                                                           
 
6  Scott Parrish and Jean Du Preez, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones: Still a Useful Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Tool? Paper 
submitted to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (2006), pp. 2–3. It is also interesting to note that the NPT 
includes an article in support of the establishment of NWFZ (article VII: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any 
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories”). This article did not appear in the original draft of the Treaty, and was proposed for inclusion by Mexico, the 
leading actor in the concurrent negotiations on the Latin American NWFZ.  
7  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX), Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zones in All its Aspects, 11 December 1975. 
8  Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects – Special Report of the Conference 
of the Committee of Disarmament, 8 October 1975 (A/10027/Add.1). 
9  The First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (1978) also mentioned in its Final Document that the 
establishment of NWFZ on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states in the region and respected by NWS 
constitute an important disarmament measure (First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament 
(1978), A/S-10/2 Final document of SSOD-I: Resolution and Decisions of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 
article 33). 
10  United Nations General Assembly Supplement no. 42 (A/54/42), Report of the Disarmament Commission, 6 May 1999. 
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The guidelines stress that the initiative for a NWFZ should emanate from within the region, and that it 
should be supported by the international community. NWS, according to the Report, should be con-
sulted during negotiations on the Treaty, so as to ensure their support for the final wording. Similarly, 
states with territories within the proposed zone should be consulted with as well during negotiations. 
In both the 1999 report and the original study from 1975, it was agreed that the issue of transit through 
the zone should be left to the discretion of state parties, most likely because it was understood that 
completely restricting movement of nuclear-armed/propelled vessels would not be accepted and the 
zones would never materialize.  
NWFZ are designated to prevent development and deployment of nuclear weapons and they do not 
provide – in practical terms or in conceptualization – the vision or guidelines for regional disarmament 
(the single exception is the African NWFZ, which contains a unique clause on reversal of nuclear 
weapons programs; discussed below in section 2.3.4). When weapons deployed by NWS on the territo-
ry of NNWS in the zone have to be removed as a consequence of establishing a zone and might then be 
scheduled for dismantlement, the zone would make a moderate contribution to nuclear disarmament. 
By limiting the freedom of action of NWS to deploy and move their weapons, they also contribute their 
share to the delegitimation of nuclear weapons. Beyond that, zone treaties are treaties of non-
proliferation and regional security rather than of disarmament, and the role and commitments of NWS 
are therefore substantial for ensuring the lack of nuclear weapons in the region. Without NWS’s re-
spect for and adherence to the zone’s provisions, the absence of nuclear weapons cannot be guaranteed. 
Since a NWFZ is intended to enhance regional states’ security, another essential component is the 
extension by NWS of negative security assurances – guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against states parties to the zone. These undertakings by NWS are usually stipulated in proto-
cols that are integral parts of the zone treaty. 
2.2 The value added of nuclear-weapon-free-zones compared to global regimes 
The advantage of regional non-proliferation arrangements lies in the possibility of tailoring them ac-
cording to a region’s specific needs and reality. In a localized, regional context, conditions are theoreti-
cally more favourable to the achievement of a comprehensive agreement due to the smaller number of 
actors involved and therefore reduced complexity, compared with negotiations on the global level. A 
global arrangement, because it must fit a multitude of actors – and therefore necessities and concerns – 
presents inevitably the lowest common denominator, while in a regional context, a more comprehen-
sive arrangement can be created under favourable circumstances. 
An arrangement which is specifically moulded for a region’s requirements can include provisions on 
issues that are of particular relevance for the region, and verification mechanisms, for instance, could 
be construed with a view to meet the specific confidence-building needs of regional states, an aspect 
that has been repeatedly emphasized with regard to a possible zone in the Middle East. A NWFZ would 
therefore be able to enhance the security of states and establish greater confidence in the region, by 
focusing its provisions on the region’s security requirements and expanding beyond the limited scope 
of a global regime, or narrowing its attention to specific matters of concern. 
NWFZ were conceptualized already in the 1950s as a regional approach to non-proliferation, aimed at 
preventing the more states from obtaining nuclear weapons,11 but they materialized to mostly serve the 
purpose of fencing-off nuclear weapons from outside of particular areas, rather than preventing nucle-
arisation within the region. NWFZ have been developed in light of regional realities and consequently 
attempt to address shared regional concerns. For example, while the establishment of a regional non-
                                                           
 
11  Jozef Goldblat, “Nuclear Weapon Free Zones: A History and Assessment”, The Non-Proliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), 
p. 18. 
9 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 27 
proliferation mechanism could theoretically allow for better, more intrusive and comprehensive verifi-
cation which would ensure that regional states do not manufacture nuclear weapons, none of the exist-
ing NWFZ has in fact developed a sophisticated region-specific verification mechanism, because this 
was not the central concern behind their establishment and the services of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) were considered sufficient. Preventing deployment of nuclear weapons, nuclear 
testing and nuclear waste dumping by NWS served as the central incentives for the development of 
most existing NWFZ, and their contribution to non-proliferation is most notable in these aspects.  
NWFZ provide a back-up for a weakening of the NPT, and create an additional barrier against the 
withdrawal of a NNWS from its undertakings not to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Should the NPT 
fade, verification measures pursuant to the zone treaties would continue, thereby preserving a highly 
important element of regional confidence-building and security. The consequences of NPT decay 
would thus be significantly reduced for the regions hosting nuclear weapon free zones, and the global 
community could concentrate its efforts to contain damage to the remaining regions where such zones 
are lacking.  
Beyond strengthening NNWS’s non-proliferation commitments and emphasizing their right to civilian 
uses of nuclear energy, NWFZ prohibit nuclear testing and the deployment of nuclear weapons by 
NWS in the territories of states parties to the zones. A global regime on the prohibition of nuclear 
testing has been established with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (1996, CTBT), and of 
course the NPT includes the basic non-proliferation commitments of NNWS. The prohibition on 
stationing or deploying nuclear weapons is therefore the most meaningful contribution of NWFZ trea-
ties. It is this prohibition which supposedly “frees” or eliminates the zones from nuclear weapons. Be-
cause none of the existing NWFZ goes further to expressly prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons 
through the zone’s territory, the distinction between “stationing” and “transiting” has been called into 
question (mostly through the time dimension – when is an extended transit considered 
ment?12). 
Another particular contribution of NWFZs, which seems only possible through a regional mechanism, 
is the negative security assurances which NWS are requested to offer parties to the zone. These assur-
ances are found in the protocols for the NWS attached to the treaties, not all of which have been rati-
fied by the NWS. Slow ratification by NWS of the protocols illustrates how complex this matter is, yet 
on a regional level legally binding negative security assurances are apparently more achievable than on 
the global.  
Additional non-proliferation provisions – such as physical protection of nuclear material – enrich 
these treaties beyond NPT-like undertakings, and give emphasis to their contributive role in the non-
proliferation regime. Prohibitions of nuclear waste dumping or the obligation to ratify the Vienna 
Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents add an additional environmental dimension to 
some of the existing NWFZ (the testing prohibition has both non-proliferation and environmental 
benefits). 
                                                           
 
12  It is interesting to note, in this context, a proposal raised by two island states, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, to address this 
issue in the context of the Rarotonga South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, due to its introduction of the implicit exclusion 
of transit and port visits from the zone (that later became the standard of all NWFZ treaties). The proposal called for 
including restrictions on the duration or pattern of port visits. Mentioned in Michael Hamel-Green, “The Rarotonga South 
Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty”, in Ranginui Walker and William Sutherland (ed.), The Pacific: Peace, Security and the 
Nuclear Issue (The United Nations University: 1988), p. 100. 
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2.3 Existing nuclear-weapon-free zones: Description and analysis of specifities 
Five NWFZs have been established, through multilateral treaties, in densely populated areas in the 
world: 
Latin American and Caribbean – Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967, entered into force (eif) 2002);  
South Pacific – Treaty of Rarotonga (1985, eif 1986);   
Southeast Asia – Treaty of Bangkok (1995, eif 1997);   
Africa – Treaty of Pelindaba (1996, eif 2009);   
Central Asia – Treaty of Semipalatinsk (2006, eif 2009).  
There are additionally three other multilateral denuclearization agreements, which include the Treaty 
of Washington on Antarctica (1959, eif 1961); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (so-called 
Outer Space Treaty, 1967, eif 1967); and Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the 
Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty, 1971, eif 1972).13  
Existing NWFZ treaties share an essential basic goal, namely, the banning of nuclear weapons from 
explicitly designated regions. This is accomplished by prohibiting the development, possession and 
testing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices by state parties to the zone, as well as their 
deployment by other states. All existing zones also determinedly ensure that peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy remain available for the regions’ development needs, echoing Art. IV, 1 of the NPT. A protocol 
for the recognized NWS is attached to all NWFZ treaties, in which their commitments to the zone are 
enumerated, and generally includes the obligations to respect the zone and not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against zone parties. However, all treaties leave to the discretion of each state party 
the decision on transit rights, i.e. foreign vessels’ visits to ports and travel through air space and territo-
rial waters. To ensure compliance with treaty obligations, all zones establish a control system which is 
based on IAEA Safeguards and additional supporting mechanisms, such as reports, exchange of infor-
mation and clarifications, to be managed by a designated entity or a body established expressly for this 
purpose. All NWFZ treaties are in force indefinitely, and none allow reservations.  
The existing NWFZ include definitions of central concepts referred to in the treaties. The treaties of 
Tlatelolco and Bangkok use ‘nuclear weapon’, while the treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba use ‘nucle-
ar explosive device’, and the treaty of Semipalatinsk uses ‘nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive 
device’ (as does the NPT); a definition for this fundamental term is not included in the NPT. The 
NWFZ treaties further define the territory which is covered under the agreement, the term stationing 
or deployment, and additional concepts which are relevant to their provisions (e.g. dumping, radioac-
tive/nuclear material, and nuclear installation/facility).  
As envisioned for such regional security arrangements, the existing NWFZs were designed to address 
region-specific concerns. While the five zones are in principle similar and include the same basic un-
dertaking, aimed at ensuring the absence of nuclear weapons from the zone, they build on each other 
and add additional dimensions relevant at the time of their negotiation and in accordance with region-
al non-proliferation needs and concerns.  
The first NWFZ – in Latin America – was initially proposed as early as 1958, but the idea gained cur-
rency following the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and 
the possibility of a nuclear exchange in the region between the superpowers. Indeed, such an exchange 
would have grimly illustrated the proverb which became associated with the Non-Aligned Movement 
                                                           
 
13  There are a few treaties stipulating the de-militarization of certain territories (e.g. the Aaland Islands) which implicitly also 
prohibit stationing nuclear weapons there. 
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during the Cold War: “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”. All five NWFZ share this 
fundamental concern regarding nuclear interference from outside the region, and parties’ undertakings 
to refraining from proliferation (not to develop) are balanced by equally weighty provisions aimed at 
preventing extra-regional states from using the region for nuclear-related activities (deployment, test-
ing, dumping or – as in the case of the Bangkok Treaty – use of nuclear weapons from within the 
zone). The record of securing ratification of NWS to the protocols of NWFZ which concern them has 
not been perfect, due to attempts by the NWS to preserve their freedom of action.14 Several such proto-
cols have not yet been ratified by the NWS, and reservations have been attached to others. Despite this, 
the establishment and entry into force of five NWFZ is a celebrated and meaningful achievement in the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. The recent past has seen an enhanced diplomatic effort to clear the 
way for signature and ratification of the relevant protocols of several zones by the nuclear weapon 
states. 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco 
The Tlatelolco Treaty for Latin America was established prior to the NPT, and introduced the basic 
obligations and mechanisms which the following NWFZ treaties would be based on – prohibitions on 
manufacturing, testing, possessing or deploying nuclear weapons. Befitting its time, the treaty of 
Tlatelolco (as its contemporary, the NPT) allows nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, due to their 
association with development. This prerogative does not appear in any of the subsequent zones to be 
established, although the language in the Tlatelolco Treaty concerning such explosions is considered 
ambiguous and has led to differing interpretations.15  
One of the greatest challenges in the negotiation of the treaty was ensuring the cooperation of relevant 
extra-regional states.16 This included, first and foremost, the commitment of NWS to respect the zone, 
and their obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the zone. Further-
more, for the complete coverage of the designated territory, the cooperation of specific extra-regional 
powers which administer colonies within the zone had to be secured. The protocols annexed to the 
treaty contain the obligations for extra-regional states, without which the zone’s non-nuclear status 
could not be guaranteed.  
Treaty of Rarotonga  
The next regional denuclearization arrangement, negotiated in the mid 1980’s, was designed to be 
broader and therefore labelled the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. 
The basic prohibitions of testing and stationing were more extensively described, and several new pro-
scriptions were introduced, according to the region’s particular experience. In particularly, regional 
concerns over nuclear testing and dumping of nuclear waste in the South Pacific by NWS motivated 
                                                           
 
14  See Annex for a table comparing the prescriptions of the existing zones and detailing their status of ratification, including 
that of the protocols.  
15  Article 18 of the Tlatelolco Treaty allows peaceful nuclear explosions and spells out the procedures under which said 
explosions may be carried out. It specifically states that such explosions may be carried out provided that they are in 
accordance with other articles of the Treaty, especially articles 1 and 5. These articles deal with the general prohibitions of 
using and testing nuclear weapons and the definition of a nuclear weapon, respectively. This definition states that a nuclear 
weapon is “any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of 
characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes”. Because a distinction cannot be made between explosive 
devices with “warlike purposes” and those without, a limited reading of article 18 would consider peaceful nuclear explosions 
as prohibited, unless and until technology advances enable the development of devices not capable of being used for weapon 
purposes. Joseph Gallacher, “Article VII, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and Colonial Warfare in the 20th Century”, in Ian Bellany, 
Coit D. Blacker and Joseph Gallacher, eds., The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (London: Cass, 1985), p. 77. 
16  William Epstein, “The Making of the Treaty of Tlatelolco”, Journal of the History of International Law, Vol. 3 (2001), pp. 153–
179. 
12 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 27 
the emphasis on these issues.17 The Treaty of Rarotonga introduced a third protocol for NWS, in which 
they specifically undertake not to test nuclear weapons in the region. A similar protocol for NWS re-
garding testing was included also in the Pelindaba Treaty on Africa’s denuclearization; indeed both 
regions’ experience with nuclear testing justifies this specific attention to testing by NWS.  
As the first zone negotiated after the establishment of the global non-proliferation regime, the Treaty of 
Rarotonga includes several references in support of the NPT, and introduced the commitment by state 
parties not to provide source or special fissionable material for peaceful uses to states that are not sub-
ject to IAEA Safeguards according to the NPT. This commitment appears in comparable – though not 
identical – form in all NWFZ treaties since (under the Treaty of Bangkok, safeguards “as required by 
the NPT” are prescribed; under Pelindaba, material must be subject to a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement concluded with the IAEA; under Semipalatinsk, comprehensive safeguards as well as the 
Additional Protocol are needed). The Rarotonga Treaty did not address the issue of US military facili-
ties in Australia that were part of the global US nuclear posture because these facilities did not host 
nuclear weapons. Thus, their existence did not obviate the basic objective of the zone. 
The Treaty of Bangkok 
The Bangkok Treaty, which denuclearizes Southeast Asia, emphasizes the prohibition of dumping, and 
includes also definitions for the relevant concepts, such as radioactive material and waste. The promo-
tion of responsible handling of nuclear material was introduced through parties’ undertaking to dis-
pose of radioactive wastes and other radioactive material in accordance with IAEA standards and pro-
cedures, and their commitment to subject peaceful nuclear energy programs to rigorous nuclear safety 
measures in conformity with IAEA guidelines. In addition, the Bangkok Treaty alone requires mem-
bers to accede to the Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents.  
The subsequent NWFZ treaties of Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk also adopted provisions concerning 
nuclear safety following the introduction of this subject in the Bangkok Treaty, and refer explicitly to 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), according to which zonal 
parties must secure their nuclear material. The Treaty of Semipalatinsk also prohibits disposal of radio-
active waste in the zone by other states, and includes an undertaking by member states to assist each 
other in efforts toward environmental rehabilitation of territories contaminated by past nuclear activi-
ties. This reflects in particular the concerns of Kazakhstan about the contamination caused by decades 
of testing Soviet nuclear weapons at the test site of Semipalatinsk. 
The inclusion of continental shelves and exclusive economic zones in the definition of the NWFZ’s 
territory in the Bangkok Treaty is unique to this treaty and reflects, in particular, the interests of the 
island states (Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia). This is considered the main hindrance to 
ratification of the treaty’s protocol by NWS, because the coverage of the treaty is thereby greatly ex-
tended. According to reservations voiced by the US, the treaty’s area of application includes sea areas 
over which states do not have sovereignty, according to the Law of the Sea.18 Despite a clear statement 
in the article on the treaty’s application, that nothing in the treaty shall prejudice any state’s rights 
under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, NWS are concerned over possible restrictions on the right 
of free passage for nuclear-armed and –powered vessels.19 A further cause for concern is the Bangkok 
                                                           
 
17  These prohibitions also appear in the Antarctic Treaty (1959; eif 1961), which designates the region for peaceful uses only 
and was the first region in the world to be declared denuclearized: “any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal 
there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited”.  
18  Amitav Acharya and J.D. Kenneth Boudin, “The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 
29 (1998), pp. 225–226. 
19  Surya P. Subedi, “Problems and Prospects for the Treaty on the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Southeast Asia”, 
The International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 1999) (available at http://www.gmu.edu/programs 
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Treaty’s Protocol for NWS, which is more sweeping than NWS protocols in any of the other zones, 
because of the expanded undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against state par-
ties to the zone or anywhere in the zone.20 This implies the extension of the guarantee towards states 
not parties to the zone (though this point has become irrelevant as all states in the zone area are now 
parties) as well as warships of third parties (NWS included) passing through the zone due to its mari-
time coverage.  
Although no NWS has so far signed the protocols of the Bangkok treaty, US concerns over the protocol 
provisions seem to have receded over the last years. On 1 June 2014, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Security and Non-proliferation Thomas Countryman urged all P5 states to sign the 
protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 
Singapore. 
The Treaty of Pelindaba 
The Treaty of Pelindaba, which covers the African continent, introduced a novel article which deals 
with existing nuclear weapons programs within the region, on top of the provisions which by then had 
become the standards of NWFZ treaties. Article 6, entitled “Declaration, dismantling, destruction or 
conversion of nuclear explosive devices and the facilities for their manufacture”, offers state signatories 
the opportunity to reverse their nuclear weapon programs. According to this article, parties undertake 
firstly to declare their capability to manufacture nuclear explosive devices, and secondly to dismantle 
any such devices they had manufactured before the treaty’s entry into force and to destroy facilities for 
the manufacturing of such devices or convert them to peaceful uses. The dismantling, destruction and 
conversion must be verified by the IAEA and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, established 
under the treaty.  
An additional unique feature of the Pelindaba Treaty is its prohibition of armed attack against nuclear 
installations, which combines the concern for environmental contamination and protection of nuclear 
energy uses, which are strongly promoted in the treaty. Lastly, the Pelindaba Treaty introduced a pro-
hibition on conducting research on nuclear explosive devices, and this prohibition was also included in 
the Semipalatinsk Treaty, the following NWFZ to be negotiated, for Central Asia. This goes clearly 
beyond the NPT whose prohibition applies to the activity of “manufacturing” nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices. 
The Treaty of Semipalatinsk 
The Treaty of Semipalatinsk established the first zone located completely in the northern hemisphere, 
and the latest to date, to be denuclearized. In this treaty, the control system that verifies compliance is 
significantly strengthened by its parties’ undertaking to conclude not only a Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement with the IAEA, but also the Additional Protocol. Providing nuclear material to NNWS is 
likewise contingent on their having concluded both agreements with the IAEA.  
The Semipalatinsk Treaty is the only NWFZ treaty in which the issue of transit by land is explicitly 
included in the clarification according to which parties are free to decide whether to allow transit 
rights. In the other treaties in which transit is explicitly mentioned (all but Tlatelolco), parties remain 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
/icar/ijps/vol4_1/subedi.htm). Subedi further emphasizes that the word “transport” is not included in the activities of extra-
regional states which parties to the treaty undertake not to allow; so parties are not required to prohibit transport of nuclear 
weapons by other states, as long as it is permissible under the Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is on top of the clear 
statement that parties can decide for themselves on transit port calls, which leads Subedi to conclude that the Treaty of 
Bangkok does not hinder NWS’s freedom of navigation. 
20  Amitav Acharya and J.D. Kenneth Boudin, “The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 
29 (1998), pp. 225–226. 
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free to decide on visits of foreign ships and aircraft to their ports and airfields, on transit through their 
airspace by foreign aircraft and navigation of their territorial seas by foreign ships. However, the trea-
ties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba include, in their definition of “stationing”, also transport on land, and 
since they prohibit stationing, such transport is therefore prohibited as well.21 
The article on “other agreements” within the Treaty of Semipalatinsk was considered controversial for 
NWS. This article firstly confirms that parties’ rights and obligations under treaties concluded before 
the NWFZ shall not be affected, and secondly clarifies that parties shall take all necessary measures for 
effective implementation of the treaty’s objectives. The point of contention is the Tashkent Collective 
Security Treaty, which links two regional states with Russia, and according to which parties undertake 
to render all necessary assistance to one another in case of aggression. While the first part of the article 
was inserted to reassure Russia that its security and regional interests were observed, the second was 
introduced to reassure the western NWS that Russia should not retain special nuclear privileges in the 
zone area. This somewhat contradictory structure led to persistent contentions.22 However, in spring 
2014 after extended negotiations all five NWS signed the protocol and undertook to expedite the pro-
cess of ratification. Meanwhile, France, the UK and China have ratified, while the US Administration 
submitted the protocol to the US Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. 
Unilateral / Domestic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status  
The UN’s Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects 
states that “obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be assumed not 
only by groups of states, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by smaller 
groups of states and even individual countries“.23 Several states have unilaterally and domestically es-
tablished themselves as nuclear-weapon-free territories, including the Philippines, New Zealand, Aus-
tria, and Mongolia.24  
The Philippines’ constitution from 1987 includes a clause establishing itself as nuclear-free: “The Phil-
ippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear 
weapons in its territory” (article II, section 8). This clause was introduced already several years prior to 
the opening for signature in 1995 of the Southeast Asian NWFZ under the Treaty of Bangkok, to which 
the Philippines is party. The Philippines was involved in the original declaration of ASEAN in 1971 to 
establish, when conditions permit, a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia, from 
which the Bangkok NWFZ Treaty evolved.25  
                                                           
 
21  The Bangkok Treaty includes the prohibition of transport under its clause on stationing, but transport is not further defined, 
nor does the definition of stationing include this term explicitly. No reference to land is included, either.  
22  According to Jozef Goldblat, the Tashkent and Semipalatinsk treaties cannot be considered incompatible, since the use of 
nuclear weapons in defence of a treaty member will not be rendered impossible by Semipalatinsk’s restriction on deployment. 
He further suggests that the controversy over “other agreements” be settled by a statement in the form of a binding 
international treaty in which regional states would pledge to settle any disputes in this context according to article 30 of the 
Vienna convention of the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions 
are compatible with those of the later treaty. Jozef Goldblat, “Denuclearization of Central Asia”, Disarmament Forum, Vol. 4 
(2007), pp. 30–31. See also Marco Roscini’s interpretation of this article: “only those provisions of previous treaties that do 
not prejudice the effective implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Semipalatinsk Treaty are preserved”. Marco 
Roscini, “Something Old, Something New: The 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia”, 
China Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2008), p. 599. 
23  Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects – Special Report of the Conference 
of the Committee of Disarmament, 8 October 1975 (A/10027/Add.1), p. 41. 
24  See Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: 
 http://www.pnnd.org/issues/Nuclearweaponfreezoens.htm; also the Federation of American Scientists: 
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/ArmsControl_NEW/nonproliferation/NFZ/NP-NFZ-SS.html.  
25  Amitav Acharya and J.D. Kenneth Boudin, “The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 
29 (1998), p. 220. 
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In New Zealand, subsequent to the creation of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, the New Zealand 
Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act from 1987 was installed. The Act prohibits 
acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, their stationing or testing, and also their transit – foreign war-
ships may only enter into the internal waters of New Zealand if they do not carry nuclear explosive devic-
es, and foreign military aircraft may not land if carrying nuclear explosive devices. Furthermore, entry of 
nuclear-powered ships into New Zealand’s internal waters is also prohibited (see further on New Zea-
land’s prohibition of transit in section 4.1.2).26  
In Austria, a Federal Constitutional Act concerning a Nuclear-Free Austria was passed in 1999. The 
Austrian constitutional law from 1955, when the state obtained its status of neutrality, already included 
a prohibition of nuclear weapons on its territory. Popular opposition to nuclear energy as well was 
growing since the 1970’s, and in 1999 the Constitutional Law was passed, forbidding both nuclear 
weapons and nuclear energy.27 Accordingly, it is prohibited in Austria, inter alia, to produce, store, 
transport or test nuclear weapons, and facilities or installations for their deployment may not be estab-
lished.  
In 1992, the president of Mongolia, speaking before the UN General Assembly, declared Mongolia a 
NWFZ and stated that his country will work towards having this status internationally guaranteed. 
Mongolia’s unique geopolitical location, between NWS China and Russia, as well as the novelty of 
seeking international recognition for a single-state free territory, has burdened this endeavour.  
In the years following its 1992 declaration, Mongolia pursued its goal of becoming internationally 
recognized and enjoying the same security guarantees as NWFZ, and also consulted with NWS in the 
framework of those efforts. Over time, its definition as a “zone” changed to “status”, and in 1998 a 
UNGA Resolution indeed welcomed Mongolia’s declaration on its nuclear-weapon-free status.  
In February 2000, Mongolia presented to the UN its law on the country’s nuclear-weapon-free status 
adopted that month. The law prohibits developing, manufacturing, acquiring or having control over 
nuclear weapons, stationing or transporting such weapons by any means, their testing or use. It further 
specifies national and international verification measures, including the international institutionaliza-
tion of the nuclear-weapon-free status.28  
Mongolia is thus far the only state to have sought international recognition of its nuclear-weapon-free 
status.29 In September 2012, the five NWS and Mongolia signed parallel political declarations that for-
mally recognized the latter’s nuclear-weapon-free status. The NWS pledged to respect this status, and 
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Mongolia. These declarations of recognition may 
or may not be legally binding, yet they formalize Mongolia’s status.30  
The Mongolian case is of some significance for the project analysed in this study. It shows the possibility 
for a single state to pursue non-nuclear status not only as a national policy, but in interaction with the 
                                                           
 
26  See full Act at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1987/0086/latest/whole.html#DLM115139.  
27  Klaus Renoldner, “From Referendum to Constitutional Prohibition of Nuclear Energy: the Austrian Experience”, in 
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility (Switzerland), 
Rethinking Nuclear Energy and Democracy After September 11, 2001 (2004), p. 69 (available at 
http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/rethinking-nuclear-energy.pdf). 
28  UN document A/55/56 S/2000/160, 29 February 2000 (available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a5556.pdf).  
29  On Mongolia’s difficult endeavour for international recognition and struggle for recognition of Single-State Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones, see Nyamosor Tuya, “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status: Recognition vs. Institutionalization”, 
Brookings Institution’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Working Paper (August 2012) (available at 
http://www.brookings.edu 
/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/8/nuclear%20weapon%20free%20monolia%20tuya/08%20nuclear&20weapon%20free
%20 mongolia%20tuya.pdf). 
30  Daryl G. Kimball, “Mongolia Recognized as Nuclear-Free Zone”, Arms Control Today, October 2012 (available at 
http://www.armscontrol .org/act/2012_10/Mongolia-Recognized-as-Nuclear-Free-Zone). 
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international community, thereby receiving international recognition of this policy and the ensuing sta-
tus. There is no principled hindrance for two or more states to conduct this type of policy jointly as a 
shared project. 
Measures to foster and institutionalize cooperation between existing zones  
Throughout the past decades, attempts are made to establish formally (or at least regularly) relations 
between the existing zones, so as to enhance their impact on disarmament and non-proliferation efforts 
worldwide, and to magnify their impact through their successes. These attempts include annual UN reso-
lutions on a nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere, and the holding of international conferences of 
the established NWFZs.  
Since 1996, annual resolutions in the UNGA call upon states parties to the existing regional NWFZs to 
explore the possibility of creating a consolidated zone – a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere 
and Adjacent Areas (NWFSH).31 The first resolution from 1996 called the states parties and signatories of 
the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba Treaties “to promote the common goals envisaged in 
those treaties, to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolida-
tion of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas”.32 It is not pro-
posed that such a consolidation should include the negotiation of a new treaty mechanism for the South-
ern Hemisphere, rather that the zones would undertake increasing cooperation between themselves, for 
instance in the form of holding a conference of states parties, in order to consider common action to 
further nuclear disarmament goals. 
The latest resolution on the Southern Hemisphere, from 2014, calls upon all states concerned to facilitate 
adherence to the zones’ protocols by the relevant states, and upon members of existing zones to explore 
and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves and their treaty agencies. The 
resolution further “encourages efforts to reinforce the coordination among nuclear-weapon-free zones 
with a view to the convening by Indonesia of the third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to 
Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia”. 33 
The first Conference of the established NWFZs was held in April 2005 in Mexico, and brought together 
the parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba as well as Mongolia. The 
Conference Declaration states that the meeting was held in order to explore cooperation in contribution 
to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world, and encourages respect for the zones (e.g. calling upon NWS 
to ratify the zones’ protocols). The Declaration reaffirms the commitment of parties to the zones to work 
to reach common objectives and advance the goals of the NWFZs through such mechanisms as joint 
meetings of the states parties, signatories and observers, and cooperation agreements.34 
The second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zones and Mongolia was held in 2010 in New York. The conference adopted the Outcome Document 
which reiterated the final declaration of the 2005 Conference and welcomed the entry into force of the 
African and Central Asian NWFZ as well as the efforts of Mongolia to institutionalize its nuclear-
weapon-free status. The parties declared their intent “to foster cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-
free zones to fully implement the principles and objectives of the treaties and to exchange relevant ideas 
                                                           
 
31  It is interesting to note that well before the actual establishment of the zones, which together now cover almost completely 
the planet’s Southern Hemisphere, the Australian and New Zealand Labour Parties proposed in 1962 the establishment of a 
regional Southern Hemisphere Nuclear-Free Zone (SHNFZ). Mentioned in Michael Hamel-Green, “The Rarotonga South 
Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty”, in Ranginui Walker and William Sutherland (ed.), The Pacific: Peace, Security and the 
Nuclear Issue (The United Nations University: 1988), p. 93. 
32  Resolution A/RES/51/45 (B) of 10 December 1996, “The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas”. 
33  Resolution A/RES/69/35 of 2 December 2014, “The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas”. 
34  The Declaration can be found here: http://www.acronym.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/0504/nwfz.pdf.  
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and best practices in areas of mutual interest. To maintain continuity in the enhanced interaction among 
the nuclear-weapon-free zones generated at this Conference, we will explore, through diplomatic chan-
nels, the appropriate modalities for maintaining contact and disseminating relevant information among 
the nuclear-weapon-free zones during the inter-sessional period”.35 
In preparation for the third conference, scheduled for 2015, three preparatory meetings have already been 
held. In the conference, parties to existing NWFZs and Mongolia will further explore initiatives aimed at 
improving the cooperation and coordination between them, for the purpose of reaching a nuclear-
weapon-free-world. The conference will take place in Mid-April 2015. 
2.4 The project of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe – previous approaches 
Approaches before the end of the Cold War  
The idea of establishing a NWFZ in Europe goes back to the mid-1950s when only the United States, the 
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were in possession of nuclear weapons. The first plan was raised 
by the Soviet Union in 1956, when Moscow proposed to the United States to completely ban the station-
ing of nuclear weapons in Europe. The next initiative was a sub-regional approach, the so-called Rapacki 
Plan (1957),36 which envisaged a Central European NWFZ, covering the area of Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, prohibiting both the stockpiling 
and the production of nuclear weapons.  
The Rapacki Plan was followed by a number of other sub-regional proposals. The 1957 Balkan Initiative 
wanted to close all foreign military bases in the territories of Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, 
Greece and Turkey which would have guaranteed a NWFZ in the region.37 The 1963 Mediterranean Initi-
ative, proposed by the Soviet Union, suggested the elimination of nuclear weapons and missiles in the 
Mediterranean region, including several North African (Algeria and Tunisia) as well as Middle Eastern 
(Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan) countries.38 The Nordic Initiative was also proposed in 1963 by Fin-
land. This plan aimed to create a NWFZ on the territories of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden, banning the production, deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons.39 In 1964 Poland pro-
posed again a Central European plan, which gave up on the idea of a nuclear weapon free sub-region and 
proposed only a freeze on nuclear weapons.40  
Five years later, in 1969 the Soviet Union revised its Balkan Initiative and extended it into a Balkan and 
Adriatic proposal, including the Adriatic Sea, as well. The most important objectives of the region were 
non-deployment of nuclear weapons, a ban on transfer and the negative security guarantees of the 
NWS.41 
In 1982 the Palme Commission, named after its chairman, former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, 
proposed a new approach and suggested a battlefield-NWFZ in Central Europe, with the potential to 
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extend the zone to a corridor from the Baltic to the Balkans.42 The key obligations were a complete ban on 
atomic demolition mines, nuclear artillery and missiles with a range up to 1000 km. Besides, the proposal 
also contained obligations to eliminate storage sites for nuclear munitions and cease all manoeuvres 
which simulated nuclear operations. 
We can discover three motivations for these diverse proposals: From the Soviet side, the priority was to 
undercut NATO’s nuclear strategy and related deployment patterns, thereby undermining the core of 
NATO’s defence posture and what the allies at the time regarded as the “glue” of the Western alliance. 
Smaller Warsaw Treaty member states’ communist governments may have shared this motive, but pro-
moted zone proposals with a second objective, namely to minimize Soviet nuclear and other military 
presence on their territory.43 Neutral countries wanted to be secured as much as possible against nuclear 
war in Europe, and aimed at confidence-building between East and West in order to diminish risky ten-
sions.  
During the Cold War most of the initiatives failed because of the lack of support from at least one of the 
NWS (both in and outside Europe). As long as the Iron Curtain divided Europe, deciding over nuclear 
issues and establishing a NWFZ in the continent by all means required the consent of the two superpow-
ers. In addition, since most proposals would have required a change in NATO nuclear policy and overall 
defence strategy, most allies, non-nuclear weapon states included, were not prepared to accept such a 
profound turn in national and common defence. 
Approaches after the end of the Cold War 
After the Cold War, two major changes occurred. First, Belarus and Ukraine took over the leading role in 
advocating for a European NWFZ, shifting the focus to Central and Eastern Europe. Belarus came up 
with three slightly different proposals (1990, 1995, and 1996) to establish a Central-Eastern European 
NWFZ.44 The first proposal was called a Nuclear Weapon Free Belt in Europe, stretching from the Baltic 
to the Black Sea (Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania 
and Bulgaria). The belt was supposed to rest on the unilateral declarations of the states that they are not 
willing to host nuclear weapons on their territory. The plan originally included a ban on nuclear power 
plants, as well, and a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing.45 
The second Belarus initiative, introduced at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was a “clas-
sical” NWFZ initiative for Central and Eastern European states (Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Es-
tonia, the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Austria, the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria). The main obligations of the pro-
posed zone were: non-possession, non-development, a ban on testing and a ban on stationing nuclear 
weapons in the territory of the states of the zone. 
The third Belarus initiative in 1996 was a Central and Eastern European Nuclear-Weapon-Free Space. It 
expanded the idea of the previous zonal approach and set up three different membership categories with 
different obligations. The core states mostly remained the same with unchanged obligations. In addition 
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to this, a second group of states (Sweden, Finland, Austria, States of the former Yugoslavia and Albania) 
were to take political obligations and help maintain and promote the nuclear weapon free space. A third 
group of states (Norway, Denmark and Germany – all NATO member states in 1996) were supposed to 
contribute through the specificity of their legislation and the international agreements on nuclear weap-
ons. 
These initiatives are evidence of continuity in Belarusian thinking on nuclear weapons deployment and 
indicate a firm non-nuclear stance regardless of Moscow’s policy preferences. Belarus and Ukraine were 
striving for a full-fledged NPT membership since the 1960s and their unified efforts after 1990 reflect the 
same desire to demonstrate a degree of independence from Russia and to impede an enlargement of 
NATO or, if it happened, prevent the deployment of NATO sub-strategic nuclear weapons east of the 
Western part of Germany. Until today, the nuclear-weapon-free status of the new NATO members is 
based only on a declaration by the Alliance, not on any legal undertaking.46 This is different from the 
situation in the former German Democratic Republic, for which the Two Plus Four Treaty of 1990 (set-
tling re-unification and the end of constraints on German sovereignty by occupation rights of the victori-
ous powers of World War II) prohibited the stationing of nuclear weapons; parties to this treaty were the 
(then) two German states, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
Besides the shift in the focus area, the second major change after the Cold War was the attitude of the 
Central and Eastern European states. As most of them were aiming Western European political and mili-
tary integration, many became hesitant to join nuclear weapon free initiatives and refused to embrace the 
idea of a sub-regional NWFZ in Europe – therefore it became even harder to realize the proposal. 
In summary, proposals for a NWFZ in Europe so far were related to strategies of the Cold War or nation-
al interests of the proposing states after the end of the Cold War. Neither was integrated into a long-term 
strategy for nuclear disarmament and/or the delegitimation of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, as long as 
NATO’s policy continues not to deploy nuclear weapons in member states that had acceded after the end 
of the Cold War and all European states stick to their NPT undertakings, the Belarus notion of a nuclear 
weapon free “belt” between the former West Germany and Russia would be a de facto, but not de jure 
reality. 
3. OBJECTIVES OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN EUROPE TODAY 
Why revive the idea right now? What is the purpose of a serious effort to adapt a concept that was invent-
ed for mitigating the risks of a nuclear conflagration in the midst of the “Old Continent”, risks that 
emerged from a political and military constellation that is no more, after previous efforts to rejuvenate it 
under the new circumstances met no resonance? What goals could such an effort aspire to achieve? The 
answers to these questions must start from the present, highly ambiguous state of the global nuclear de-
bate and seen in the light of the renewed tensions in Europe vividly documented by the Ukrainian crisis. 
President Barack Obama’s pledge to work for a nuclear weapons free world has changed the playing field 
a bit, but not decisively. For the first time, the leader of a nuclear weapon state (and the most powerful 
one at that) has committed in a quite unambiguous way to the political goal of eliminating nuclear weap-
ons from the face of the earth. However, the initiative has found a mixed reception among the nuclear 
armed peers, to say the least. While some (welcome) positive steps have been taken, namely the New 
START Treaty of 2010, the speed of nuclear disarmament remains very low, the resistance in the nuclear 
establishments and their political allies is tangible, and public resonance, except the traditional pro-
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disarmament groups and the respectable, but still relatively small groups of new allies from the main-
stream security community in several NATO states, remains limited. The situation of the nineties, when 
the demise of the immediate nuclear threat led to diminished public interest in the matter, does still ob-
tain. Without such public commitment, nuclear disarmament lacks the necessary political momentum. 
In Europe, NATO has decided to stick to a low-number nuclear posture with a declared high threshold of 
possible use, but still a first use option. The debate was controversial: some NNWS (including some with 
nuclear weapons on their territory) pleaded for a different doctrine and removal of the weapons, but 
others, notably some members from the eastern part of NATO and the NWS, opted for continuing 
NATO as a “nuclear alliance” in the same form as before. This position is firmer than ever given the re-
enforced concerns of these states about a Russian threat. Russia remains interested in keeping its nuclear 
weapon status (and a four-digit number of non-strategic nuclear weapons) as well, for both security and 
status reasons.47 While the latest version of the Russian military doctrine, issued December 2014 amidst 
the Ukraine crisis, has not changed the spectrum of contingencies for which Russia would consider the 
use of nuclear weapons (response to nuclear or other WMD attack on Russia or its allies, and to a conven-
tional attack that presents an existential threat), as some observers had feared, nuclear weapons remain an 
essential part of Russia’s defence posture and a key tool to counter American superiority at the conven-
tional level. The latter aspect is important, as the document emphasizes US ballistic defence and conven-
tional global strike assets.48 Out of Europe, Chinese, Pakistani, Indian and presumably North Korean 
nuclear weapons holdings continue to grow, though they remain still relatively insignificant compared to 
what the US and Russia possess, even counting the effects of New START. Israel holds fast to its small 
nuclear arsenal, but might not work hard to expand it. Overall, this makes for a highly mixed balance for 
nuclear disarmament, and the whole process might as well grind to a halt. At least, the present situation 
does not augur well for determined nuclear disarmament. 
The plan of action adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference as part of its final document “encour-
ages” in Action 9 the establishment of new NWFZs as part of the general effort expressed in the plan of 
action to revive the disarmament process. The appeal of Action 9 is directed towards the NPT parties as a 
whole and opens a road to activity for NNWS to participate actively in the disarmament process within 
their own region. 
In this perspective, a revived debate on a NWFZ in Europe aims at the political and the symbolic level. 
The objectives can be divided into two categories, hard-core security objectives and objectives of a politi-
cal-symbolic nature. As it will turn out, the second category is by far the more relevant for the project 
under scrutiny: Its immediate impact on regional security is less salient than its effect on the political and 
ethical discourse.  
3.1 Security objectives in the narrow sense 
Confidence-building in the regional neighbourhood 
Most established NWFZs had as a priority target the improvement of regional security by enhanced con-
fidence among neighbours. In Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia, the possibility that one or more 
regional powers might consider acquiring nuclear weapons for security or status reasons was higher than 
zero when negotiations on establishing a zone came under way. A NWFZ initiative in Europe nowadays 
would have a different emphasis. All states in the region are loyal parties to the NPT, and for many of 
them, membership goes beyond compliance and involves active promotion of the spirit and letter of that 
                                                           
 
47  Harald Müller, “Flexible Responses: NATO Reactions to the US Nuclear Posture Review”, The Nonproliferation Review, 
Vol. 18, No. 1 (2011), pp. 103-124.  
48  Dmitri Trenin: Russia’s New Military Doctrine Tells It All, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=57607, hit April 15, 2015. 
21 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 27 
treaty. While in a distant past about half a dozen among Europe’s NNWS once considered procuring 
nuclear weapons49, today not a single one is suspected of having such intentions, and it would require a 
complete political upheaval to reverse this situation. In that sense, regional confidence building as an 
objective of a NWFZ does not concern hard core security, but would rather signal a convergence of basic 
ethical values in the thinking on security. It would be part of a process to tie the members of the emerging 
European security community50 ever closer together, but would not represent a process in which former 
rivals and enemies overcome the security dilemma to establish cooperation – the European non-nuclear 
weapon state have left this phase of their history, happily, behind them. The zone therefore would just 
confirm and demonstrate to the outside what is already established: The strong confidence in the regional 
neighbourhood. This assessment applies as long as the membership of the zone will remain restricted to 
non-NATO states. If the development of the zone reaches a stage when all NATO NNWS have become 
parties, and, by consequence, nuclear weapons will be removed from their territory, this will serve as a 
confidence-building measure vis à vis Russia where these weapons are still seen as somehow threatening. 
Reciprocal measures by Russia which would serve to de-emphasize nuclear weapons in Moscow’s security 
doctrine would enhance the feeling of security of her Western neighbours, thereby helping to re-establish 
confidence. One such step could be the commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons outside of Russian 
territory, turning a factual situation into a legal obligation. In this process of mutual confidence-building 
steps, the zone might even function as a vehicle for transforming the West-East relations in the European 
region as a part of a re-juvenated arms control and disarmament process that will probably have to start 
sooner or later, as it did start at the US-Soviet and the NATO-WTO levels one year after the Soviet inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
Irreversibility and Stability  
Legal obligations, bolstered by verification, are hard to revoke. Breaching them or withdrawing from 
them is a weighty act that influences negatively the relationships of a state with its complete neighbour-
hood. As far as there is irreversibility in international politics, the zone would contribute significantly to 
it. By enhancing the barriers to re-introducing nuclear weapons into the region, the trust of regional states 
in that the nuclear threat in the region has gone from “very remote” to “nil” will be enhanced. Therefore, 
the zone would also make a valuable contribution to the stability of security in the region. 
Immunizing the region against the consequences of a nuclear confrontation 
Both the crisis in Ukraine and the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons of the 
recent years were a dramatic reminder for European states that nuclear risks haven’t vanished after the 
Cold War. A NWFZ in Europe might mitigate the risk to be affected by a nuclear confrontation. As a 
matter of fact, one objective of any NWFZ has always been to protect the region concerned against be-
coming a nuclear battleground: By not offering targets of high priority in a nuclear war, the region con-
cerned eliminates incentives to target any intraregional sites as a matter of strategic urgency. In order to 
obtain a legal guarantee of its strategic irrelevance in a nuclear conflict, NWS are invited – indeed urged – 
to sign and ratify protocols which oblige them (a) not to obviate the spirit and letter of the zonal treaty 
and (b) not to threaten with, or actually employ nuclear weapons against, the countries of the region 
under any circumstances. This objective is no doubt of higher priority in Europe today than the first one 
(confidence-building among NNWS). The probability of a nuclear conflict has been since 1990, to use 
NATO’s language, “extremely remote”, but not zero. The Ukraine crisis has not enhanced this risk to the 
                                                           
 
49  Harald Müller/Andreas Schmidt 2010: The Little-Known Story of Deproliferation: Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapons 
Activities, in: Potter, William C./ Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar (Eds.), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century. Vol. 
I: The Role of Theory, Stanford University Press, pp. 124–158. 
50  Michael Barnett and Emanuel Adler, “Studying security communities in theory, comparison, and history”, in Emanuel Adler 
and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 413–44. 
22 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 27 
level of the fifties, sixties or early eighties, but has documented that the danger has not shrunk to zero. 
NATO and Russia still reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against each other in extremis, even 
though they have vowed not to target each other (a commitment that has become a bit unclear on the 
Russian side because of a variety of statements about the consequences of deploying ballistic missile de-
fence assets in NATO’s NNWS).51 For non-NATO NNWS, the assurances connected to NWFZ member-
ship may add to the feeling of security emerging from alliance non-membership, but it would not protect 
them from the consequences of radioactive fall-out in their neighbourhood in the case of an all-European 
war with a nuclear component. Furthermore, the negative security assurances by the NWS for the zone 
members to which they commit themselves by signing the protocols reduce the military significance of 
nuclear weapons, they weaken their symbolic status, and they limit the options of giving them a role in 
military scenarios. 
It is impossible to write on security assurances today without addressing the impact of the failure of the 
Budapest Memorandum of 1994 to protect the security of Ukraine as it was intended to do in the process 
of Ukraine renouncing nuclear weapons. The Budapest Memorandum is an unusual security assurance in 
two respects. First, it is meant to ensure the security of a state in exchange not for a pledge not to acquire 
nuclear weapons as in the NPT and other NWFZ, but for the practical act of getting rid of nuclear weap-
ons that were already in its possession. Second, the Budapest Memorandum was not just an assurance 
against nuclear threat or attack, but also a guarantee of territorial integrity and economic security. That 
despite this assurance, part of the territory of Ukraine was annexed by a nuclear weapon state and another 
part ravaged by non-state armed actors supported by a nuclear weapon state, and that this nuclear weap-
on state used nuclear policy verbally and in exercises to bolster its own position during the crisis opens 
critical questions concerning other security assurances given to non-nuclear weapon states.52 This experi-
ence would probably necessitate deep and innovative thinking in the context of assurances for a European 
NWFZ. It is probably too early to give this operational thought as the fog about the further development 
of the Ukraine crisis would have to be lifted to address this issue, and we are not yet there. But it is inevi-
table to mark the issue and to keep in mind that one might feel the need to go beyond the scope of the 
standard assurance type that will be discussed in this study in chapter 5.5.1. 
3.2 Political-symbolic objectives 
This takes us to the second group of objectives which are all more of a symbolic-political nature. Howev-
er, this makes them by no means less relevant than those seemingly closer to “hard security”. The risks of 
a nuclear war in Europe can still be rated as low at the moment and in the foreseeable future, extraordi-
nary circumstances excluded. The impact on global nuclear policy thus gains in importance relative to 
“hard core” security issues. The reason is that the security of European countries, NATO members or not, 
is likely to be affected by global events as much as by the development on the European scene itself which 
despite disturbing tensions still offers much more experiences with reasonable crisis management and 
institutional tools than any other region of the world.  
Strengthening the non-proliferation regime 
NWFZs are an instrument sui generis to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. They complement the 
global regime of the NPT and are recognized in this capacity in Article VII of the NPT. There is the op-
tion that parties to a NWFZ may agree to accept obligations beyond those in the NPT, and the existence 
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of zones around the world provides a safety net in case the NPT may collapse: In that case, the NWFZs 
with all their obligations, notably verification of the parties’ undertakings, will still be in place. Even in a 
region little prone to proliferation like Europe, this is a reassurance against the regression into past times. 
It secures the build-up of the European security community against the worst reversal scenario and can 
thus be seen as an instrument of irreversibility. 
But there could be a value added beyond the reassurance goal. Europe has been the most nuclearized 
region in all history. The presence of non-strategic nuclear forces in NATO NNWS remains a bone of 
contention in the NPT community, even though in purely legal terms, it might be said that deploying 
those weapons on the territory of NNWS is no breach of the Treaty as long as they remain in the control 
of a nuclear weapon state (as is the case), and that a breach would only occur once the transfer into the 
physical control of a NNWS would be effected (however, one could also make the argument that the 
intention to do so under certain circumstances, as NATO plans provide for, would constitute a potential 
breach of the NPT).  
Be that as it may, NATO’s arrangements have been a bone of contention in the NPT community, and the 
more so the longer the memory of the Cold War faded into the past.53 For states in more troubled regions 
of the world than Europe and which are not initiated in the intra-NATO culture it is hard to understand 
why the most powerful military association in history has to insist on the option of first use, needs nuclear 
weapons deployed in NNWS, and intends to hand them over to those states’ air forces in the unlikely case 
that they would be used. The project of a NWFZ holds the promise of terminating this ambivalent state of 
affairs in the long run, and of closing the hypothetical prospect of the transfer of nuclear weapons into the 
hands of NNWS. The gap between NATO’s NNWS and the non-aligned world would thus narrow, a 
healthy development for the NPT as one of the frontlines of acerbic dissonance would disappear – at least 
in a long-term perspective if we assume that NATO countries would accede to the zone, one by one over 
time, but most likely not immediately. 
The strength of the non-proliferation regime, as for all cooperative international regimes, hinges on the 
unity among the membership. The stronger the sense of a common purpose, the stronger the regime as 
such; one of the main reasons for this correlation between consensus and strength is the likelihood to 
mobilize the membership successfully against serious breaches of undertakings (like the one we have been 
facing for long in the Iranian case). A divided membership will not face up to rule-breakers. A united 
membership with a high level of satisfaction about regime efficiency will. It is here that the establishment 
(and incremental growth) of a NWFZ in Europe might have an impact.  
Fostering nuclear disarmament 
Sub-strategic nuclear weapons are today one of the most nagging issues for nuclear disarmament. It is 
obvious that they must be included in the disarmament process. Even with strict safety and use control 
arrangements in place, they are more prone than those in the strategic arsenals to be intentionally em-
ployed in conflict, but also stolen, used without authorization, and that implies becoming instruments of 
terrorism. And generally, the idea of nuclear disarmament means that no weapon type must be excluded 
from the process. 
A NWFZ in Europe would intend to, eventually, cover an area in which NATO’s sub-strategic nuclear 
weapons are presently sited and to stimulate adequate reciprocal concessions by Russia concerning her 
capabilities in the same weapons category that would raise the level of security in Eastern Europe, whatev-
er the specific shape of these measures might be. To be clear, establishing the zone would be a drawn-out 
process of incremental accession. The effect of enhanced security would be reached over time. But its 
                                                           
 
53  Harald Müller, “A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test: Obama’s Nuclear Policy and the 2010 NPT Review Conference”, The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2011), pp. 219–236. 
24 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 27 
double contribution to disarmament and security would be obvious from the first moment on when the 
zone would be introduced into the political debate, and would be one of the main aspects shaping this 
debate (besides opening questions about French and British nuclear weapons). First, the debate about the 
elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons, which was first initiated by the 2000 NPT Review Confer-
ence and picked up again (though unfortunately in a more convoluted form) by the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference would gain momentum. 
Second, the effect of enhanced security would be reached over time. The double impact of freeing a region 
from nuclear weapons and enhancing security among two actors – NATO and Russia – between which 
the nuclear issue played ( despite relatively favourable political circumstances ) still a disproportionate 
role would make a significant contribution to the overall disarmament process. By incrementally defusing 
the residues of the nuclear confrontation in Europe, it will contribute to the framework conditions which 
facilitate nuclear disarmament. Some NWS point to the conditionality of going to zero which, they claim, 
can only be possible under favourable circumstances. The de-nuclearisation of regions counts among 
these conditions. 
Helping delegitimize nuclear weapons 
The issue of the legitimacy of nuclear weapons has been debated ever since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It 
reached a culminating point with the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion of 1996. It is, of 
course, intimately linked to the basic principles of international humanitarian law and, in this context, to 
the humanitarian consequences a use of nuclear weapons, not to speak about a major nuclear war, would 
engender. This latter aspect was written into the first preambular paragraph of the NPT, making the effort 
to avoid the humanitarian disaster of nuclear use the first objective ascribed to this treaty. 
The issue has never been dormant, but it has lived through waves of more and less emphasis. It experi-
enced a strong revival at the 2010 Review Conference and since has been the subject of a major campaign 
in the NPT membership, driven by a coalition of like-minded states and non-governmental organiza-
tions. Through three international conferences, the last one held in Vienna in December 2014, it has 
attracted more and more supporters and developed considerable momentum. 
The humanitarian argument is a strong tool in an attempt to delegitimise nuclear weapons. Again, this 
desire and related actions are not new. The much heralded “nuclear taboo”, and unwritten but factually 
efficient norm never to use nuclear weapons, gives a name to a norm which is unwritten and without legal 
force, but appears to guide very much the practice of the nuclear weapon states. 
The present humanitarian campaign pursues this line but goes beyond. Not only the use of nuclear weap-
ons is to be deprived of legitimacy, but the mere existence of these weapons which, in the view of the 
campaigners, implies the conditional intention to be ready to use and thus, consequently, should be stig-
matized (tabooed) as well. While some involved in the campaign see this as a long-term process accom-
panying incremental disarmament steps with a view to prepare the normative ground for a nuclear weap-
ons free world, others view it as the jumping board into negotiations on a convention banning nuclear 
weapons in analogy to the BTCW and the CWC. It is clear to these protagonists that a nuclear weapons 
convention (other than the BTWC or the CWC) has no chance to attract the possessors of the weapons to 
be banned any time soon. The nuclear weapons convention thus is a symbolic step in which those who 
would negotiate it and accede to it use their sovereign right to give legal status to their normative position 
that nuclear weapons are incompatible with international humanitarian law and the moral values inform-
ing it and thus, whether they are of military use or not, must be banned. The Convention would open for 
them a chance to express their stance clearly in legal terms in a way the NPT does not. Many countries 
acting in that way would mount strong pressures on reluctant parties to follow suit. 
From this vantage point, the project of a European NWFZ might look like a distraction for a minor objec-
tive. Rather than aiming at a global norm, the zone is constrained to regional scope. Investing political 
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and social capital in that project, thus, could be seen as less worthwhile than investing the same effort into 
the global objective. However, three objections can be offered to see the regional project as at least com-
plementary, if not more sensible, than the global one. 
First, the nuclear weapons convention requires complex negotiations among many parties. This makes it 
a difficult and probably controversial endeavour even if the nuclear weapon states and their allies abstain 
completely from participating. The success, notably in the short run, is thus all but ensured. This leads to 
the second objection, which concerns the ambition of a nuclear weapon convention which is doubtlessly 
universal in character. In order to satisfy this ambition, some critical mass of participation is needed. 
Short of this, it might be looked at as a failure. The complexity of the negotiations involved puts some 
doubts whether this critical mass could be achieved. A regional approach is less ambitious, notably if 
promotors make it clear at the outset that they do not expect the region as a whole to participate from the 
beginning (see below). Nevertheless, being party to a small scope regional NWFZ gives the same sover-
eign expression to the humanitarian position in a legal form as membership in the convention would. 
Fourth, there is the particular characteristic of Europe which makes this a particular region in the justifi-
cation/delegitimation discourse on nuclear weapons. There are three layers of justifying the existence of 
nuclear weapons. The first one is the proposition that they provide an insuperable deterrent which coun-
ters any clear and present danger to the survival of a nation. Such a danger could arise when an aggressor 
is about to prevail in a conventional contest or one in which the enemy employs chemical or biological 
weapons. The second justification maintains that nuclear weapons prevent the emergence of any violent 
conflict even at the non-nuclear level by the sheer possibility of (nuclear) escalation / retaliation and the 
ensuing immense damage. The third one suggests that nuclear weapons help to preserve the security of 
allies covered by a guarantee pronounced by a nuclear weapon state. These three arguments together have 
been providing a degree of legitimacy to nuclear weapons in the national security discourses of NWS as 
well as certain NNWS. Incidentally, the third argument relates not only to states that are legally members 
of the Western alliance. It has also been applied to states that just happen to be sited in the region but 
which have not decided to become alliance members. It has been stated that some of them are bounded to 
NATO through non-public commitments, or by the implicit implications of NATO deterrence policies (a 
free riding posture). The allegation – whether true or not – that officially neutral countries also profit 
from alliance nuclear deterrence is no doubt a legitimacy asset for extended deterrence. 
The situation is a powerful barrier to the complete delegitimation of nuclear weapons. Europe is populat-
ed with liberal democracies that wave the banner of human rights and humanitarianism. That these states 
should intend, directly or indirectly, to use nuclear weapons as a legitimate instrument of national securi-
ty weakens the case that these weapons, by their very nature of being indiscriminate and causing dispro-
portionate and lasting suffering to victims, fall squarely under the criteria that stigmatize them as inhu-
mane. But when more and more of the same democracies would accede to a NWFZ, this would indicate a 
move away from implicitly endorsing the legitimate character of these weapons. The severe curtailment of 
the freedom of movement of nuclear weapons by potentially excluding the territory of zone members as 
transit route at least on the ground (depending on the undertakings laid down in the zone treaty) would 
add a tangible consequence to this delegitimation effect. The delegitimising effect of this process would be 
further strengthened by explicit preambular language of the zone treaty confirming the incompatibility of 
nuclear use with international humanitarian law e. 
Provoking a regional public debate 
The last two paragraphs have already alluded to the main function the zonal initiative will fulfil: The re-
vival, and then sustainment, of a debate on nuclear policy in European societies and politics. It has been 
rightly observed that the slow progress, and even the temporary reversal during the last decade, of the 
process of nuclear disarmament, has been facilitated by the public disinterest in the matter after the end 
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of the Cold War seemed to lay nuclear dangers to rest. The impact of public opinion on the course of 
events was proven by the only major campaign in the nuclear field during this period, namely the conclu-
sion of the CTBT; and the fading of this campaign with the opening up for signature of this treaty helped 
foes of a nuclear test ban in the US to stall it in the Senate. In the absence of continued testing, it proved 
impossible to get the campaign back on track. 
The same consideration applies to nuclear disarmament in general. The new momentum (probably al-
ready being threatened by asphyxiation) came about by a civilian initiative, unexpectedly from the heart 
of the US security establishment by the Wall Street Journal article of Kissinger and Co. in January 2007. 
This triggered a wave of commitment by other well-known security experts in a new and unprecedented 
alliance with traditional disarmament groups. The campaign which included the US and major allied 
countries proved strong enough to motivate a US President to make nuclear disarmament a part of US 
security policy. It did not prove strong enough to create irresistible momentum. For this, a more powerful 
and sustainable public debate would be needed. 
The NWFZ in Europe approach might have the potential to trigger, and then sustain, such a debate. It is 
surprising, and thus an eye-catcher and it is controversial, and thus interesting. Since it involves practical 
steps that extend over time, it will not be over in a few months, but drag on and thus be capable of keep-
ing a debate alive. The confluence of diverse attributes might help to focus attention on the nuclear issue 
not only in those countries that have been disarmament-minded all along, but also in NATO NNWS and, 
eventually, Europe’s NWS as well.  
It is surprising by the combination of subject and initiator. Since such a zone has not been on the agenda 
for a very long while, it might generate some media interest across the Continent. At the same time, it 
might not catch attention at all if it would emerge from the “usual suspects” among disarmament-minded 
non-governmental organizations. Being introduced by a group of governments makes a difference. Public 
attention will be much higher because of the surprise effect, and the announcement of practical steps then 
might create a focus on which the NGO-community can zoom in (if a NATO member were in the group, 
or would join later, this attention would no doubt be even higher). Campaigning for a zone is much less 
abstract than campaigning for eliminating all nuclear weapons or a global ban on nuclear weapons, as the 
humanitarian initiative envisages. While a non-governmental initiative alone will not stimulate the neces-
sary interest, and a purely governmental activity runs the risk of losing the momentum gained after a brief 
period, the combination of the two has a much higher potential for sustainability. 
The second factor that supports both interest and sustainability is the controversial character of the initia-
tive. Running counter to established NATO positions and being anathema to the European NWS (Russia 
included) (see chapter 6), the project triggers what media like most: conflict of interests and controversy. 
If the public debate takes off, it will be impossible for the NWS to simply ignore the approach. The hu-
manitarian initiative may serve as an example: after boycotting the conferences in Oslo and Nayarit in 
2013, the US and the UK were no longer able to ignore an initiative, which had attracted a critical number 
of states, and – as a consequence – Washington and London sent official delegations to the 2014 Vienna 
Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.54 Taking a stance against an initiative such 
as the NWFZ in Europe enhances interest and prolongs the discussion. If we envisage a drawn-out pro-
cess over years wherein additional countries decide to become party to the zonal treaty in irregular inter-
vals (as was the case with NPT accession or with countries embracing the phase-out of nuclear energy as 
national policy), then there will be a continuous debate (or a stream of debates) on the future of nuclear 
weapons, as each new accession – or even the discussion on accession in domestic politics – will revive 
international public interest in the matter. This is a close to perfect precondition for political sustainabil-
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ity. The permanent substantial and political discussion offers an apt platform to broaden support for the 
stigmatizing of nuclear weapons and for promoting nuclear disarmament. In opening and maintaining 
this process lies the greatest and lasting value of the NWFZ in Europe project for the cause of nuclear 
disarmament. It should also be noted that in this way, the leverage of small state policies can be multiplied 
beyond the material capabilities of the initiators. 
Of course, this deliberation is speculative. The flux of public opinion is harder to predict than the weather 
that will result from a particularly complex meteorological situation. But it is worth a try. For govern-
ments as well as non-governmental pro-disarmament actors, the question is always one of the economies 
of effort. They have limited resources, including social and political capital to spend, and thus must be 
selective concerning the topics they pick up and propagate. But it is probably unwise to bet all resources 
on a single item; the zone issue has its promise, and should be part of the overall menu which disarma-
ment-minded actors offer to the public. 
3.3 Adapting defence policies to the political situation in Europe 
One of the most frequently heard observations by non-Europeans is the disconnect between the nuclear 
constellation and the political situation in Europe. The relation between the West and Russia is not with-
out disputes and occasional tensions, as the year 2014 painfully showed, but the idea of a war against each 
other sounds still far-fetched. The EU and Russia called each other strategic partners, there is a NATO-
Russia Council discussing mutually interesting security matters – presently suspended, but for how long?, 
and economic relations have been developing and will probably do so again when, one day, the sanctions 
end. Yet NATO and Russia are still considering, if in a “remote” way, using nuclear weapons against each 
other. The zone project is an important step to confront and overcome this strategic absurdity. One could 
make the case that the sobering experiences with the Ukrainian crisis make such a step all the more ur-
gent as the confrontational potential in the European theatre has proven bigger than one might have 
estimated.55 
4. OPTIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS 
4.1 Experiences from other regions  
The existing NWFZ were established in regions in which no substantial nuclear threats emanated from 
within the region, and none of the treaties necessitated direct disarmament or withdrawal of nuclear 
weapons deployed within its territory. Although the NWFZ treaties share a similar outline, they also each 
represent the particular realities of each region, and are each “a product of the specific circumstances of 
the region concerned and highlights the diversity of situations in the different regions”.56 Several negotia-
tion dynamics and resultant treaty clauses hark back to these regional specifities, and the experiences are 
of relevance to the European case, where nuclear weapons or related programs had existed in the region 
concerned or where nuclear armed neighbours had an impact on the region. 
Latin America 
Negotiations on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which culminated in a novel and ground-breaking agreement, 
required resourcefulness and innovation management, as well as the design of creative mechanisms. The 
original idea for the denuclearization of Latin America was proposed already in 1958 by Costa Rica at the 
Organization of American States. In 1962, following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Brazil introduced the con-
cept to the UNGA First Committee, and was later joined by three other regional states.  
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In 1963, Mexico and several other Latin American states issued a joint declaration on the denucleariza-
tion of the region, in which they declared their preparedness to sign a multilateral agreement undertaking 
not to manufacture, receive or store nuclear weapons and to cooperate with other regional states to obtain 
recognition of the region as denuclearized. A UNGA Resolution later that year, which gained the support 
of more regional states, noted the Joint Declaration with satisfaction.  
In a meeting hosted by Mexico in 1964, 17 regional states decided to establish the Preparatory Commis-
sion for the Denuclearization of Latin America which would be charged with preparing a preliminary 
draft for a regional denuclearization treaty. This Commission, called COPREDAL, met in Mexico several 
times between 1965 and 1967 to negotiate that draft, and received technical assistance from the UN Secre-
tary General. Non-regional states, including NWS, observed the plenary sessions of COPREDAL during 
this time. By its last session in 1967, COPREDAL was attended by all regional states (except Cuba), and all 
NWS were observing (except the Soviet Union).  
COPREDAL established three working groups to discuss different aspects of the agreement. The first 
working group focused on the extent of the zone and was charged with solving the question of non-
independent territories, i.e. “colonies”; the second dealt with obligations as well as verification, inspection 
and control provisions; the last working group was charged with obtaining NWS declarations. When, in 
1966, Brazil submitted a rival draft treaty to the 1965 working draft, a working group was established to 
reconcile the two drafts.  
Private negotiations were held behind the scenes of the UNGA annual meeting during those years, espe-
cially with the NWS. Mexico, as the central advocate of the endeavour, was keeping the UNGA informed 
of the work of COPREDAL, as well as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which was 
negotiating the NPT at the same time. When a draft was approved by COPREDAL, it was circulated be-
tween all participants, as well as the NWS. In February 1967, the Commission approved the draft treaty 
unanimously.57  
While at the time of negotiation none of the regional actors possessed nuclear weapons, several holdouts 
were complicating the process, most of all Argentina and Brazil, whose nuclear programs and plans were 
ambiguous. Both states opposed limitations on their nuclear programs (also in the global framework, they 
contested the NPT regime and export control restrictions), and their position on the NWFZ was in con-
tradiction to that of most other regional states.  
Tlatelolco’s sophisticated entry into force mechanism is the result of a compromise reached following a 
demand put forward by Brazil, insisting that ratification by all regional states and extra-regional states 
would be a prerequisite to the treaty’s entry into force. The general view during negotiations was that 
ratification by a significant number of regional states is enough to allow entry into force, while condition-
ing this on NWS protocol ratification might delay entry into force substantially.58 
The treaty, as stipulated in article 29, shall enter into force upon the fulfilment of four conditions: ratifica-
tion by all regional states, ratification of Protocol I by all extra-regional states which control territories in 
the zone, ratification of Protocol II by NWS, and conclusion of safeguards agreements as stipulated in the 
treaty. However, each state has the right to waive, wholly or in part, these requirements, and the treaty 
shall enter into force for those states immediately. Thus, the Treaty entered into force fully and for all its 
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members only in 2002, when universality was achieved upon the ratification of the last regional state, 
Cuba. Brazil, while ratifying the treaty already in 1968, waived these requirements only in 1994, at which 
time the treaty entered into force for it. It should be noted that this formula betrayed high respect for the 
sovereignty of each state of the region (which is a sovereignty-conscious region). States who believed that 
a couple of conditions would be required to make membership in the zone acceptable were not coerced 
into a compliance status with the zone undertakings unless their conditions were met. States who wanted 
to enter the conditions of legally assured non-nuclear status were permitted to do so as well. This ap-
proach has some bearing on the situation in Europe. 
The Treaty also offers the option of amendments, which can be proposed by any party, and accepted by a 
two-thirds majority. This provision proved useful in bringing into the regime the two regional actors who 
were suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons. After several revisions Argentina and Brazil proposed in 
1992 were accepted by all parties and the treaty was amended, both states finally fully joined the Tlatelol-
co Treaty in the mid 1990’s, waiving the draconian entry into force conditions.59  
The enabling of NWS to attach ‘interpretative statements’ to their ratification of Tlatelolco’s NWS proto-
col (despite the treaty’s explicit provision that it would not be subject to reservations) was another sophis-
ticated mechanism which supported the NWS’s commitment to the zone.60  
South Pacific 
The initiative for denuclearization of the South Pacific came from New Zealand as early as the mid 1970’s, 
and was supported at the 1975 meeting of the South Pacific Forum, where members decided to bring the 
issue to the attention of the UNGA. In the same year, a draft resolution by New Zealand, Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea was adopted by the GA.  
It wasn’t until the early 1980’s, after conservative governments in both Australia and New Zealand were 
replaced by Labour, that the process picked up pace. At the South Pacific Forum meeting in 1983, Aus-
tralia presented a nuclear-free zone proposal, which was discussed with no substantive outcome. Howev-
er, during the following year’s meeting, Forum members agreed to establish a Working Group to prepare 
a draft treaty before the Forum’s 1985 session.  
The Working Group held five meetings to negotiate a draft, and various members of the South Pacific 
Forum participated in the negotiations. The actual treaty drafting was conducted by a legal sub-
committee established for that purpose. The draft was adopted by the South Pacific Forum in 1985 and 
the Treaty opened for signature. The Forum could only agree on wording on the Protocols the following 
year, and they were opened for signature in 1986.61  
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The Treaty of Rarotonga was meant to be more encompassing than Tlatelolco, and was labelled a nuclear-
free zone, not only nuclear-weapon-free. However, since differences in opinion between negotiating par-
ties limited its further-reaching objectives, those regional states that called for stricter limitations eventu-
ally applied them unilaterally, domestically.  
The difference between the position of Australia and that of New Zealand regarding the nuclear-free zone 
exemplifies how contentions over the multilateral mechanism’s scope can be alleviated by further far-
reaching domestic legislation. Although New Zealand sought a more comprehensive and extensive nucle-
ar-free zone, it nevertheless supported a more conservative regional arrangement, in line with Australia’s 
position. The latter opposed a ban on port visits because of its military alliance with the US, and objected 
to a prohibition on all nuclear-related activities due to its uranium exports. The treaty eventually was 
indeed not radical in its scope, but New Zealand committed itself domestically, via the New Zealand Nu-
clear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act, to stricter non-proliferation standards, and intro-
duced more stringent domestic legislation where treaty provisions, in Wellington’s view, were too leni-
ent.62  
During the Treaty’s negotiations, Australia took care to present its interpretation of the proscriptions. It 
clarified that Article 3 of the Treaty, the renunciation by parties of actions that assist or encourage the 
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices by any state, by no means prohibits the “export of 
uranium or other nuclear materials that might conceivably be used for nuclear weapon manufacture, or 
scientific/military/diplomatic co-operation with nuclear weapons powers”. Furthermore, it implied that 
“various forms of support for a nuclear power, that could be justified as contributing to the maintenance 
of ‘nuclear deterrence’, would be permitted under the Treaty”.63  
This support of nuclear deterrence as part of its national security policy was the reason why Australia had 
to reconcile its engagement for the zone with its commitment to the US.64 Australia considered it of cru-
cial importance to maintain its security relations with the US. The question of facilities serving nuclear 
strategic systems is therefore most relevant in the context of Rarotonga, because Australia hosts such 
installations for the US. The Treaty of Rarotonga eventually does not include prohibitions regarding 
nuclear support facilities and installations for command, control, communication and intelligence, “alt-
hough these constitute an integral part of nuclear war fighting and preparedness”.65  
While Australia was eager to maintain the 1951 tripartite security alliance between Itself, New Zealand, 
and the United States (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, ANZUS) and its security 
relations with the US, New Zealand enacted and implemented far reaching national restrictions on port 
visits even at the cost of its ANZUS membership. New Zealand’s “stricter standards” were its complete 
ban on port calls by nuclear vessels, which would be maintained by confirming that visiting vessels are in 
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fact non-nuclear (this included both nuclear-carrying and nuclear-powered). This policy clashed with the 
longstanding policy of the US, particularly with regard to the Navy, to “neither confirm nor deny” 
(NCND) the absence or presence of nuclear weapons on board of their vessels. 
While the US policy of ‘constructive ambiguity’ through NCND was supposedly meant to withhold in-
formation from its adversaries, it is in fact mostly useful in securing access to “friendly and allied ports in 
states where anti-nuclear sentiment is strong”.66 In other words, like in the case of NATO keeping nuclear 
weapons in the territory of NNWS members against the will of their population, other US alliances must 
admit calls on port of possibly nuclear armed vessels against the will of the host state’s population, and 
democratically elected governments are kept in the dark whether nuclear weapons are or are not in the 
country they are supposed to govern. Once more, nuclear weapon policies come into contradiction with 
basic requirements of democracy. In defence of these requirements, and unlike other states with anti-
nuclear policies who accept NCND, New Zealand insists on confirming the non-nuclear status of the 
visiting vessels. When in 1985 New Zealand refused a request for a port visit by a US warship, because it 
could not unambiguously ascertain that it was non-nuclear, the US responded harshly, breaking off its 
commitments to New Zealand in the framework of ANZUS. In 1986, the US formally suspended its secu-
rity obligations to New Zealand, while reaffirming its bilateral ties with Australia.67 ANZUS has not been 
formally abrogated, despite the fact that the US and New Zealand no longer maintain a security relation-
ship.  
New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy led to its desire to separate all nuclear aspects from the alliance, by 
prohibiting visits of nuclear vessels to its ports. The ANZUS Treaty “makes no mention of nuclear wea-
ponry or unconditional access to ports, and the New Zealand Government argued that it was entitled to 
disengage from nuclear deterrence whilst remaining an active member of the Western Alliance”.68 New 
Zealand, in particular, clearly did not perceive of ANZUS as a nuclear alliance.69 The harsh response by 
the US proves that it interpreted New Zealand’s obligations under ANZUS differently: it considers New 
Zealand’s prohibition on nuclear vessels’ port calls to have “effectively prevented practical alliance coop-
eration under ANZUS”.70  
Although diverging interpretations of the nature of ANZUS merit a more comprehensive discussion than 
appropriate in this framework,71 it is important to emphasize that it was not membership in the nuclear-
free zone that was perceived by the US as contradictory to ANZUS, since the US indeed continues the 
security guarantees to, and cooperation with, Australia, a founding member of the South Pacific Zone. 
The Rarotonga Treaty neither bans nor restricts in any way “nuclear transit, nuclear related support facili-
ties and programmes, exercises and operational alerts involving nuclear weapons, [or] military alliances 
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involving potential use of nuclear weapons”.72 The attempt by New Zealand to go beyond the scope of the 
Rarotonga Treaty was what triggered the suspension by the US of its commitments to New Zealand under 
ANZUS. It took more than twenty years for a thaw in the security relationship. During the Obama ad-
ministration, the US and New Zealand laid to rest the nuclear dispute in the “Wellington declaration” 
(2010), after military cooperation had resumed silently already in 2007. In 2012, the ban on New Zea-
land’s warships to US ports, a remnant of the dispute, was finally lifted. 
Southeast Asia 
A declaration on the establishment, when possible, of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-
east Asia was issued by the five members of ASEAN in 1971. As political conditions were not suitable for 
this far-reaching proposal, the idea to promote the denuclearization of the region came up in the 1984 
meeting of ASEAN.  
In 1986, a committee of officials was directed to study the principles, objectives and elements of a NWFZ 
in Southeast Asia, and to begin drafting such a treaty. Only after the end of the Cold War did conditions 
ripen, and in 1993 ASEAN foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the zone of peace and to 
pursuing denuclearization of the region. A final draft was ready in 1995 and the summit of ASEAN 
adopted the draft in December 1995, at which time all ASEAN members signed on the same day.73 
None of the NWS has yet signed the Bangkok Treaty’s protocol as a result of reservations regarding the 
treaty’s extended territorial area of application, and the extensive negative security assurances in the pro-
tocol. Nevertheless, discussions with the NWS regarding adherence to the relevant protocol have been re-
started in 2011, and there are a few encouraging signs that in the years to come an agreement may be 
reached which will overcome the reservations and the protocol will enter into force.74 
Africa  
While the states of Africa were keen early on to consider and elaborate the idea of regional denucleariza-
tion, negotiations only began in the 1990s, when conditions were considered favourable. Only after the 
end of Apartheid and the dismantlement of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program was it possible to 
realize the envisioned African NWFZ; it could not have been done without South Africa, the most ad-
vanced African state in nuclear energy.75  
Following French nuclear tests in Africa, fourteen African states proposed in 1961 a UNGA Resolution 
calling on members to refrain from testing in Africa. In 1964, the Council of Ministers of the Organiza-
tion for African Unity (OAU), at Ghana’s initiative, drafted a brief convention on denuclearization of 
Africa, which was sent to member states to study. The following year, the UNGA endorsed a declaration 
on the denuclearization of Africa. However, only with the end of Apartheid and the Cold War could 
efforts truly begin to realize Africa’s denuclearization.  
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In 1991, a group of experts was convened, comprised of representatives from several African states, OAU 
representatives, one from UN, observers from Rarotonga and Tlatelolco, and IAEA representatives. Sup-
port from UN and IAEA was considered crucial for the work of the UN/OAU group of experts. 
The UN/OAU group’s role was initially to lay the groundwork for a denuclearization agreement, by ex-
amining the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of such a treaty. Among the 
topics discussed were the political conditions needed for denuclearization, the area of application and the 
scope of prohibition. The expert group’s mandate was extended, and it met again in 1992 to conclude its 
report. During the consideration of elements and modalities, those states that would be expected to ad-
here to the protocols were invited for consultations. These consultations proved useful for both the proto-
cols as well as the treaty itself. 
The incorporation of South Africa into the process was vital, and was enabled by the involvement of an 
NGO at a crucial point of the treaty’s drafting. The Program for Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation 
held a meeting at the University of Zimbabwe in 1993, to which South Africa was invited, and in which it 
expressed its acceptance in principle of a regional NWFZ. Thereafter it was recommended that South 
Africa be invited as an observer to the negotiation process. The drafting process was slowed due to chang-
es in the composition of the UN/OAU expert group in 1993, which prolonged discussions. In its meeting 
in 1995, the draft was finally agreed.76 
The necessity to address South Africa’s nuclear weapons stockpile distinguished the negotiations process 
for the African zone from those of the other zonal arrangements where no state possessing nuclear weap-
ons was part of the region. Already during the pre-negotiations of the Pelindaba Treaty it was agreed that 
South Africa would have to be a member of the zone and subject to its obligations, due to its nuclear 
weapons capability and its continuing nuclear technology proficiency. As South Africa had already dis-
mantled its small nuclear arsenal at the time it joined the zone, the other African states needed to be en-
sured that the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as of residual weapon production facilities was 
complete and not easily reversible. The conditioning of entry into force on South Africa’s ratification was 
even contemplated. Furthermore, the importance of total transparency on the part of African states was 
considered necessary to ensure that the zone is indeed nuclear weapons free. The clause on reversal of 
nuclear weapons programs is a direct result of the unique nuclear situation in Africa.77  
Central Asia 
Upon Mongolia’s declaration of its territory as a NWFZ in 1992, it called for a regional NWFZ. In 1993, 
Uzbekistan made a formal proposal for such a zone in the UNGA, and a year later, its approach was sup-
ported by Kyrgyzstan. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, both states proposed the 
creation of a NWFZ in Central Asia. 
The first substantial move was achieved in 1997, with the Almaty Declaration by the five presidents of the 
Central Asian states, endorsing the creation of a zone in their region. At the UNGA meeting later that 
year, all five states submitted a draft resolution, which after the addition of some amendments won the 
support of NWS, and was endorsed by the GA. 
Treaty drafting began by the five Central Asian states, with support from the UN and the IAEA, as well as 
financial support from Japan. In a 1998 expert meeting held in Kyrgyzstan, basic principles for the zone 
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were discussed with representatives of the NWS. Significant points of disagreement halted progress until 
2002, when compromise was achieved. The compromise draft treaty was sent to NWS for their endorse-
ment, but the ambiguous language that was used to reach agreement between the five regional states 
proved problematic for the western NWS. The US communicated its concerns to the regional states. 
Russia and China, however, supported the draft. In 2005, the Central Asian states revised the draft slightly 
to address only some concerns voiced by the US, and the treaty opened for signature in 2006.78 After 
extensive negotiations, all the NWS signed the protocol in May 2014, and China, France and the UK have 
ratified it since. On 27 April 2015 President Obama submitted the protocol to the U.S. Senate for its ad-
vice and consent to ratification. 
Summary 
Analysis of the negotiation processes that led to the established NWFZs shows that all zones relied on, or 
at least were backed by, international support for the goal of regional denuclearization. UNGA Resolu-
tions on regional denuclearization seem to have played a meaningful role in consolidating international 
and regional support for the endeavours.  
For each of the five existing NWFZs, a regional working group or expert committee was created for the 
purpose of exploring the legal and political aspects of the free zone treaty: these groups eventually also 
drafted the treaties. These working groups enjoyed technical and other support from the UN and IAEA. 
In at least three treaties, the negotiation process was held in the framework of regional organizations, 
namely the South Pacific Forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of 
African Unity (for Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, respectively).  
Having stated the importance and contribution of international support, a crucial aspect for a NWFZ has 
been NWS endorsement, and ultimately their ratification of the relevant treaty protocols. As recom-
mended in the UN’s report on NWFZ from 1999, NWS were consulted during the negotiations of all 
existing NWFZ treaties, to differing degrees and differing levels of satisfaction. While not all of their res-
ervations and discontent were incorporated into the treaties, their considerations were addressed where 
possible. Indeed, in a slow process, the NWS have almost completely ratified their respective protocols in 
three NWFZ treaties, namely Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba (US ratification is pending for the two 
latter, and was submitted in 2011 for the Senate’s approval). For the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, there has 
been huge progress since spring 2014. For the Treaty of Bangkok, none of the NWS has yet signed the 
protocol; ongoing negotiations aim at bridging the gap opened by fundamental disagreements on specific 
provisions in the treaties.  
The history of negotiation and establishment of existing NWFZ shows that “a Zone arrangement is a very 
flexible instrument that can accommodate many political and geographical peculiarities”.79 The existing 
zones required meaningful and momentous innovation, and while they are similar in their basic scheme, 
they are each a product of their regional environments and influenced by regional opportunities and 
constraints.  
The case of the Pelindaba Treaty documents that zones can deal with a situation where a state in the re-
gion had built and dismantled a nuclear arsenal, while the Central Asian case demonstrates that zones can 
also address the constellation of deployment of weapons in states in the region that belong to someone 
else. While the circumstances differ significantly from those in Europe, the precedents show nevertheless 
that these issues can be successfully handled with sufficient creativity and good political will. 
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Although NWFZs are theoretically intended to “eliminate” nuclear weapons from the denuclearized 
regions, the permissive provision on transit could be considered as rendering this intention and the title 
of these arrangements (“free” zones) incomplete. Nevertheless, and despite the hurdles that still remain 
for NWS ratification of several NWFZ protocols, all existing zones have entered into force, and are lauded 
as important parts of the non-proliferation regime. They thus entail a symbolic and normative signifi-
cance, which is of great importance on its own and a meaningful achievement, considering the strategic 
and political obstacles facing NWFZ. 
4.2 Options for negotiation in Europe 
The particular conditions, under which a NWFZ in Europe would be sought, as previously discussed, 
necessitate a closer look at the options how to negotiate it. In the following, four options are discussed 
and evaluated. 
The conventional way 
The usual approach is that all states in a region are invited (conventionally by a regional organization, if 
one exists) to hold negotiations on the scope and the provisions of a zonal treaty. This corresponds literal-
ly to the principle that zones must be “established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at” by the 
countries in the region. As history has shown, the existence of countries sceptical about such a zone does 
not prevent the success of its negotiations. Brazil and Argentina had their concerns regarding a zone and 
were not particularly eager to accede to the Tlatelolco Treaty when the negotiations were completed, but 
they did not refuse to participate therein, although they represented the minority opinion regarding sev-
eral topics during negotiations. Likewise, the existence of countries openly opposed to a zone because 
they possess nuclear weapons and want to keep them does not necessarily prevent the other countries of a 
region to deliberate about a zone (though true negotiations are not possible): The African Union, on 
Nigerian initiative, conducted such deliberations in the absence of then apartheid South Africa, and the 
Arab League, without Israeli and Iranian participation, came up with valuable ideas on how a zone treaty 
might be framed. Yet if the zonal treaty can only be opened for signature if the draft is adopted unani-
mously, and only enter into force when all members have ratified it, its validity remains forestalled until a 
landmark change in the sceptical and opposed countries has taken place. The Tlatelolco Treaty, with its 
opportunity for individual waivers, found a way around this difficulty. The 2010 NPT Review Conference 
chose in “Action 9” the wording “freely arrived at among States of the region concerned” which implies 
that (initially) not all states of the region must be involved. The same possibility is opened by the UN’s 
Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects: it states that 
“obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be assumed not only by 
groups of states, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by smaller groups of 
states and even individual countries“.80 The respect for the sovereign will of the individual state which 
characterized the solution for the problem existing during the negotiations on the Tlatelolco Treaty is 
reflected in this wording of the UN study as well. 
In any case, the situation in Europe makes the conventional approach inadvisable. The proper organiza-
tion for the area – the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – will probably not 
call for negotiations because any one of the four NWS belonging to this organization may veto such a 
move. In addition, a large number of regional states are NATO members or allied to the Russian Federa-
tion (like Belarus). It is unlikely that a majority of them would decide to participate in negotiations on a 
NWFZ right away, though they might be willing to engage in informal or bilateral talks about the project. 
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While a few disarmament-minded NATO states might be ready to defy their nuclear armed or nuclear-
minded allies, most would probably stay aside and just watch further developments. A general, public call 
for negotiations to which only very few would respond would to a certain degree symbolically delegiti-
mate the project at the outset and probably impact negatively on its pivotal purpose to start a lasting de-
bate. For this reason, going through the OSCE is inadvisable, and the initiative then rests with “states in 
the region”. 
The Mongolian way 
The way Mongolia pursued in the direction of a NWFZ is exactly the opposite extreme to the conven-
tional way: The country declared itself (after preliminary talks with its two nuclear armed neighbours, 
Russia and China) a NWFZ consisting of a single state, and switched from “zone” to “status” later on 
grounds of persistent objections. It is conceivable to transfer the model to Europe: A particularly daring 
and committed European state would make such a declaration. The big advantage would be to have a 
zone realized right away, and the mere act would certainly attract sufficient attention to trigger a debate. 
However, there are significant differences between the Mongolian and the European case. Mongolia has 
borders only to the two named neighbours. There are thus no further NNWS contagious to Mongolia 
with which it would form a region that could be covered by a zone. Central Asia is several thousand miles 
away and Mongolia is not regarded, nor does it regard itself, a member of this region.81 Mongolia had 
thus never any intention or ambition to star as the initiator and core of a future regional zone. Exactly 
that, however, would be the ambition of a single European state declaring itself a zone. 
For a single-state zone, a declaration is sufficient. For a regional zone, a treaty is needed, because a balance 
of rights and obligations must be established as soon as more than one state actor is involved. To start a 
zone without a treaty and even without any negotiation is thus an odd procedure that would probably 
meet a lot of alienation even among sympathizers. The risk that the act would be successfully ridiculed 
and thus delegitimated, and that the debate would be virulent, but also short and not sustainable is thus 
high. For this reason, this option should probably also be avoided. 
Closed negotiation of like-minded countries 
The number of European states considering membership in a NWFZ in Europe must be currently ex-
pected to be relatively small. Apart from Austria and Switzerland, also Ireland, Liechtenstein, and Sweden 
might have sympathies. Whether Finland, an erstwhile promoter of such a concept during the Cold War, 
would feel comfortable to be in the forefront today is uncertain. Similarly, Norway might feel impeded by 
its NATO membership; but Oslo has shown considerable autonomy in nuclear weapons policies before 
and might be daring enough to consider the step. The Holy See, member of the NPT, might also feel fit to 
accede. Furthermore, there are a number of former Soviet Republics, which are shifting their foreign 
policy priorities towards establishing stronger ties with European countries and institutions. Some of 
these transition countries might sympathize with the idea of establishing a European NWFZ, first and 
foremost Ukraine and Belarus, but in principle also Georgia and Armenia (though Ukraine and Georgia 
might have concerns because of its continuing desire to enter NATO, even more so today than in former 
years; the possible reaction of NATO members is dealt with in chapter 6). Priority for accession to West-
ern organizations might also caution Balkan states not presently members to NATO against taking a 
strong pro-zone stance. It might make sense for the initiators to quietly approach this group of presuma-
bly or possibly sympathetic countries with a view to explore their readiness to enter closed negotiations 
on the legal shape of the zone. This means that about half a dozen like-minded countries might eventually 
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agree on a text which would then be published, signed and ratified, bringing the zone into existence (cf. 
chapter 4). It should be recalled that the initial round of negotiation on the Tlatelolco Treaty saw restrict-
ed participation as well. 
Keeping the negotiations strictly to like-minded countries committed to the project from the outset 
would have the big advantage of confronting objections only when the main deal is already done and 
avoiding any veto situation which would stymie the whole project from the beginning. At the same time, 
it would avoid the perception of the project as the product of a lonely national idiosyncrasy which the 
“Mongolian way” might suggest. It would also result in a text that could present the rallying point for an 
ensuing campaign led by civil society actors, in contrast to the “Mongolian way”.  
A disadvantage might be that the like-minded countries would be vulnerable to the accusation that they 
isolate themselves from the majority of possible participants, undermining the legitimacy of the project 
under the “arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region” principle. 
Ottawa way 
The Ottawa way, labelled after the process that led to the Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personal 
landmines, would also start with like-minded countries but lead to drafting conferences where an initial 
draft by the like-minded would be discussed and amended by a larger group of interested countries on the 
basis of an invitation. The process would proceed through a – limited – sequence of meetings with a 
drafting character and result in a treaty that would then be opened for signature. 
The initiators would invite all potential participants in a regional zone as well as representatives of civil 
society whose participation they deem useful for fostering the project, but the process would not be frus-
trated if some or even many would decide not to come or would in the end abstain from early accession. 
Since the format contains no veto position, but entitles those who wish to do so to eventually go forward, 
the flaws of the conventional approach would be avoided. Since the like-minded have control over proce-
dure and protocol, the process could be completed within a desired time span and could not be delayed 
into the indefinite future by filibuster techniques of opponents.  
In the end, a draft would be opened for signature. Even if most of the participating countries would ab-
stain from signing and ratifying for the time being, their participation in the deliberations would add 
legitimacy to the process and create the hope that at one point in the future they may join the zone treaty 
for good. This chance would certainly be higher if they had the chance to introduce their own preferences 
and concerns into the deliberations by virtue of the Ottawa way. The participation of civil society would 
help with creating the basis for an accompanying as well as ensuing campaign and would establish a feel-
ing of ownership which would enhance the motivation for campaigning. 
Comparative Evaluation 
The highly formal conventional way is too open to sabotage by countries averse to the whole project, 
while the Mongolian way is not fit for application for a regional (and thus multilateral) project. The 
closed approach suffers from legitimacy problems that should not be underrated. A combination of the 
closed approach with the Ottawa way might be best. The likeminded initiators would have to explore 
thoroughly the readiness of all potential NNWS participants to join a series of meetings designed to lead 
to a zone treaty. The invitation would go to all, the relevant NWS included, once a critical mass of partici-
pation would be ensured (including a clear commitment to remain ready to attend even if the NWS exert 
pressure to dissuade countries from participation). The likeminded would have to work closely together 
throughout the process and to become parties to the Treaty even if there would be little prospect that 
others would emulate their example immediately. The involvement of civil society in these meetings 
should not restrict them to observation only, but accord a serious opportunity to voice their views. 
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As will be discussed in the next chapter, this way of proceeding has consequences for the treatment of the 
territorial scope and entry into force questions. Before we go into that, however, we have to discuss two 
rather delicate problems that bother the negotiating setting for a NWFZ in Europe: The involvement of 
the UN and the IAEA, and the question whether and when the NWS should be consulted. Both questions 
are inevitable, as it has become customary to involve the two international organizations, and consulta-
tions with the NWS are part of the UN guidelines (discussed in section 2.1) and have been conducted in 
the run-up to all established NWFZ treaties. 
Involvement of the UN and the IAEA 
All NWFZs have asked the UNGA for support well before the opening of the treaties for signature. While 
there is nothing in international law which would require the consent of the UNGA for establishing a 
NWFZ, the custom has created a presumption that this procedure creates the necessary legitimacy for a 
zone project. In our case, this is a very problematic requirement. It can be hoped that a draft resolution 
asking for support for a NWFZ in Europe may attract the necessary two thirds majority due to the sup-
port by the vast majority of the non-aligned, notably the members of NWFZs established already, and the 
disarmament minded “Western” nations (such as New Zealand). But a UNGA vote might also show 
determined objections (e.g. France, maybe even all P-5) and a great number of abstentions (NATO coun-
tries and, maybe, Central Asian friends of Russia). The most embarrassing result might be that a vote 
would show that only a tiny minority among the potential members of the zone are presently supportive 
of the project – a rather unique situation in the history of NWFZs. While this constellation is probably a 
matter of fact, to demonstrate this in a highly symbolic UNGA vote might be detrimental to the legitima-
cy of the whole project. In weighing the negative impact on legitimacy of not going to the UNGA versus a 
vote with symbolically detrimental outcome, it might be wiser to avoid the UNGA until such time that a 
sizable portion of potential zone members is ready to vote “yes” in New York. 
To achieve this result, the promoters should designate one among themselves to present the project in the 
UNGA plenary session of the year in which the plan to initiate a zone is made public. Initiators would 
consult key UN member states in advance and ask for their support. Consultations would be continued 
with a broader number of GA members at the margins of the session. When the initiators are sure that 
they have the required support, they would then introduce a resolution of support. 
The IAEA has been routinely part of zone negotiations because of the expectation that the Agency would 
take over the brunt of verification duties. This would not exclude a complementary system of regional 
(European Atomic Energy Community – EURATOM), multinational (e.g. the involved NWS between 
each other), and supranational (IAEA) verification, but it is hardly conceivable that a system could be 
built without the experienced Vienna agency. The advice of the IAEA would probably be indispensable 
particularly for tricky issues such as how to integrate into the verification system those facilities that used 
to host nuclear weapons (as in the NATO NNWS with a nuclear role) or that have served military or 
dual-use purposes (as in France, Russia, and the UK), and for drafting language in anticipation of a far-
away future where verification of such sites would become relevant. However, these tricky, complex con-
tingencies may be avoided by restricting the verification system to the immediate tasks, while facilitating 
amendments meant to cover verification of former nuclear weapon states once they are ready to accede in 
the process of nuclear disarmament. 
The problem is whether the Agency would feel free to enter related consultations. NWS and NATO 
NNWS have a strong voice in the Board of Governors, and there might be objections to the IAEA con-
necting to the zone business at all. Since consultations can be paid for from the regular budget routinely, 
such objections would have no immediate effect on a determined IAEA leadership, but the degree of 
determination depends on the person in charge (Blix or ElBaradei would have had no qualms), and this 
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person would always have to calculate the future costs of retaliation by the offended parties when the 
Agency engages against the expressed will of the NWS (and possible all or part of NATO NNWS). 
The first imperative is thus to explore informally whether the Agency leadership is willing to engage be-
fore a formal invitation is issued. If it turns out that the IAEA leadership is not willing to take risks, the 
alternative is to wait for a more courageous leadership and to consult with retired IAEA experts (and 
former leaders) whose availability is certainly not in question. The whole issue might be postponed if – as 
is to be expected – the original members of the zone would be neutral countries already covered by the 
NPT. The verification clause in the zone could then call for the application of NPT comprehensive safe-
guards and the Additional Protocol, with an opening clause that the verification system will be amended 
as circumstances change through new accessions (i.e. NATO states which have or had nuclear weapons 
on their territory, or NWS).  
Consultations with NWS 
The “guidelines” request, and the parties to zone negotiations so far have duly conducted, consultations 
with the NWS with a view to ensure their endorsement of the zonal project, not always with the desired 
success as the not-ratified protocols to some of the zones, and the drawn-out process of signature and 
ratification document. Indeed, it may be asked why a group of states whose compliance with their under-
taking under Article VI of the NPT has come increasingly under criticism should hold a kind of veto 
position over the sovereign decision of a region, or certain states therein, to be nuclear-weapon-free. 
From today’s vantage point such a position looks rather alien. As the constellation of zones without rati-
fied protocols shows, a region might defy NWS objections and develop in a zone anyway – at the cost of 
lacking the desired security assurances (this means that the NWS keep the option to attack NNWS with 
nuclear weapons not because of an urgent need of survival but because of annoyance about an uncom-
fortable constraint on their freedom of action – a strange position in itself). Nevertheless, again the cus-
tom has been established, and a European zone project would have to address it, one way or the other. 
The “Ottawa option”, which is part of the hybrid which we recommend as a procedure for negotiations, 
assumes that NWS are invited to the table. Whether they will attend or not is an open question; their 
refusal to participate in the Oslo and the Nayarit meetings on the humanitarian aspects of nuclear weap-
ons does not augur well for their readiness to take part in a project which they – or at least some of them – 
are probable to distinctly dislike.82 In addition to this invitation, governments willing to pursue the zone 
project might ask for bilateral meetings on issues concerning nuclear disarmament and put the zone on 
the agenda for such consultations in the hope that at least some decent conversation might be possible. 
As these deliberations show, this is one of the most difficult aspects in the negotiation setting, not the least 
because the reaction of the NWS is so incalculable. They might be willing to participate in consultations 
or even negotiations as such but be negative in the consultation/negotiation itself; they might refuse to 
participate in either consultations or negotiations, but willing to engage bilaterally and utter their objec-
tions. Or they may go incommunicado vis-à-vis the zone promoters. We just do not know. 
If the dialogue between the NWS and the NNWS in the region and beyond develops positively, consulta-
tions in the run-up to establishing a NWFZ in Europe might foster the process and the general move 
towards nuclear disarmament. If the NWS are hostile, not having them in the negotiation room might 
constitute empowerment for the NNWS; such an effect was observed at the Oslo Conference. Promoters 
of the zone project would have to decide ad hoc which conditions obtain and what the best answer might 
be. 
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5. CONTENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE TREATY IN EUROPE 
5.1 Geographical scope and entry into force 
The “leaving it open” approach 
Dealing with the (desired) geographical scope of the zone is a tricky issue. While the area covered by the 
OSCE or the Council of Europe could supply templates for the desired geographical extension, defining a 
scope in an operative paragraph (e.g. Tlatelolco Treaty) or in an Annex that is integral to the operative 
part of the treaty (e.g. Rarotonga Treaty) would mean taking the controversial step to create a legal reality 
(though virtual) over the objections of states in this geographical area which are predictably hostile or 
hesitant to the project at this moment. It might be seen as highly provocative and evoke stronger re-
sistance than the promoters might wish to stimulate at this point in time. Such refusal from NNWS in the 
region would diminish the legitimacy of the project. The fact that states whose territory would be named 
as desired part of the zone had not ‘freely agreed to’ the project might also open a debate among lawyers 
that diverts energies and momentum from the political aim to popularize the zone idea. Promoters of the 
zone are thus well advised to search for options which do not require specifying the territorial scope of 
their zone right away. 
The negotiations for the Tlatelolco Treaty weighed an option that was dropped after some discussion but 
could serve as a solution for the problem: “Opinion was divided as to whether to decide on a pre-
determined regional zone or to adopt a more pragmatic approach and include in the zone the territory of 
each state party as it joined [emphasis added]. No decision was taken until the end, when the extent of the 
zone was finally defined.”83 Given the situation in Europe, the “pragmatic approach” – eventually rejected 
by the Tlatelolco negotiators – appears an attractive option. One would not define in operational terms 
the whole area to which the ambition of initiators extends. The extension of the zone would be cotermi-
nous with the territory (including territorial waters) of those who had actually become parties to the zonal 
treaty by signing, ratifying and deposing their note of ratification with the depositary. The territorial 
scope of the zone would then be extended when additional states accede. For this reason, the zone would 
not be called “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Europe”, but “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe”, there-
by denoting the transitory and partial nature of its geographical scope. 
On the other hand, it would be odd to have no notion in the treaty of the objective for geographical exten-
sion the agreeing parties have in mind. But rather than inserting it in the operational part, this notion 
should be confined to the preamble. Various formulations could be considered. A more daring one would 
be: “hoping that eventually all members of the OSCE with the exception of those already covered by a 
nuclear weapon free zone treaty might join the NWFZ in Europe in the free exercise of their sovereignty 
and in the process of nuclear disarmament as endorsed by the 2009 United Nations Security Council 
summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. This formula (a) denotes the desired geograph-
ical scope, (b) in full compliance with the principle “freely arrived at”, (c) avoids a competitive relation 
with the Semipalatinsk Treaty84 and (d) makes clear that the zone project is part of the broader disarma-
ment process to which the highest authority in global security policy, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), has already committed. If this approach would appear still too intrusive, an alternative would be 
to leave the desired scope vague by noting the desire of the members that one day “all states of Europe” 
                                                           
 
83  William Epstein, "The Making of the Treaty of Tlatelolco", Journal of the History of International Law, Vol. 3 (2001), p. 161. 
84  In principle, it would be thinkable to admit double membership (as Egypt would inevitably incur in both the African and the 
Middle East NWFZs once the latter would come into being). However, the treaties might contain non-identical or even 
contradictory provisions and obligations; for example, the Semipalatinsk Treaty contains the disputed “other agreements” 
clause which could be interpreted as to enable nuclear weapons to be introduced to the area as a consequence of mutual 
defence obligations. Such ambiguities would create a legal nightmare that should be avoided as it could lead to enduring 
controversies and thereby, once more, divert energies from much more important issues and activities. 
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might decide to become members of the zone; this approach follows the example of the European Union 
not to define what “Europe” eventually means – the EU formula has never been attacked.  
A zone will be a challenge to NATO (and, to a lesser degree, to Russia), in any case. The question is 
whether the edge of the challenge can be softened even more by choosing very modest language on the 
scope issue. In order to display an maximum of modesty without renouncing any ambition for growth, 
the preamble paragraph as formulated above might be changed into something like: “The nuclear-
weapon-free zone in Europe is an undertaking by neutral states, members of the OSCE, belonging to no 
military alliance and have chosen as a matter of their sovereign decision to remain free of nuclear weap-
ons. The original signatories of this treaty hope that the zone might once extend beyond its present 
scope”. 
The OSCE confidence-building measures approach: Complex and revolutionary 
A third (particularly intriguing) possibility would be to mention explicitly the hope to extend the zone to 
the area where the confidence-building measures of the OSCE apply. The option is intriguing as this 
would include a considerable part of the Russian Federation (including a strip east of the Urals). The 
obvious objection that this would fail on Chinese/Japanese resistance could be neutralized by using the 
vast distances of Siberia to locate the weapons in an area where they would be at about equal distance to 
NATO and East Asia (the discussion preceding the INF Treaty is full of this sort of considerations). This 
option should be welcome to the most reluctant NATO members, the Baltic States, as it would remove 
Russian sub-strategic weapons out of range. Russia, at first glance, might be supposed to object because it 
would necessitate not only a re-deployment of sub-strategic nuclear weapons but even of some intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) which are sited in this area. On the other hand, Russia would obtain, for 
a part of its territory including the capital, a security guarantee against nuclear threat and attack, provided 
Western NWS would be prepared to grant it. The condition would be that Russia has not previously 
attacked with nuclear means (something that negative security guarantees towards NWFZs usually pre-
sume, as, so far, the members of these zones have always been NNWS). The United States might consider 
the concession worth the candle given the required re-structuring of Russia’s nuclear forces and the pos-
sibility to remove the sub-strategic part far from Alliance borders. The UK will probably follow, for 
France, however, it would be a major change in doctrine and French readiness for such a change would 
not be assured. The Eastern European states, in turn, may have second thoughts if a conventional attack 
by Russia would be covered by their Western allies’ negative security guarantees. In other words, we 
would face a mindboggling complex situation. This prospect is so revolutionary as to defy imagination; 
still we found it necessary to mention it because it demonstrates the enormous potential for change which 
is inherent in the zone project even if, at this moment, it looks vastly utopian. 
It is our own assessment that this complex stratagem would fail on the rocks of Russian objections. The 
more moderate approach would be for zone members to hope for the success of confidence-building 
members between NATO and Russia, and to enter, if possible, quiet discussions with Russia on possible 
positive reactions in case that NATO NNWS would accede to the zone. From today’s vantage point, it is 
likely that chances for an extension of the zone’s territorial scope would hinge in no small measure from 
the further development of the relationship between NATO and Russia. At any rate, being overambitious 
at the outset of the zone project might be the typical “best being the enemy of the good”. 
Defining the minimum group of initial zone members 
Using the approach with no fixation of the final geographical scope (other than in a modest preambular 
aspiration sentence) would also affect the entry into force question. Requiring the ratification by all states 
eligible for membership before the treaty could enter into force would invite sabotage and postpone legal 
validity ad infinitum. On the other hand, the discussion about the “Mongolian way” has demonstrated 
the shortcomings of the minimalist solution to establish the zone by the fiat of a single state. The initiators 
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should thus seriously explore how many countries would be ready to commit to early ratification. The 
entry into force should then be pre-conditioned on the ratification by a minimum number of states, fewer 
than those ready to commit to ratification (say, if six countries commit to prompt ratification, the condi-
tion might be set at four to have some safety margin against unforeseen developments in one or two of 
the committed proponents). The entry into force clauses in existing NWFZs also require a certain 
amount of ratifications (except for Tlatelolco, which has a more complex mechanism), and the suggested 
formulation would fit with the template. This approach would grant an early existence of the zone, an 
important step to create momentum for the political campaign. 
The patchwork problem 
It might be objected that this would establish the zone in a patchwork way, making it quite different from 
the zones that exist. There are two counterarguments: First – and most important – the European project 
is sui generis and thus special features and procedures cannot and must not be avoided. Second, one of 
the established zones is a patchwork not only in becoming, but in an enduring way, namely the South 
Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone. It is a patchwork by nature, since it extends across a gigantic Ocean, it com-
prehends land territory, territorial waters, and open seas which are terra nullius and are thus not under 
the sovereign rule of the members of the Rarotonga Treaty. But there are two additional features of great 
interest to the European case. 
Rarotonga is open to signature by all South Pacific Forum (now called Pacific Islands Forum) members. 
Presently, that encompasses 16 states which are eligible to join the Zone, by virtue of their membership in 
the South Pacific / Pacific Islands Forum. Only three states are not parties to Rarotonga: Micronesia, 
Palau and Marshall Islands. All three are located north of the equator, and their territory is not part of the 
zone, as delineated in the Treaty’s Annex 1 and the map attached thereto (the equator is the general 
northern border of the zone; parts of Papua New Guinea, Nauru and Kiribati are north of the equator, but 
in the delineation of the zone in Annex 1 these parts are accounted for and therefore included in the 
zone’s territory of application). 
When the Rarotonga Treaty was opened for signature in 1985, the South Pacific Forum had only 13 
members (Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa). Later on, three additional states became 
members of the South Pacific Forum and therefore also eligible to become parties to the Zone – Microne-
sia, the Marshall Islands and Palau (the first two joined the Forum in 1987, the latter in 199485). In 1985, 
these three states were the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the US. This territory 
was not included in the zone, as it was delineated in Annex 1 to the treaty.86 Article 12(3) of the Raroton-
ga Treaty opened the possibility to extend the zone delimited by Annex 1 simply by the accession of states 
outside of this delimited territory, based on the agreement of the members of the South Pacific Forum. 
                                                           
 
85  Savita Pande, “Regional Denuclearisation – II Treaty of Rarotonga: Nuclear- Free South Pacific?”, IDSA’s Strategic Analysis, 
Vol. XXII, No. 2 (May 1998) (available at http://www.idsa-india.org/an-may8-4.html). 
86  Mogami mentioned that it was considered questionable that the US’s Trust Territory was not included in the zone, while 
French Polynesia was. Toshiki Mogami, “The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: A Fettered Leap Forward”, Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 411–430. Mogami writes: “As delimited by Annex 1 of the Treaty, the zone includes 
French Polynesia but not US Trust Territory (sic). Some states called for this inconsistency to be redressed, with PNG 
insisting on its preference for the wider boundary of the South Pacific Commission (SPC)17 which includes the Trust 
Territory. This was overruled, as it 'could complicate current negotiations on the constitutional future of these territories'. 
Such a zonal extension would have irked the US, for it would have included (1) Belau, where the termination of the 
trusteeship is yet to be effectuated because of American antipathy to Belau's non-nuclear constitution, and (2) the Marshall 
Islands – the US 'Air Force's Nuclear Bullseye' (Johnson 1984, Ch. 5) – which has the Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR) where 
American test missiles launched from Vandenberg AFB, California, splash down. The proposed zonal extension would have 
lent support, even if only moral, to the people struggling for a return to true peace; however, the majority of the Treaty 
framers chose to connive at the reality” (pp. 418–419). 
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Hamel-Green suggested that the Zone should be extended north of the equator to cover the Micronesian 
members of the South Pacific Forum. He states that “at the time the treaty was negotiated, these states’ 
territories were not included, primarily because of potential conflict with US strategic interests in the 
region and US requirements under its respective Compact of Free Association agreements with particular 
Micronesia States. Once such states have joined the Forum [South Pacific Forum], it is feasible for the 
treaty to be amended to include such states in its boundaries, although the legal or political necessity of 
gaining US approval may continue to be a constraint. On the other hand, now that the US has itself 
signed the treaty,87 there could be less US opposition to Micronesian states joining, particularly in the 
context of reduced US reliance on overseas land-based stationing and storage of nuclear weapons”.88 
The three states to emerge from the US’s Trust Territory are now the only three members of the Pacific 
Islands Forum which are not parties to Rarotonga (neither signed nor ratified). So according to our un-
derstanding and calculation, article 12(3) has not yet been executed. 
The Rarotonga Treaty’s zone, as it is delineated in its Annex 1, includes territories of three extra-regional 
states – UK (Pitcairn); France (French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna and New Caledonia); and US (Amer-
ican Samoa and Jarvis Island). So these territories fall under the geographical scope of the zone, as defined 
by the Treaty. Because these territories are under the responsibility of extra-regional states, there is the 
Protocol through which those states commit to impose the same prohibitions on those regions in the 
zone that are under their control (Tlatelolco and Pelindaba treaties – the Latin American and African 
NWFZs, respectively – have a similar protocol for extra-regional states with territories in the zone under 
their control). Protocol 1 to Rarotonga is open to signature by these three extra-regional states (US, UK, 
France) and through it they undertake the following: 
“Each Party [to Protocol 1] undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is interna-
tionally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone [emphasis added], the 
prohibitions contained in Articles 3, 5 and 6, in so far as they relate to the manufacture, stationing and 
testing of any nuclear explosive device within those territories, and the safeguards specified in Article 
8(2)(c) and Annex 2 of the Treaty.”  
All three extra-regional states signed Protocol 1 in 1996; only the US has yet to ratify (France ratified 
1996, UK ratified 1997). 
By virtue of these two circumstances the Rarotonga Treaty has set two interesting precedents for the de-
liberations on a NWFZ in Europe: First, the possibility to extend the geographical scope beyond the initial 
delimitation, and second, the possibility to bring the zone into force while there are “holes” in the zonal 
tapestry. If we combine the two precedents, we are close to the European problematic: A zone that con-
sists initially of non-contiguous “islands” free of nuclear weapons with a view to extend the geographical 
zone through new accessions.89 
It should also be noted that the waiver clause in the Tlatelolco Treaty made the emergence of the zone a 
patchwork process as well. The difference as compared to the European project is that the scope of the 
zone in total was agreed by all countries concerned in advance in the case of Tlatelolco, while the realiza-
tion of the zone took a patchwork path. 
                                                           
 
87  Meaning the relevant protocol 
88  Michael Hamel-Green, “The South Pacific – The Treaty of Rarotonga”, in Ramesh Thakur (ed.), Nuclear Weapons-Free 
Zones (Macmillan, 1998), p. 70. 
89  Mogami (op. cit) qualifies Rarotonga as “semi-zonal approach”: “This is typified by the idea to form a 'non-nuclear club', 
whereby the participants of the 'club' may establish a 'zone' but restrict the area of nuclear freedom to their own land and 
maritime territories. ‘Zone' in this case means no more than the expression of the solidarity among the members, predicated 
upon their shared determination to free themselves from nuclear orthodoxy” (p. 426). 
44 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 27 
Finally, it should be noted again that international reference texts quoted above provide a solid base for a 
patchwork approach. According to the UN’s Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zones in All its Aspects, “obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may 
be assumed not only by groups of states, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but 
also by smaller groups of“ without specifying that this group of states must satisfy the criterion of contigu-
ity.90 “Action 9” of the 2010 NPT Conference’s plan for action spoke of “states of the region concerned”, 
not of “the states” or “all states”. This formulation allows for the emergence of a zone with “holes” in its 
territorial space. 
There is little doubt that the initial patchwork shape will lead to criticism from opponents of the project. 
The promoters should make it clear that the zone is held together by the common political will and by the 
common hope that it will expand. They might also argue – pointing to the support by bodies and citizens 
from other European states – that the zone of common political will extends in fact beyond their own 
borders. The stronger these two arguments are made, however, the stronger the challenge to outsiders, 
notably NATO states, will be. Whatever strategy is chosen, it should be clear that the patchwork form, 
while being a bit exceptional, is neither illegal nor principally incompatible with the basic idea of a 
NWFZ. It thus presents no serious stumbling block for those determined to pursue the NWFZ in Europe 
project. 
In the European case, states establishing or later acceding to a zone make a political statement through 
this very act about their determination to delegitimate nuclear weapons and about their conviction that 
those weapons are not instruments of security but of inhumane mass murder, the very opposite of securi-
ty. They also document their hope that the initial patchwork will grow into a carpet with a few holes and 
that, eventually, these holes will be fixed as well, a hope that, as we propose, will be inscribed in the pre-
amble of the zonal treaty. The treatment of the issues of geographical scope and entry into force proposed 
here designs these elements in a way well fit to serve as a tool for the needed political campaign across 
Europe. 
5.2 Undertakings by the parties 
We differentiate between three sets of undertakings, distinguished by their relevance to the primary goal 
of the zonal treaty, and the prohibition of attaching a reservation to it or the permission to do so.  
Basic obligations without opting out  
The following obligations should apply to all parties without the possibility to opt out by uttering a reser-
vation. They represent the hard core of undertakings without which a zone would make no sense. 
 The undertaking not to research on, develop, produce, acquire, possess, transfer, test or use nu-
clear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, not to admit nuclear weapons in the pos-
session or control of another state on one’s territory or to receive such weapons from another 
state for use and maintain and train forces for the purpose of receiving and using such weapons. 
These comprehensive obligations reaffirm those which result from membership as a NNWS in the NPT, 
but add to that an explicit prohibition on testing as well as prohibitions that would be incompatible with 
the current practice of NATO nuclear sharing in its two aspects, a) the stationing of nuclear weapons on 
the territory of European NNWS and b) the arrangement that the air forces of some of these states would 
obtain nuclear weapons in the case of war, carry them to target and drop them. The preparation of armed 
forces for this mission in peacetime is also excluded.  
                                                           
 
90  Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects – Special Report of the Conference 
of the Committee of Disarmament, 8 October 1975 (A/10027/Add.1), p. 41. 
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One might argue that this excludes a group of countries from the region some of which count among the 
most disarmament-minded in the Alliance (Netherlands, Belgium, Germany). While this is true, accept-
ing NATO practice as an unchangeable given would defy the basic purpose of a NWFZ and would inevi-
tably lead to resentment by the members of other zones and the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole, 
obviating the objective to bridge the cleavage within the NPT membership. If the zone project would not 
aim at changing a practice that many governments and citizens view as obsolete it would serve no serious 
political purpose at all. And it might well be that the very fact that accession would be impossible under 
present circumstances, while completely in agreement with the preference of both governments and pop-
ulations in the countries concerned, would finally trigger the broad debate that would encourage execu-
tives and parliaments to break the painful deadlock. 
These obligations would not change the situation for all those NATO countries which do not engage in 
nuclear sharing and/or harbouring US sub-strategic nuclear weapons on their territory. As the member-
ship of Australia in the Rarotonga Treaty documents, even a country covered by a nuclear guarantee in 
the context of an alliance with a NWS (ANZUS in the Australian case) can be party to a NWFZ. By the 
same token, being nuclear-weapon-free does not contradict membership in such an alliance. In fact, dur-
ing the Cold War, it was explicit Danish and Norwegian policy not to deploy such weapons on their terri-
tory, and Spain, when acceding to NATO, insisted that the nuclear deployment at Torrejon Airport be 
terminated. That position was compatible with NATO membership (and even membership in NATO’s 
Nuclear Planning Group) at a time when nuclear weapons were thought to be absolutely essential for 
Alliance defence, a view that during the last decade has been openly disputed even within alliance mem-
bership. When NATO was extended, the Alliance gave a political promise to Russia not to deploy nuclear 
weapons in the new member states (“No need, no intention, no plan”); this commitment put the new 
members in an even more explicit non-nuclear position, since Norway, Denmark and Spain would be 
able to change policy at the national level, while it would take a decision by the whole Alliance to effect 
such a change for the new members. Turning the political posture of NATO’s nuclear weapons free 
members into a legal obligation changes its formal status, but means no change in practice. It is thus not 
excluding NATO members not engaged in nuclear sharing from zone membership. 
 The undertaking to work in all international contexts for a nuclear-weapon-free world and for the 
de-emphasis on nuclear weapons in international security policy. 
This soft obligation, comparable to the wording of Article VI of the NPT, would apply to all parties, but 
assist NATO members party to the zone in their effort to persuade NATO and its reluctant members to 
give arms control and disarmament higher priority, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance 
policy and to drop the still held option to use nuclear weapons first in conflict. This effort has been visible 
for a while, but has led so far only to limited progress. 
Non-essential obligations with opting out 
 Refrain from permitting the presence of nuclear weapons in the territorial waters of the party and 
from permitting transit through its territory.  
Similar undertakings are found in the Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaties where the prohibited “station-
ing” is defined as including “transport on land”. Bangkok prohibits “station or transport of nuclear weap-
ons by any means”. This undertaking would not only exclude nuclear sharing, but interfere with the flexi-
bility of NATO regarding its nuclear umbrella in peacetime, crisis and wartime once NATO members 
became party to the zone. While fully compatible with the objectives of a zone, it might be prohibitive to 
even disarmament-minded NATO members, thus limiting membership for the foreseeable future. It 
might thus be considered to put this provision under an “opting out” option by admitting a reservation. 
Alternatively, parties could be given unlimited discretion to permit transit, or only transit on the ground 
might be prohibited while overflight and passage through territorial waters and calls on port might re-
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main in the national purview of the parties which could, by national legislation, go beyond the core un-
dertakings of the zonal treaty, following the example of New Zealand. 
 Renounce all participation in nuclear planning. 
This would prevent zone members from participating in NATO’s nuclear planning group. However, 
NATO members might claim that their membership in the planning group were indispensable to imple-
ment another obligation not subject to reservation, namely working for the de-emphasis on nuclear 
weapons. One should keep in mind that Norway, probably the most disarmament-minded NATO mem-
ber, has been sitting in the nuclear planning group for decades. It might thus be useful to keep an opting-
out clause on this provision or leave it completely to national discretion. 
Non-essential but useful obligations 
 Commit itself to restricting any nuclear energy and other technology use to strictly and unambig-
uously peaceful activities und observation of the toughest nuclear and radiological safety standards 
available and to refrain from dumping nuclear and radioactive material, 
 Undertake to grant the IAEA verification rights in line with the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement and the Additional Protocol and to make these rights permanent for all facilities, ma-
terials and technologies acquired, produced and/or maintained during membership in the Zone 
(for concrete verification measures see section 5.3), 
 Adopt proliferation resistant technologies as they come along, 
 Subject all fissile nuclear material and waste that is being present and has been produced on its 
domestic territory to appropriate safeguards and physical protection in line with the 2005 
amendment91 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
 The undertaking not to produce or use highly enriched uranium in whatever mode. 
These undertakings would go beyond the NPT and support a global trend, reinforced by the Nuclear 
Security Summits and led by the United States. It would be a contribution to global non-proliferation and 
give the zone a positive aspect from the perspective of US interests. While it is not absolute essential for 
establishing the zone, it is strongly recommended to consider it for inclusion in the zonal treaty. 
Although these four undertakings do only entail commitments that already exist, they would have a con-
siderable value added. They would clarify the ambivalence in the NPT concerning the endurance of safe-
guards after withdrawal by a party from the Treaty that in case of the nuclear test-ban, seen that the entry 
into force of the CTBT is still pending.  
 Prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations 
 Refrain from transferring nuclear material and nuclear dual use technology to any NNWS unless 
the recipient has concluded with the IAEA a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and signed 
the Additional Protocol.  
A NWFZ could consider going beyond existing regulation also in case of proper nuclear waste manage-
ment and the provision of nuclear material by following the Semipalatinsk treaty and stipulating the ap-
plication of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material together with its 2005 amend-
ment (entry into force still pending) and by making a signature of the IAEA Additional Protocol manda-
tory for the reception of nuclear material from states members to the zone. This would create value added 
in terms of nuclear security.  
                                                           
 
91  GOV/INF/2005/10-GC(49)/INF/6 (available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49inf-6.pdf).  
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In general, it should be recalled that zone members are free to complement their undertakings with far-
ther-going legal commitments in form of national law, as long as the respective provisions do not contra-
dict their obligations under the zone treaty and other treaties they are parties to. It will be useful to have 
discussions about “best practices” during review conferences of the zonal treaty where member states 
present and discuss such extra-treaty commitments.  
Article for accession of nuclear weapon states and NATO states with a previous nuclear role 
The modalities of the accession of NWS and NATO NNWS with (previously) nuclear weapons on their 
territories could be modelled after the related article in the Pelindaba Treaty.92 In the sentence on verifica-
tion, the “commission” might be replaced by “any organization or arrangement with a third party a state 
member of the zone might be party to whose mission is to verify the absence of nuclear weapons and 
related activities”. This would accommodate a mutual verification arrangement among NWS that is likely 
to be established in the process of complete nuclear disarmament and might become relevant to the zone 
once former NWS would wish to accede in the process of nuclear disarmament. 
In order to enable NATO members to accede who had previously nuclear weapons on their territories 
and whose air forces had a role in nuclear sharing, an article should call for declaration of (former) sites 
with nuclear weapons and provide for the IAEA to verify the absence of nuclear weapons in these sites It 
might be unnecessary also to verify the reconfiguration of aircraft for non-nuclear missions (because, 
most probably, present nuclear-capable dual use aircraft will be retired). If deemed necessary, however, 
such verification measures could draw on comparable verification procedures in the START Treaties. 
Generally, the IAEA should be given the authority to check continued non-deployment (see section 5.3 
below on verification). 
5.3 Verification  
In its 1975 study, the UNGA stated that, among other characteristics, “an international system of verifica-
tion and control” must be “established to guarantee compliance with the zone treaty obligations”.93 It also 
states that the scope of a NWFZ means the “total absence of nuclear weapons”. Usually, verification tries 
to match the scope: it should be adequate and economical, not redundant. The “total absence” is com-
monly understood as a ban on the control, possession, testing, deployment, acquisition by any means, or 
transporting of nuclear weapons. The Treaties of Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk even ban “research and 
development”. Ideally, all of these activities should be verified; in the NWFZs that are in force today, this 
happens only to a certain extent. 
The ban on “acquisition by any means” is verified by IAEA safeguards. Thereby, “possession” is verified 
as well, if an “acquisition” was successful. To a certain extent, safeguards cover also the detection of “de-
velopment”, especially after the safeguards reforms over the past two decades. Verification reaches its 
limits in case of “research”. Furthermore, non-testing is verified, simply by the provision that any mem-
ber of a NWFZ signs and ratifies the CTBT. The CTBT – though not yet in force – has a global and very 
                                                           
 
92  “Each Party undertakes:  
 (a)  To declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices;  
 (b)  To dismantle and destroy any nuclear device that it has manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty;  
 (c)  To destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or, where possible, to convert them to peaceful 
uses;  
 (d)  To permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as IAEA) and the Commission established 
in article 12 to verify the processes of dismantling and destruction of the nuclear explosive devices, as well as the destruction 
or conversion of the facilities for their production”. 
93  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX), Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zones in All its Aspects, 11 December 1975 
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effective verification system that operates already today.94 What is not verified in existing treaties is the 
absence of “control”, “deployment”, and “transport” of nuclear weapons. This is relevant for NATO’s 
nuclear sharing arrangements, the ensuing deployment of nuclear weapons in NNWS’ territories and the 
nuclear capabilities of selected air forces.  
Possible verification scenarios of a NWFZ in Europe could include IAEA safeguards, and some reporting 
or even inspection mechanisms to verify the absence of nuclear weapons on the participant's soil, possibly 
by the instrument of challenge inspections; this would hardly ever be applied, since the trust prevailing in 
Europe is almost certain to prevent both cheating and challenge. It would be advisable to follow the prec-
edent of most arms control treaties and to detail the verification system in a protocol, not the treaty itself, 
and to make the protocol easily adaptable to changing circumstances, notably improvements in verifica-
tion technology. 
Full-scope IAEA safeguards 
In its 1999 report on NWFZs, the UN approached verification in a very specific way:95 Verification should 
be provided “inter alia, through the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities in 
the zone”. This was understood as INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements with the IAEA. 
INFCIRC/153 (corr.) of 1972 is a model for the agreements that each state concludes with the IAEA. Full-
scope safeguards cover the complete inventory of nuclear materials in a state and are applied to all its 
facilities in order to account for its total inventory of fissile materials. All NPT NNWS members are sub-
ject to full-scope IAEA safeguards, including all European countries except the NWS UK and France.96 
Each state with full-scope safeguards must maintain a State System of Accounting for and Control of 
nuclear materials (SSAC) that reports to the IAEA, which in turn verifies the correctness of this reporting. 
In accordance with the 1999 UN Report, the verification provisions of all NWFZs that are in force today 
rule that the member states are at least subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. Because today all members 
of a NWFZ are also NNWS members of the NPT, this requirement is easy to meet. 
There is also a regional verification system in Europe, namely EURATOM, founded in the early 1950s. In 
the early ages of nuclear industry, it created international confidence as well as confidence among the 
members of the then European Community. EURATOM verifies all civilian nuclear activities in the EU. 
The early EU members do not run a national SSAC but use EURATOM for this function. They will con-
tinue this practice in case they become members of a NWFZ. EURATOM safeguards the entire civilian 
nuclear fuel cycle in the EU, including in the NWS UK and France. These safeguards are at least as intru-
sive as IAEA safeguards. Should UK and France one day decide to abolish their nuclear weapons and join 
a NWFZ, IAEA verification will built upon the EURATOM safeguards already in place. EURATOM 
therefore could play a role in a NWFZ in Europe, and this already in the founding stage – provided oppo-
nents of the project which are members of the EU do not object; the role of EURATOM could be the 
same as for NPT verification. It might also be considered to offer EURATOM services to non-EU mem-
bers in the future. 
                                                           
 
94  When the CTBT enters into force, it will also be possible to conduct inspections. So far, inspection exercises are already 
conducted in many countries. 
95  Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region 
concerned, Annex I in Report of the Disarmament Commission, UNGA, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42), 1999.  
96  INFCIRC/153-type safeguards make use of various methods, including declarations and material accountancy, containment 
and surveillance, non-destructive and destructive analysis methods, and on-site inspections in nuclear plants, storage, and 
transports. 
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The Additional Protocol 
Until 1992, the IAEA applied its safeguards only to materials and installations that a state party had 
declared. It worked under the tacit assumption that those declarations were complete, but the com-
pleteness, although required by INFCIRC/153, was not verified. This changed with the approval by the 
Board of Governors of INFCIRC/540, called “Additional Protocol”, which regulates additional rights of 
the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared activities. All states with INFCIRC/153 type agreements 
are requested to conclude Additional Protocols. 
The Additional Protocol requests access beyond nuclear sites, access on “short notice” or “no notice” 
during routine inspections, expanded declarations that ask for information about activities and equip-
ment functionally related to fuel cycle operations, including exports and imports of such technologies, 
as well as ongoing research. The reform also permits taking environmental samples not only at an 
inspected facility (which had been already legal) but also in the vicinity under certain circumstances as 
well as remote monitoring. The Agency has established a database to store and retrieve safeguards-
relevant information from open sources which assists in interpreting the expanded data and in depict-
ing a proliferation or non-proliferation profile of a state. Furthermore, the new protocol allows the 
IAEA to make use of “third party information”, i.e. press reports or information provided by member 
states. The latter may also include intelligence information or national technical means. 
All EU member states plus Norway and Switzerland have an Additional Protocol in force. For signato-
ries Belarus, Liechtenstein, and Serbia it is not yet in force.97 Overall, it would make sense to include the 
provision to adopt the Additional Protocol in a European NWFZ. 
Integrated Safeguards and the State Level Approach 
After the Additional Protocol had been adopted, further development of IAEA safeguards led to the 
concept of Integrated Safeguards (IS), i.e. the optimized combination of traditional full-scope safeguards 
and the new tools provided by the Additional Protocol, and they eliminate redundancies and ineffi-
ciencies due to the previous overlap of traditional and strengthened measures. States grant the IAEA 
more inspection and access rights, and in return, the higher detection probability of undeclared activi-
ties allows for a reduction of safeguards efforts of declared material by randomization of safeguards. 
An advantage is the reduction of costs. 
States that qualify for IS are those with both full-scope safeguards and the Additional Protocol; they 
enjoy high trust and a low probability of non-compliance. In order to evaluate states and to find out 
whether they qualify for IS, the IAEA establishes an overall assessment for each state that takes into 
account various factors, including its non-proliferation credentials, the set of all its nuclear activities, 
the presence of equipment and installations, or consistency or inconsistency of nuclear material uses. It 
also includes information that the Agency obtains by other sources. This new approach is called State 
Level Approach.98 
All EU NNWS with nuclear industry have qualified for IS, and so has Norway.99 Some countries with 
Additional Protocols in place such as Switzerland are still abstaining, which can be probably explained 
by the still preliminary nature of the State Level Approach. The criteria for state assessments and the 
list of state-specific factors for evaluations are being further developed to minimize the degree of sub-
                                                           
 
97  IAEA, Additional Protocol Status List, 31 December 2012. 
98  James W. Tape, The State-Level Approach: Moving Beyond Integrated Safeguards, LA-UR-08-6/14, INMM/ESARDA 
Workshop Tokyo, October 2008. 
99  IAEA Press Release, Agreement Reached on Integrated Safeguards in European Union, 8 January 2010; IAEA Safeguards 
Statement for 2010 and Background to the Safeguards Statement (http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es/es2010.html). 
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jectivity.100 Switzerland has expressed interest but appears to wait for more clarification concerning the 
procedures.101 
As the qualification for Integrated Safeguards is recognition of good standing in terms of non-
proliferation, a NWFZ in Europe could set a precedent and require its members to strive for this quali-
fication or to achieve it in a certain time frame. 
Verification of the absence of deployment, transport, and control of warheads 
States accede to the zone once they are nuclear-weapon-free. As nuclear weapons must thus be, as a 
matter of principle, absent from the zone, the verification system of a NWFZ in Europe would be rela-
tively simple as long as membership remains confined to states where nuclear weapons have never 
been deployed. Members could notify the absence of nuclear weapons, and they could provide for 
baseline on-site inspections on military sites, by inspector teams composed of state party nationals or 
by the IAEA if it had acquired the necessary capabilities. Inspection goal would not be to verify the 
withdrawal of nuclear weapons but only their absence. Since initial membership would probably only 
include countries that had never hosted nuclear weapons on their soil, these baseline inspections might 
appear unnecessary 
Should US deployment of warheads in Europe cease in the future, and host states accede to the NWFZ, 
inspections would probably start after the removal of these weapons. This could be left open in a treaty 
text. The IAEA should have the option to visit former nuclear weapon sites (baseline inspec-
tions).Verification of the absence of deployments has pros and cons: First of all, confidence is high 
anyway that all members comply, and problems among the member states are not to be expected. The 
verification is thus more a demonstration to the outside, and sends a signal that strengthens other 
nuclear disarmament efforts.  
Verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons held by former NWS which had become nuclear 
weapons free and members of the zone would certainly fall in the scope of a nuclear disarmament trea-
ty (that is, a “nuclear weapons convention”) and dealt with separately from the zone treaty. As men-
tioned earlier, the treaty should have an opening clause for easy amendment concerning this contin-
gency because the modalities of elimination verification are yet unknown and should not bother the 
zone as such. 
IAEA verification activities are mainly geared towards the nuclear fuel cycle and do not focus on the 
absence of nuclear weapons. However, the Agency has verified the absence of nuclear weapons several 
times before, twice in Iraq, in South Africa, and in the three former Soviet republics where strategic 
nuclear weapons had been deployed. The Agency has experience with integrating nuclear weapons 
experts from nuclear weapons states into its staff on an interim basis. This should thus create no major 
difficulties. 
At any rate, there should be the possibility of short-term inspections or confirming the absence of 
nuclear weapons; probably, this instrument would not be used with high frequency. 
                                                           
 
100  As an example, the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management has sponsored a workshop on “Evolving the IAEA State-Level 
Concept”, May 14–16, 2012, University of Virginia, USA. 
101  In a statement at the 56th session of the IAEA General Conference on 19 September 2012, the Swiss delegate expressed this: 
„Concerning this issue, the Secretariat is introducing information elements into the basic system of safeguards as well as into 
the integrated safeguards. My delegation is highly interested in this development and encourages the Secretariat to inform 
the Board of Governors on the progress made in these deliberations, especially regarding the content of the objectives 
relating to the State-level approach, as well as the criteria that may be attached to them. My delegation would also like the 
Secretariat to provide information relating to the practical framework within which information will be independently 
evaluated“. 
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Societal Verification 
Europe is a democratic area with a vivid civil society. It behoves this region to support the concept of 
societal verification by adopting it for its own NWFZ. Information offered by non-governmental actors 
– individuals and organizations – should be legitimately used by the IAEA in its verification activities. 
Member states should be obliged not to harass or prosecute whistle-blowers and, if they do, the other 
parties should be empowered and obliged to offer asylum notwithstanding existing extradition com-
mitments which, for this specific case, would be suspended by the zonal treaty. 
Consultation mechanisms 
Verification must be complemented by a consultation mechanism managed by the organization 
founded by the zone treaty. It must provide for notifications in cases of problems, and regular and 
special meetings. There should be provisions for data exchange, transparency, notifications, clarifica-
tions, rules of procedure and collaboration with the IAEA and EURATOM with a view to allow addi-
tional IAEA inspections in case of need of clarification.102 
5.4 Formal provisions 
Organization 
The zone treaty would provide for an organization to administer the treaty as soon as it enters into 
force. The organization would consist of a secretariat and a general conference meeting annually to 
take relevant decisions. It would be charged with coordinating with the IAEA in the realm of verifica-
tion. The organization would also be responsible for managing a website, a responsibility that could be 
explicitly mentioned in the treaty (this mentioning would give status to citizens endorsing the zone; see 
section 5.5.6 below).  
Depositary 
Choosing a depositary for the zone is a tricky issue. The regional organizations (OSCE, EU) are likely 
to be prevented by member states opposed to the zonal project. The UN Secretary General has the 
authority to assume such a role without caring for the grumblings of permanent UNSC members, but 
it is not a regional authority and might thus be seen as an inadequate institution. The least complicated 
option would be to entrust one or more of the states that reassure each other to ratify the zonal treaty 
forthwith with the mission to act as depositary.  
Amendments 
On amendments, two approaches are possible. First, to make the Treaty easily amendable in order to 
be able to cope smoothly with the accession of NATO states, notably those with a present nuclear role, 
and of course future membership of nuclear weapons states (or parts thereof). These changes might 
necessitate regulating aspects that were not thought through at the time the text was agreed between 
neutral NNWS. On the other hand, states might be shy to enter legally binding obligations that are 
easily changed. It might be reasonable to have different procedures for amending the Treaty with re-
                                                           
 
102  The Treaty of Tlatelolco establishes the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). Its 
organs are a General Conference, a Council, and a Secretariat. The Council may request “special inspections” to be 
conducted by the IAEA. Treaty of Rarotonga also runs a “Control System”. In addition to the IAEA safeguards, it incorporates 
reports and exchange of information and consultation mechanism that may trigger special inspections. Similarly, the Treaty 
of Pelindaba establishes the African Commission on Nuclear Energy and consultation procedure. The Commission may 
request the IAEA to conduct an inspection in case of suspicions and disagreements. The Treaty of Bangkok establishes the 
Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, an Executive Committee among whose tasks are, if 
requested, “fact-finding missions” in addition to IAEA safeguards. The Treaty of Semipalatinsk simply enables “consultative 
meetings” and the “settlement of disputes”, but does not trigger any additional IAEA inspections. See comparative chart in 
the Annex regarding the existing zones’ control systems. 
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gard to the first contingency – negotiating the accession of NATO states – and for all other business, 
where routine procedures for amendment are more advisable, such as amendment conferences requir-
ing unanimity, and/or having the amendment in force only for those countries having ratified it. 
Withdrawal 
There are reasons to make withdrawal difficult in order to discourage reversal movements. Withdrawal 
from the obligation to stay nuclear weapons free in a region like Europe could be a highly destabilizing 
event which one might wish to make difficult enough. One far-reaching possibility would be that “su-
preme reasons related to the substance of the treaty” must be stated in detail well in advance of with-
drawal becoming effective (say, one year), and submitted to the UNSC and the International Court of 
Justice for checking plausibility and validity. If one of the two bodies would find the justification want-
ing, withdrawal would be null and void. On the other hand, such strict rules might make states think 
twice before accession (notably NWS about to decide whether they should disarm). Measures which 
have been discussed for more than a decade now in the context of the NPT might be considered as well 
as the regional level: Having the UNSC scrutinizing the reasons given for withdrawal, having a confer-
ence of all members of the zone debate the withdrawal, if possible with the withdrawing party, making 
withdrawal invalid if it takes place in a state of non-compliance by the withdrawing party. In the end, 
given the expected small numbers of those initially ready to join, one would not make this item the 
reason why one or more of them would not. In this case, standard formulations like the one in the NPT 
might be the option of choice. 
5.5 Protocols for non-members 
NWFZs require certain non-zonal states to respect the provisions of the zone and sign specific proto-
cols which are attached to the actual treaty text. Therefore, whereas all states within a NWFZ are re-
quired to sign and ratify the actual treaty, selected states outside the NWFZ (and hence non-members 
of the zone) are expected to sign and ratify the relevant protocols attached to the treaty.  
The peculiarity of the NWFZ in Europe lies in the fact, that – unlike in the other NWFZs – the dividing 
line between the in-group and out-group might change over time. Hence, a NWS in Europe, which 
would be considered a non-member today (and hence should sign the appropriate protocol), could 
theoretically become a NWFZ member tomorrow (and hence should sign the actual treaty), if it de-
cides to denuclearize its territory. This holds even more for European NATO countries stationing 
nuclear weapons on their territory. 
Extra-regional states required to sign NWFZ protocols historically comprised two types of actors: first, 
the five NWS recognized by the NPT; and secondly, states outside the zone, which controlled de jure or 
de facto territories within the NWFZ.103 Since the latter case does not apply to the broad concept of 
“Europe” underlying this study (there are no regions under control of any extra-European power), the 
prime candidates to sign protocols pertaining to a NWFZ in Europe are the five NWS recognized by 
the NPT, and thus the US, Russia, China, France and the UK.104 
                                                           
 
103  This was the case, for example, in the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ, where the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
France and the United States were requested to comply with the prohibitions of the Tlatelolco Treaty in their overseas 
territory, which lied within the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ, see Protocol I, Treaty of Tlatelolco. Analogous cases 
can be found in the Pelindaba Treaty and the Treaty of Rarotonga, in short, in all regions, which had experienced some 
colonial past and where former colonial powers still retained some control over some of the territory within the zone. 
104  The question why other nuclear weapon possessors, who are not NPT Members, are not considered, is theoretically valid, but 
goes beyond the scope of this study. All other existing NWFZ limit themselves to require the “established“ five NWS 
mentioned above to sign the attached protocols.  
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The importance of these non-member states should not be underestimated, since some observers see 
their participation in the regime as equally, if not more important than the participation of actual zonal 
states to the project of a NWFZ.105 At the end of the day, NWFZs codify an obligation to forego nuclear 
arms, which states within the zone usually already fulfil, mostly through their membership to the NPT 
as NNWS; but through their protocols NWFZs impose real restrictions on (outside) NWS, both with 
respect to their freedom of movement (NWFZs become off-limits for their weapons, in terms of de-
ployment or testing), and with respect to their nuclear doctrines, which must exempt states within a 
NWFZ from the threat of using nuclear weapons against them. Although in practice these restrictions 
have not proved to be perfectly water-tight, one should not discard the symbolical and normative di-
mension of these limitations. They contribute to the overall delegitimation of nuclear weapons as in-
struments of power (see also section 3.2.3). 
Hence, by the spread of NWFZs and through the process of binding NWS into these zones, the “pan-
demic” of nuclear weapons can be gradually overcome, as a Mexican delegate put it at the UN Confer-
ence of the Committee on Disarmament in 1975: “the most natural and appropriate procedures in such 
case would be similar to those applied in the case of an epidemic, namely, an endeavour gradually to 
widen the zones of the world in which nuclear weapons are outlawed until the territories of the States 
that persist in possessing them become, as it were, contaminated islets under quarantine”.106 
Since NWFZs affect the freedom of action of NWS, it is of no surprise that the protocols attached to 
the zones were often met with scepticism and sometimes with outright rejection by some NWS. A 
possible NWFZ in Europe will be no exception to this rule: it can be expected that several objections 
might be raised by NWS, when they are asked to sign and ratify the associated protocols to such a zone, 
and thus to show respect for the undertakings of the NWFZ. 
Nuclear weapon states 
As a matter of fact, the minimum demand to the NWS would be to show respect and commitment to a 
NWFZ in Europe. This would entail two basic obligations: first, to refrain from stationing any nuclear 
weapon within the zone, and secondly, to issue unambiguous negative security assurances (NSA) to all 
members of the zone. We recall here what has been said earlier in the study that the experiences con-
cerning the Budapest Memorandum might have an impact on how security assurances for a European 
NWFZ might be shaped. These experiences did not include an explicit nuclear threat or attack, but the 
subtle use of military force accompanied by “nuclear diplomacy” which could be read by non-nuclear 
weapon states as implying a nuclear threat without uttering it. In the following, we restrict ourselves 
nevertheless to a more traditional consideration of negative security assurances. 
Both issues will represent a challenge for the US and Russia, due to the “nuclear umbrella” Washington 
is providing to its NATO allies (which includes the stationing of 160-200 US B61 nuclear gravity 
bombs in Europe and Turkey) and the security partnerships between Russia and a number of Europe-
an clients such as Belarus and Armenia. Should any of these clients join the European NWFZ, some 
NWS might face a dilemma. In the past at least, the US, France and the UK were reluctant to grant 
legally binding NSA to third parties, which were allied to other NWS.107 The current US doctrine, how-
                                                           
 
105  On this issue see Christopher Daase, “Ursache und Wirkung regionaler Nichtverbreitung: Ansätze zu einer Theorie 
Nuklearwaffenfreier Zonen“, in Constanze Eisenbart and Christopher Daase (eds.), Nuklearwaffenfreie Zonen, Neue 
Aktualität eines alten Konzepts (Heidelberg, 2000), p. 105. 
106  Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Annex II, 41. 
 http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage /ODAPublications /DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/A-10027-Add1.pdf. 
107  Leonard S. Spector and Aubrie Ohlde, “Negative Security Assurances: Revisiting the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Option”, 
Arms Control Today (April 2005). These reservations were of political nature, since – legally speaking – most security 
cooperation agreements were not incompatible with the undertakings of a NWFZ; for a legal analysis of this issue in the 
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ever, extends negative security guarantees to all non-nuclear weapon states in good standing with their 
non-proliferation undertakings; and the recent signature of the protocols of the CANWFZ by the US, 
France and the UK is another sign that being an ally of a NWS (as Kazakhstan is with respect to Russia) 
does not have to be in contrast with negative security assurances by other NWS.  
A less problematic issue might arise in the context on how to regulate transit rights of NWS’ ships and 
aircraft through a NWFZ in Europe. True, several European states are engaged in security partnerships 
with NWS through NATO, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, known as Tashkent Trea-
ty), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or specific bilateral agreements (Russia-Belarus; Rus-
sia-Azerbaijan; Russia-Armenia), and these partnerships can entail port calls, stopovers at national 
airfields and overflights by a nuclear-armed ally, and thus the transit of nuclear weapons through the 
zone. Still, if non-nuclear allies of NWS shall be eligible for the NWFZ in Europe, assuming they will 
not fundamentally challenge their existing security arrangements, the issue of transit rights shall not 
represent a major obstacle.108 Hence, NWS could in principle continue their security commitments to 
their “clients” within the zone, as long as they refrain from stationing (permanently) nuclear weapons 
in the interested country.  
The difficulties of the NWS with the treaty of Bangkok suggest also restraining the NWFZ in Europe to 
the land-masses and the corresponding territorial waters of the respective member states. Extending 
the NWFZ to the exclusive economic zone (as the treaty of Bangkok did) might prove problematic in 
the context of the Law of the Seas and in the light of the presence of Russia’s Northern Fleet in the 
Baltic and the Barents Sea, and the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.  
A further ingredient to a European NWFZ protocol should be the obligation to refrain from testing 
within the zone. This prohibition should be unproblematic, since the only active test site on European 
soil is represented by the Russian Novaya Zemlya archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. Since Moscow 
signed and ratified the CTBT (as did Paris and London, who had relied on extra-European test site 
before), signing a testing prohibition within a European NWFZ (as large as it might be) should not 
represent a major obstacle to the NWS. 
Hence, a “minimalistic” protocol for NWS should include the prohibition of stationing and testing of 
nuclear weapons within the zone as well as a commitment not to threaten or to use nuclear weapons 
against any member of the zone. The NWFZ geographical scope should be restricted to the land masses 
and territorial waters and the treaty should be pragmatic on the issue of transit rights due to the com-
plex security fabric of the Old Continent, which ties together different European states with four NWS: 
the US, France, the UK and Russia. 
It might be considered to require additional commitments from member states and the NWS, such as 
not to attack nuclear installations within the zone and to refrain from dumping nuclear waste within 
the land and sea region covered by the zone. It is true that these commitments, so far, have been insert-
ed into zone treaties for their members, but not for external powers, but one would wish to bind the 
states with the largest power projection capacity to these undertakings as well. Such clauses should not 
represent a major obstacle for NWS to sign their protocol to a NWFZ in Europe.109 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
context of the CANWFZ, see Marco Roscini, “Something Old, Something New: The 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty on a Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia”, Chinese Journal of International Law (2008), Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 593–624. 
108  For a good and concise discussion on this issue see Roberta Mulas, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and the Nuclear Powers. 
Lessons for a WMD/DVs Free Zone in the Middle East, Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East, Policy Brief No. 5 
(December 2011). For an exhaustive discussion see Marco Roscini, Le zone denuclearizzate (Giappichelli Editore, Torino 
2003), pp. 145–256. 
109  The Pelindaba Treaty contains a clause obliging members not to attack nuclear installations in the zone. The NWS take this 
commitment indirectly by pledging to respect the objectives of the zone. An explicit clause could represent an obstacle for 
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The protocol should include a clause that its validity would cease when the signatory would become a 
member of the zone and the undertakings of the zone treaty would then substitute for those of the 
protocol. 
NATO non-nuclear weapon states  
According to well-informed nongovernmental sources, five NATO countries, which formally belong to 
the NNWS of the NPT, are currently hosting US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) –B61 gravity bombs 
– in the context of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements.110 These “stationing countries” are Belgium 
(10-20 estimated bombs), Germany (10-20), the Netherlands (10-20), Italy (60-70) and Turkey (60-
70).111 Although the bombs are under the physical control of US forces (which are deployed in these 
NATO countries) during peace times, they are planned to be used by the Belgian, Dutch, German or 
Italian air force in case a major war breaks out, pending the approval of the US President. 
At the same time a number of NATO countries such as Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Spain have not 
been allowing the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories for many years (this prohibition 
holds only during peace-time, though); Greece, who openly sympathized with the idea of a Balkan 
NWFZ during the Cold War, is believed to have worked successfully toward the quiet removal of US 
TNW from its soil at the beginning of the 21st century; and finally, after NATO’s pledge not to deploy 
its TNW to its new member states (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Croatia) there is a de-facto denuclearized (NATO) 
buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe. 
At first glance, it would seem sufficient that the five NATO countries with nuclear weapons on their 
territories would rule out to use the B61 bombs against any member of a NWFZ in Europe, and sign an 
appropriate protocol, as the official NWS do.112 Still, the practical implementation of such a commit-
ment would be problematic, since NATO does not mention the specific member states, which host 
TNW and are trained to deliver them, but rather emphasizes that the Alliance as a whole relies on 
nuclear deterrence and that all states contribute to this endeavour through their engagement in 
NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and some appropriate burden sharing to implement the Alliance 
nuclear mission.  
Therefore, even NATO countries without nuclear weapons on their territory are taking part in the 
Alliance’s nuclear posture. Although they will not deliver nuclear weapons in case of war, their nuclear 
engagement is visible in four fields: first, they shape NATO’s nuclear policies through their delibera-
tions in the Nuclear Planning Group; second, they may take part in non-nuclear support missions to a 
nuclear strike (air refuelling, search and rescue operations etc.);113 third, they “benefit” from NATO’s 
extended deterrence policy, which means that an armed attack against these (nominally) non-nuclear 
countries – for example from a state within the NWFZ in Europe – might well lead to nuclear retalia-
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
the WMDFZ in the Middle East, though, if Iran’s nuclear programme continues to cause distrust in the international 
community. It is unlikely that the US under these circumstances would commit to a pledge not to attack the Iranian nuclear 
installations under the current circumstances, even if a WMDFZ was established in the region. However, if there would be 
détente between Washington and Teheran, this situation might change. 
110  Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, 
No. 1 (2011), pp. 64–73.  
111  All estimates taken from Hans M. Kristensen, Non-strategic nuclear weapons, Federation of American Scientists, Special 
Report No. 3 (May 2012). 
112  This issue should not preclude the fact, that they might become zone members at some later stage, if they decide to 
denuclearise their territory (the same holds for the European NWS). 
113  „Already today, 15 nonnuclear NATO member states provide support to, as the NATO jargon says, SNOWCAT missions 
(Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics)“. Karl-Heinz Kamp and Robertus C.N. Remkes, “Options for 
NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements”, in Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams (eds.), Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe. 
A Framework for Action, NTI (Washington 2011).  
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tion by their NATO allies; fourth, some of these countries have a crucial role in the deployment of 
NATO’s planned ballistic missile defence system (this holds especially for a number of new Alliance 
members). Ballistic missile defence systems are, of course, not armed with nuclear warheads, but they 
can have a critical impact on the strategic stability in a region and hence cannot be ignored in the over-
all strategic equation. Thus, it would be desirable that all NATO NNWS would rule out taking part, in 
whatever capacity, in a nuclear attack against members of the zone in case of an armed conflict and 
sign a corresponding protocol. In terms of security policy and strategic considerations this should not 
be problematic as long as the expected initial core of the zone is concerned. It would be more interest-
ing and possibly controversial when countries like Belarus, Ukraine, or Armenia would accede to the 
zone while being engaged in security relations with Russia. However, as long as the US negative securi-
ty assurance stays as it now stands, excluding the use of nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear 
weapons states in good standing, the dropping of US weapons on the territory of such states should be 
impossible notwithstanding whose air force is implementing the mission. 
In sum, due to the fact that there are not only three NWS (Russia, the UK and France) in Europe, but 
also an extended nuclear alliance with the worldwide unique case of nuclear weapons deployed on the 
territory of a number of NNWS, both NWS and NATO Members should sign protocols codifying their 
respect to a NWFZ in Europe; the NWS and NATO Members should especially rule out any threat or 
use of nuclear weapons against any member of the zone. Russian allies should be invited to sign such 
protocols as well. 
For NATO, such a request might prompt a review of the current strategic principles of the Alliance, 
which posit that NATO is a nuclear alliance that does not rule out nuclear retaliation in case of an 
armed attack on one of its members. If, as a consequence of such a review, NATO would adopt the 
current US position on negative security assurances – no nuclear threat or attack against NNWS in 
good standing with their undertakings under the NPT (or any equivalent legal commitment), there 
would be no substantial problem to sign the said protocol. However, measured by the positions taken 
during the last review of NATO’s nuclear policy in 2010, France might be expected to express consid-
erable objections to such a change. 
As in the case of NWS joining the zone, the provisions of the protocol would cease to apply for NATO 
NNWS once they would accede as full members to the zone treaty.  
A unified protocol 
There might be objections to either type of protocol discussed above. Even though the NWS protocol is 
standard in all NWFZ treaties, under present circumstances (notably the humanitarian discourse about 
nuclear weapons and the campaign for a nuclear weapons convention), it might be argued by some 
disarmament-minded parts of civil society that spelling out negative security assurances would imply 
the legitimacy of nuclear use towards parties not covered by such assurances which would contradict 
the core of the humanitarian argument. Likewise, there might be concern that a legal commitment by 
NATO’s NNWS not to participate in nuclear war against members of the zone might convey legitima-
cy to both attacks towards other states and NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, an operation that 
some actors might wish to avoid. On the other hand, it might be objected that the relationship between 
NATO’s NNWS and the potential members of the zone are so friendly, and likely to remain so, that 
such protocols are not only redundant, but could be seen by the potential signatories as a political of-
fense. 
From this perspective, a unified protocol for NWS and non-nuclear NATO members in which signato-
ries commit just to respect the objectives and provisions of the zone treaty without spelling out in de-
tail what this would mean might be the more desirable alternative. A security guarantee would be im-
plicit rather than explicit, but since threatening or using nuclear weapons against the zone is an act 
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certainly not compatible with the notion of “respect” this might be good enough to accept. On the 
other hand, the vaguer language might stimulate less objections and concerns on the part of potential 
signatories. Yet it would be noted that this option would present a tangible difference to the standard 
established by other NWFZ. 
No protocols 
A more radical way to avoid political difficulties and moral hazards is to have no protocols at all. The 
relationship between zone members, on the one hand, and NWS and other states in the region, on the 
other hand would be dealt with in the preamble of the zone treaty. A preambular paragraph would 
state unambiguously, referring to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, that a 
nuclear attack against a member of the zone is seen by all parties as a war crime against humanity and 
thus against international law and that this fact constitutes an obligation for all states to respect the 
objectives and integrity of the zone. The deviation from the standard could be justified, once more, 
with the particular political conditions in Europe, but there would probably be some criticism from 
members of other zones as well as from regions where states are striving for a zone (such as the Middle 
East) that renouncing explicit security guarantees would make the zone in Europe somehow deficient. 
Declarations instead of protocols 
The last possibility is to ask NWS and NATO member states to sign declarations rather than protocols. 
While declarations do not emanate the legally binding force which protocols contain, their politically 
binding effects might be good enough for the purpose. The content of the declarations could be as 
strictly formulated as a protocol, or be restricted to the expression of “respect”. In the case of Mongo-
lia’s non-nuclear weapons status, the declaration was chosen as the best way to bind the NWS to the 
objectives of the zone. In September 2012, the five NWS and Mongolia signed parallel political declara-
tions that formally recognized the latter’s nuclear-weapon-free status. The NWS pledged to respect this 
status, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Mongolia. These declarations of 
recognition may or may not be legally binding, yet they formalize Mongolia’s status.114 
Non-state actors 
Commitment by sub-state administrative entities 
Option 1: Protocol on support for the zone: 
This is a revolutionary proposal which, however, reflects the spirit of our time. The idea is to open the 
opportunity for regional and provincial governments and the self-governments of cities and local 
communities to express their support for the zone project. This is a political statement that has no legal 
weight for the position of the related national government, but it adds to the momentum of the project 
and serves the objective of creating a sustained debate and campaign as it gives citizens opportunities 
for meaningful activities below the level of national security policy (where it is very difficult to affect 
positions, at least in the short term). The Protocol should contain a language like this: “Without preju-
dice to the position of our national government, sharing the hope noted in the Preamble ‘that the scope 
of the zone may grow in the future,’ [...] expresses its support for the objective of the nuclear-weapon-
free zone in Europe.” Obviously, this language has declaratory character and does not create a legal 
obligation. This corresponds to the fact that the signing units have no authority to enter an interna-
tional legal binding commitment of this kind. It has to be examined whether a protocol is the appro-
priate form for such a declaration, or if it should be put in a technical annex to the zone treaty.  
Option 2: The “Geneva Call Model”: 
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Promoters of the zonal project could be concerned that other states view this protocol as interference 
in their internal affairs. In order to prevent the possible diplomatic repercussions, they might prefer a 
less formal way to engage supporters of the zone at the sub-national level. They could “outsource” the 
collection of such supportive declarations to a disarmament-minded NGO or a group of such organi-
zations. A good model for this activity is the successful effort of the NGO Geneva Call to persuade 
non-state combatant groups in civil wars to formally commit to humanitarian undertakings such as 
renouncing the use of landmines. In the same vein, NGOs could collect declarations of support from 
sub-state administrative entities and make them available to the public through electronic communica-
tion (website) and during review conferences of the parties to the NWFZ in Europe. 
Civil society 
The latter option has already proposed a specific role for civil society in the evolution of the zonal pro-
ject. As with non-national administrative entities, addressing civil society directly reflects the situation 
in Europe as a continent with far developed democracies, and a vivid, active, and well informed mature 
civil society. The following considerations reflect on this situation and propose to use it for the zonal 
project. 
Participation opportunity for individual citizens 
As one main objective of the zonal project is to revive the debate on nuclear disarmament in Europe it 
is of utmost importance to open spaces for meaningful action by civil society. The protocol for sub-
state entities goes a long way to achieve this objective, but it might be advisable to install opportunities 
for individual citizens as well. This might be done directly through the treaty or indirectly by establish-
ing a link between the treaty community and non-governmental organizations engaged to foster the 
zonal project. 
Option 1: Direct integration into the zone treaty. For this option, the website of the Organization of 
the Zone (or another public accessible tool for electronic communication) would contain a portal that 
would be explicitly mentioned in a technical annex to the treaty as one of the Organization’s missions. 
The portal would give the opportunity to citizens of European states to express their support for the 
zone. The portal allows the signature by citizens to a short text of support, similar to the one in the 
protocol for sub-state entities. There should be software which groups these signatures automatically 
according to the country the signing person is citizen of.  
Option 2: Indirect connection to the zone treaty. Here, the likeminded countries would work with one 
or more non-governmental organizations engaged in nuclear disarmament in the preparatory phase of 
the zone treaty to mobilize public support. The NGOs would set up a website with a related portal on 
their own, but in close coordination with the likeminded states which would be used to mobilize citi-
zens’ declarations of support. When the zone treaty would be signed, this support would thus already 
be visible. The treaty preamble then could take note of the support expressed by European civil society 
to this project. It could also be considered to give the related NGOs regularly the opportunity to report 
on the support given by Europe’s citizenship to the zone when the parties hold their annual conference. 
The connection between the expression of individual support and the legal and organizational struc-
ture of the zone would be markedly looser than in the first option, but it would still exist. 
Option 3: Mobilization of support by civil society outside of the zone treaty. The treaty would not 
contain any language relating to civil society and individual support. NGOs, in contact to the like-
minded states, would collect individual expressions of support and post them on a publically accessible 
website. It might still be considered to give these NGOs a spot during annual conferences to report on 
the attitude of the public towards the zone. 
In comparison of the three options, the first option contains the largest mobilization potential because 
the stance taken by the individuals would be most meaningful. By the same token, the challenge to 
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states opposing the zone would be strongest through the “officialisation” of the deviant individual 
positions of their citizens, notably if the number of zone supporters in an opposing country would 
reach a significant threshold, and negative attitudes on part of the respective governments and thus 
diplomatic quarrels for the zone promoters could be expected. However, this would enhance media 
interest and thus give the issue more salience in public debate. 
In the third option, the challenge (and thereby political tension as well as media interest) would be 
lowest, as the responsibility for mobilizing deviant opinion would squarely be with the non-
governmental sector. Compared with the official recognition in treaty language, the slot given to the 
NGOs in the annual conferences would probably look much more harmless. Diplomatic repercussions 
would remain limited, but the same applies to the media interest and the mobilization potential. The 
second option falls between the extremes.  
Final thoughts on involving actors other than governments 
These new instruments open uncharted roads for civil society to make their activities practical. Rather 
than addressing national governments only with a view to persuade them to accede to the zone, they 
address also local governments and individual citizens to support the project in a globally visible way: 
Integrating these utterances of support into an international treaty gives it much more weight than 
similar expressions in a purely non-governmental environment, valuable as those are. Increasing num-
bers of collectivities and individuals from non-parties using this opportunity build up pressure on 
national governments to reconsider their stance. 
As stated, this is a highly unconventional and innovative device and bound to engender objections. But 
it would be applied in Europe, in an environment where governments uniformly appreciate the in-
creasing weight of civil society, call upon non-democratic governments to accept the importance of 
non-governmental organizations, and support such NGOs abroad when they take positions deviant 
from their national government. Thus, while innovative, this step is far from being illegitimate. Never-
theless, a thorough legal scrutiny under the auspices of treaty law, which is beyond the reach of this 
study, should be conducted before it is officially proposed. Also, zone promoters have to carefully 
weigh how much dispute they wish to risk with other states in the region, with due regard to the econ-
omy of investment of political and diplomatic capital. At any rate, what is discussed in this section 
necessitates a close relationship and intense dialogue between the initiators of the zone and civil socie-
ty. This dialogue, in turn, serves one of the main objectives of the whole zonal project: to stimulate the 
discussion on nuclear disarmament in Europe. 
6. POLITICS: ANTICIPATED REACTIONS 
In this chapter, we speculate about the probable reactions of various types of states – NWS, NATO 
members, the EU, and several groups from the global South. We do not touch again the attitudes of 
those who are potential candidates of the zone which we discussed earlier (cf. section 4.2.3), as their 
potential candidacy implies the likelihood of a sympathetic or at least non-hostile position towards the 
zone project. 
To some extent the ongoing humanitarian initiative can be seen as a litmus test on how a project such 
as the establishment of a NWFZ in Europe might be received by key international stakeholders: the 
humanitarian initiative was hailed by disarmament supporters, which included a number of (old) 
NATO members such as Norway and Denmark, it was supported with some caution if not reluctance 
by traditional US allies like Australia and Germany, and it was basically rejected by the NWS. Still, 
among the official NWS the positions were not uniform: France and Russia fiercely opposed the hu-
manitarian initiative, whereas the US and the UK showed some willingness to engage the debate 
60 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 27 
through their attendance to the 2014 Vienna Conference. China kept a low profile on the issue. We 
might expect similar reactions, if a NWFZ in Europe were proposed today.  
6.1 Nuclear weapon states 
The NWS approach to NWFZs, as a rule, has been quite ambivalent, as attentive observers of the non-
proliferation regime have noticed: as a matter of fact, “although all five of the NPT-recognized nuclear-
weapon states have formally endorsed the principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in practice, they 
rarely have found a zone that they like. As a result, even when they do not actively oppose the creation 
of a zone, they typically have been slow to conclude the relevant protocols”.115 
There will be no exception to this rule, when the NWS will be confronted with the prospect of a NWFZ 
in Europe. Still, it can be expected, that the reservations against such a zone will vary between them, 
first and foremost, because the establishment of such a zone in Europe will challenge the NWS to a 
different degree.  
It will represent a direct challenge to France, Russia and the UK, because the project of a NWFZ in 
Europe (especially if crowned with success) will inevitably question their status as European nuclear 
powers and could force these countries to justify their non-membership in a project, which – more 
than anything else – symbolises the end of the Cold War in Europe and the realization of effective 
cooperative security as enshrined in the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. This pressure will not only come from the NNWS, but might arise even from within these 
NWS, especially if more and more of their citizens and sub-state entities sign the online petition to 
become part of the European NWFZ (see the discussion in the previous section 5.5.6). 
It will represent a special challenge to the US as well, since the American military footprint on Europe-
an soil and Washington’s commitment to its European NATO allies goes way beyond any other securi-
ty cooperation arrangement, which the US offers to other regions (Middle East, East Asia, and South 
Pacific/ANZUS). The NWFZ in Europe is an initiative taken outside of this arrangement with deep 
repercussions for NATO, though, depending on the way the zone treaty is shaped, these repercussions 
may create larger or smaller difficulties. It will not represent a specific challenge for China, which has 
no particular stakes in the European theatre.  
China. Moreover, Beijing has been relatively sympathetic with NWFZs in other regions in the past – 
maybe with the exception of the Bangkok treaty, where China points to some unresolved territorial 
issues between Beijing and some of the zonal states.116 But China has certainly been the most “forth-
coming” NWS in the global debate on granting negative security guarantees to NNWS members to the 
NPT and in particular to members of NWFZs.117 Hence, China might be the only NWS not openly 
opposing a NWFZ in Europe. 
Russia. The Russian reaction to a NWFZ in Europe will critically depend on which countries are in the 
zone and which countries are outside of it. It is worthwhile to remember in this context that the Soviet 
Union and Russia have always shown sympathy for a denuclearized buffer zone between Moscow’s 
sphere of interest and Western Europe. Hence, a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe – as already 
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envisioned some time ago118 – could find Moscow’s support and endorsement. However, the NATO 
enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe has complicated the equation. Although NATO accom-
panied its eastward expansion with a declaration that it has no intentions to move its nuclear assets 
closer to the Russian border, Moscow made clear that it does not rely on these political commitments. 
Rather, Russia perceives all NATO states as members of a nuclear alliance. Thus, even if denuclearized 
NATO states might join a European NWFZ one day, it is doubtful that Moscow will provide these 
countries with negative security guarantees. Hence, for the time being, it can be assumed that Russia 
will only “respect” a zone of non-NATO countries; in order to accept a zone, which comprises also a 
number of NATO countries, the Alliance would probably have to solve some other outstanding issues 
with Moscow before (first of all in the realm of missile defence and the regulation of conventional 
forces in Europe). It can also be surmised that Russia might be most affected by a renewed debate on 
nuclear weapons in Europe as it has become part of Russia’s external policy to brandish their nuclear 
posture through “targeted utterances”, exercises with an explicit nuclear component, and deployment 
moves. As a consequence, Russia might attract increasing criticism propelled by the zone discussion 
and would possibly not like it. But if NATO and Russia overcome the present political crisis and, in the 
future, would show some flexibility they may agree on confidence-building measures and some con-
straints which would enhance the security of the zone. In fact, the efforts to find some way to newly 
calibrate the security relationship between NATO and Russia in all its aspects might indirectly and 
unwittingly foster the zone project. 
United States. The establishment of a NWFZ in Europe will come as a surprise to Washington. Since 
the Obama Administration is pursuing other priorities in the field of nuclear arms control, it will prob-
ably see the project as an unwanted digression, even though Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear 
weapons, a vision, which emphasizes the incremental approach and is fully compatible with the ap-
proach to construct the zone step-by-step, country by country. A negative reaction from the Republi-
can security establishment is certain. US conservatives, if they will not simply ignore the project, will 
almost certainly lambast and ridicule the whole endeavour and warn against its corrosive effects on US 
and NATO security. There might be supporters for the project among those actively working for a 
world without nuclear weapons. The US government will probably be reluctant to grant NSA to states 
in the zone, which maintain security partnerships with Russia (e.g. Belarus or Armenia), and – by do-
ing so – might repeat its concerns it showed with respect to the Central Asian NWFZ.119 Still, there are 
also signs that more flexibility is possible concerning these past reservations: Washington’s most recent 
Nuclear Posture Review (2010) exempts all countries from a potential nuclear attack, which are NNWS 
members of the NPT in good standing with their non-proliferation obligations. This holds for all 
NNWS in Europe, today.  
Secondly, the US will probably be allergic to the idea that (some) NATO countries could join the 
NWFZ. Apart of the fact that these countries could not be used for stationing or storing US nuclear 
weapons any longer, Washington’s major concern could be that such a decision by an Alliance Mem-
ber could compromise the freedom of movement of American nuclear forces within NATO-Europe, 
and thus repeat its experience it had with New Zealand within the ANZUS context (see chapter 4) and 
with a number of NATO members in the past (Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Spain do not allow the 
stationing of NATO nuclear weapons on their territories unless there is a major crisis). Washington 
would probably also be concerned that a difference of policy among NATO members on such a sub-
stantive issue of the common defence might indicate a deep division of the Alliance that is particularly 
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unwelcome in a phase of sharp conflict with Russia and uncertainty about the future of NATO-Russian 
relations.  
France. The major objection to a NWFZ in Europe could come from Paris. France’s security discourse 
is still fully imbued in the orthodoxy of nuclear deterrence, and Paris has probably been the most vocal 
critic of Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons from the very beginning.120 Whereas the 
UK has a lively debate both in Parliament and in the media on the future of the British deterrent, there 
is no comparable debate in France. Furthermore, unlike the US and the UK, Paris has not moved with 
respect to its opposition to “Global Zero” or the humanitarian initiative in the international arena 
either, and fights against any attempt to move the strategic discourse away from its concept of practi-
cally endless step-by-step nuclear disarmament. This French resistance was a key factor, why NATO’s 
last Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) had such a conservative (in the true sense of the 
word) handwriting: Paris simply resisted any attempts to change NATO’s nuclear policy.121 However, it 
might also be that Paris would find it more expedient to largely ignore the initiative and not confront 
the initiators. 
United Kingdom. The UK position on a NWFZ in Europe can be expected to be more nuanced than 
the French stance. London’s position on the zone will depend critically on the outcome of its domestic 
debate on the future of the British deterrent (“Trident replacement”). Should the UK opt to discontin-
ue its nuclear status in the next years (an improbable, but not impossible option), it would probably be 
supportive of the zone. If, on the other hand, London decides to renew its nuclear-armed submarine 
fleet (which still seems the most probable outcome), its enthusiasm for the zone will be limited. But it is 
unlikely that London will oppose the zone with the same passion as Paris is expected to do. This is due 
to the fact that senior British politicians have shown sympathy with the Global Zero vision, and that 
one of the two parties forming the current government coalition (the Liberal Democrats) has repeated-
ly uttered its discomfort to continue the British nuclear mission more than two decades after the Cold 
War. It can also be surmised that a Labour-led government would pursue a smoother line than one 
with a conservative Prime Minister. One should also note that, unlike Paris, London attended the 2014 
Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. Nevertheless, the most pivotal 
aspect in this matter would be how London would assess the consequences for NATO (see above the 
considerations for the United States). 
6.2 NATO non-nuclear weapon states (old) 
The enthusiasm for NATO’s nuclear mission is diminishing among the Western (“old”) Alliance 
members.122 This discomfort is not a new phenomenon,123 but has gained further momentum in the 
last years: first, in 2008 the conservative-liberal German government called for a withdrawal of US 
TNW stationed in its Western region of Rhenania-Palatinate. Secondly, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Norway wrote a joint letter to NATO’s Secretary General in 2009 calling for the inclusion 
of NATO’s TNW into an arms control approach with Russia with a view to withdraw and ultimately 
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eliminate these weapons. Thirdly, the calls for increased transparency on TNW and arms control nego-
tiations with Moscow on this issue grew louder during the deliberations of NATO’s 2012 DDPR. 
It is interesting to note that among the most vocal critics of NATO’s current status quo, we find also 
three countries currently stationing US TNW on their territories: Belgium, Germany and the Nether-
lands. 
It can therefore be expected that a number of “old” NATO countries might welcome the establishment 
of a NWFZ in Europe, since it confirms their desire to overcome a nuclear status quo, which they see as 
outdated since the end of the Cold War. Among these possible (moderate) supporters of the zone we 
might find the above-mentioned stationing countries Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, together 
with Luxemburg, Norway, and possibly Denmark.124 Greece, which discontinued the stationing of 
NATO nuclear weapons on its territory some years ago, is also likely to sympathise with the idea to 
denuclearize Europe. The strongest argument available to “old” NATO members willing to consider 
joining the zone is the fact that NATO has always lived with member states that refused to host nuclear 
weapons. If this has not weakened NATO’s security during the Cold War, it is highly implausible that 
it should have this negative effect today. In addition, the US has indicated that US strategic nuclear 
weapons could grant extended deterrence (as long as it is seen to be needed) on their own, as is already 
the case for the US nuclear guarantees to its East Asian allies.125  
Still, among these old NATO countries, Norway deserves a special mention, since Oslo fiercely advo-
cated a core demand of NWFZs (legally-binding NSA) in the past, and since Norway is currently at the 
forefront within a global discourse aimed at delegitimizing nuclear weapons. It should not be forgotten 
that the Norwegian MFA hosted a world-acclaimed conference on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear 
weapons in March 2013, which was the effective starting shot for the current humanitarian initiative 
within the NPT.126 Yet, one has to wait how the new Norwegian government positions itself on the 
nuclear issue. 
Spain, Portugal and Italy are expected to keep a low-profile on the issue. They have been neither very 
eager to challenge nor to maintain the existing nuclear status quo, but rather strive for some balance 
and consensus on these issues.127 Hence, they will probably neither embrace nor obstacle the estab-
lishment of a NWFZ in Europe at the beginning, and then “follow the trend”. Still, all of the above 
mentioned “old” NATO countries might even become candidates to join the zone in the mid-term 
(pending a NATO review on its nuclear posture). 
One has, however, to account for the impact of Russian policy during the Ukraine crisis. Moscow’s 
readiness to use military force in various forms (what is called “hybrid”) has opened the spectre of a 
threat which the disarmament-minded NATO members will not ignore. Even if they feel that this 
threat is limited, must thus not be exaggerated, and that arms control and disarmament is an indispen-
sable policy element for overcoming the crisis even more now than before, they will move cautiously 
and with due regard for solidarity with the Eastern fellow members of NATO and alliance solidarity. In 
this regard, the Ukrainian crisis is working as a slow-down factor. 
Turkey’s position is difficult to predict, as Ankara currently finds itself in a difficult security environ-
ment (Iranian nuclear crisis and Syrian civil war); as long as these crises persist, Turkey is not expected 
to advocate the withdrawal of US TNW stationed on its soil and thus to join any NWFZ, neither in the 
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Middle East nor in Europe. Still, it can be expected that Ankara will put little resistance against the 
establishment of a limited NWFZ in Europe, provided it will not remain the only NATO country host-
ing US TNW.  
Resistance to the zone is likely to emerge from within NATO’s bureaucratic apparatus, since bureau-
cracies have the inevitable tendency to resist change and warn against alterations of the status quo. The 
experiences during the Ukraine crisis is certainly helping this political narrative justifying defence 
conservatism. NATO is a well-attuned machinery with a specific language regime, decade-old princi-
ples and several well-ingrained standard operating procedures. Therefore, it will be difficult to awake 
enthusiasm within NATO’s bureaucracy to an innovative concept like the NWFZ in Europe, which 
challenges beloved principles of nuclear burden sharing, flexible response and indivisible security for 
all Alliance members.  
6.3 New NATO Countries 
In order to anticipate the reactions of the newer NATO countries (Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) it is worth 
taking a look at their attitude towards nuclear issues in general – NATO’s DDPR process might shed 
some light on it. 
As none of the New NATO countries possesses or hosts nuclear weapons, only their NATO member-
ship might constitute a political or technical obstacle to join a NWFZ initiative. Still, Central and East-
ern European (CEE) countries probably would not support the idea of a NWFZ in Europe and are not 
the best candidates to join such an initiative in the first round, even though in principle, all these coun-
tries are supposed to be in favour of a world without nuclear weapons, as they had to give their consent 
to the 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 DDPR document which clearly states that the alliance sup-
ports the vision of global zero. 
During the debate over the new DDPR, Central and Eastern European countries mostly advocated a 
“status quo” in NATO’s military capabilities. They argued that the strategic nuclear forces of the Unit-
ed States, the United Kingdom and France, as well as the sub-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in 
Europe, missile defence and conventional capabilities all have their essential role in NATO’s deterrence 
posture and all of them are necessary to protect the territory of the alliance and to provide the guaran-
tees of Article V. Besides, CEE countries were mostly against major changes in the declaratory policy of 
the alliance, and they did not support the adoption of a universal negative security guarantee either 
(Poland was the only exception, which seemed to be open to the idea of a universal negative security 
guarantee).128 
Although none of these countries seem to perceive U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons as actual war-
fighting tools and none of them showed willingness to host these weapons, CEE countries declared that 
they would only support withdrawal of these nuclear weapons in case of reciprocal reductions with 
Russia. Poland appears to be the most flexible in looking for arms control solutions to the problem, 
working with Germany and with Norway on this matter. Poland was also the only new member to join 
a German initiative at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to put sub-strategic nuclear weapons on the 
disarmament agenda. 
The reason why CEE states in general support NATO’s nuclear sharing is that sub-strategic nuclear 
weapons are still considered the strongest physical evidence of US commitment towards the protection 
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of Europe, it strengthens the notion of burden-sharing and it guarantees responsibility to all member 
states in the Nuclear Planning Group. Although as a result of political pressure from the French gov-
ernment the 2012 DDPR clearly states that “missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weap-
ons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them”129 there is still some consideration among member 
states whether missile defence assets deployed in Eastern Europe might substitute for sub-strategic 
nuclear weapons as the new “glue” of the Alliance. The question remains whether this view survives the 
announcement by the US government to scrap the phase four of the planned system and to give up the 
development of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptors.130 These interceptors were supposed to be deployed 
in phase four to Poland and Romania131 and they were expected to have a limited capability to destroy 
ICBMs which was the primary reason of Russian concerns. Therefore, the US announcement was a 
clear gesture towards Moscow but it might undermine the willingness of some CEE states to support 
the withdrawal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons.  
Besides these general considerations, some CEE states have additional region specific concerns which 
influence their attitude towards nuclear-related issues. The Baltic states usually emphasize the threat 
from Russia and the fear from growing aggression if NATO did not possess all elements of the strategic 
deterrence mixture. Romania and Bulgaria mentioned several times the possibility that Turkey might 
decide to start its own nuclear program if US sub-strategic nuclear weapons were withdrawn from its 
territory. 
The Ukrainian crisis and ensuing Russian policy has strengthened the security concerns in the region 
and re-enforced the felt need to rely on extended deterrence. While the new members welcome the 
measures in the conventional sector which NATO has taken as a response and are investing dispropor-
tionally in their own defence posture, they are aware that the Alliance’s position to the East is rather a 
tripwire posture than one of solid conventional defence. Extended nuclear deterrence is thus believed 
to be indispensable, and the zone might be regarded as a distraction from this consideration. However, 
the same countries might welcome a debate triggered by the zone that would put a stronger critical 
light on the Russian nuclear posture and nuclear rhetoric  
As a result of all these threat perceptions and strategic considerations, CEE countries are not likely to 
embrace the idea of a NWFZ in Europe. As long as they attach such an important strategic role to 
NATO’s nuclear capabilities, it is hard to imagine that they would undergo any limitations regarding 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, these states will definitely not be the first to stand up for such a proposal; 
however, there is a slight chance that if other NATO member-states find a way to join the initiative, 
some CEE countries might also follow suit in the distant future. The most possible candidates for that 
are Poland, the Czech Republic and probably Romania. During the DDPR process they seemed to be 
the most open to discussions on actual changes in NATO’s strategic posture and as all of these states 
will host essential elements of NATO’s ballistic missile defence system (Poland and Romania will host 
missile interceptors and the Czech Republic will host a radar station), the importance of nuclear shar-
ing might lose significance for them and they might be persuaded to join the project of a NWFZ in 
Europe. The Baltic states, on the other hand, are probably the last three countries in the region to em-
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brace this idea. But any change of attitude would certainly depend on a tangible reduction of 
NATO/Russia tensions and an ensuing significant improvement of the perceived security situation. 
Will the controversy on the zone exacerbate the cleavage between the “old” and the “new” NATO 
members? First, it is no done deal that all “old” members will uniformly be in favour of the project or 
the new ones uniformly hostile (e.g. Slovenia). Second, much depends on how the controversy is han-
dled by NATO members sympathizing with the project. Sympathizers of the zone would have to en-
gage their Eastern neighbours in continuous consultations in which they take the security concerns of 
countries that had lived in the power shadow of the Soviet Union seriously. They would confirm their 
unswerving commitment to Art. V of the Washington Treaty, the undertaking to come to the support 
of a threatened or attacked member. They would also document their effort to work on Russia for 
reciprocal measures to enhance the security of NATO’s Eastern part. 
Thirdly, we are not talking about a one-sided withdrawal from NATO solidarity by NATO sympathiz-
ers of the zone. In most of the countries that deploy US nuclear weapons on their territory, both gov-
ernments and peoples want to get rid of them, and the popular opposition is not more explicit only for 
the simple reason that many citizens believe that these weapons are long gone – unconvincing as their 
mission is under current circumstances. Governments stick to NATO’s line against their own prefer-
ences and against the will of their peoples just for NATO solidarity. It is highly questionable if it is 
healthy for an alliance that prides itself of being democratic that a couple of governments are pressured 
to act against the preferences of their publics. That Germany is among these states, NATO’s most im-
portant member state on the continent concerning the conventional aspect of Article V, is a reason not 
to be complacent with the status quo. “Old” and “new” NATO members would be well advised to pre-
serve respect for the different positions and to seek a way out of the underlying controversy that is 
satisfactory to either side and that removes the alienation of the citizenship of several states from the 
current NATO posture. 
6.4 Intra-EU repercussions 
The zone project does not introduce controversy on nuclear policies in the EU out of the blue. The 
dispute on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament has existed for long. Difficult compromises 
between the three principal groups, the two NWS, NATO NNWS, and neutral members were always 
visible during NPT Review Conferences, UNGA First Committee sessions, UNGA meetings and the 
Conference on Disarmament. Where these differences have not prevented common positions, they 
have confined those that were achieved to a low common denominator. 
This was visible on a “zone discussion in disguise” during the 2010 NPT Review when a group of Eu-
ropean countries, including eight EU members, proposed the inclusion of sub-strategic nuclear weap-
ons in the disarmament process. None of the EU NWS supported this motion, and only Poland among 
the new members did so from the floor.132 EU consultations on nuclear weapons issues have been acer-
bic not infrequently. The zone debate would add another layer of dispute, but by no means establish it. 
Again, much depends on management. Timely and frequent consultations, and respect for the serious-
ness of the partners’ interests and positions is a condition to continue living with the controversy once 
the project is in the public domain. Nothing the zone promoters can do will force the opponents into 
agreement, and nothing the opponents may undertake will divert the promoters from their convictions 
and, consequently, from their project. As the EU is currently confronted with such a divisive issue such 
as the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and since Brussels has lived with this sort of disagree-
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ment not only in the nuclear field but beyond, there is nothing inherent in the zone project that would 
impose a need to become more antagonistic against each other than in the past. 
6.5 NPT members outside the region 
The overall-reaction of most NNWS-NPT-members outside the zone would most likely be positive. 
The project of a zone that had been for half a century the potential hotbed for nuclear conflict and the 
site of the densest deployment of nuclear weapons worldwide would be seen as great encouragement 
for the cause of nuclear disarmament. Countries in the non-Western world would also see – and wel-
come – the impact of the project on intra-NATO discussions (the very reason why some other players 
would be less enthusiastic). At the same time the project would reinforce existing debates within the 
non-proliferation regime such as the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East, on the legitimacy of the 
threat and use of nuclear weapons and the principle of nuclear sharing, and about (negative) security 
assurances. The idea to establish a NWFZ in Europe would, thus, develop and strengthen already exist-
ing dynamics within the regime and possibly widen differences of positions among groups of actors. 
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). First of all, any initiative to create a NWFZ in Europe would be 
grist to the mill of the NAM: the impression that European states dissociate from their fellow Western, 
EU (and, maybe, even NATO) partners might look like an opportunity to exert more pressure on the 
nuclear powers. The NAM would grasp the chance to lead a campaign on the NWS to accede to all 
zonal protocols from which they are still abstaining. As for those states in Europe which would not be 
able or willing to become party to the zone, the NAM would probably embark upon strong criticism, 
notably in those cases where this abstention might be due to nuclear sharing, which the NAM always 
considered as a breach of Articles I and II of the NPT. Moreover, the movement would use the mo-
mentum to stronger address the issue of sub-strategic nuclear weapons on NNWS territory in the dis-
armament discourse and attack the nuclear character of the NATO, pointing out that doctrines entail-
ing first nuclear use contradict the legitimate claim of all members to the NPT to be freed from the 
threat of use of nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, the NAM’s aims in many aspects coincide with 
those of an initiative to establish a NWFZ in Europe, and the NAM will represent a strong supporter of 
the initiative. 
While such NAM activities will, on the one hand, help the momentum of the zone project, it might as 
well force undecided or sympathetic NATO members to close the ranks with their alliance partners 
and distance themselves from the zone idea. Being put on the spot too much is not always helpful for 
good causes in international diplomacy, and this might be a case in point. 
A second problem is the bouncing-back effect of disappointed expectations. While the promoters of 
the campaign will be rewarded with a wave of appreciation from the NAM, this reaction might turn 
into biting criticism if high expectations will be disappointed by a loss of momentum soon thereafter. 
In this case, the European zone might be perceived as another arms control failure. For this reason, it 
would be important to keep expectations within reasonable limits, to express higher hopes with an 
audible emphasis on the distant future, and to shape entry-into-force conditions – on the basis of pre-
negotiations and reliable commitments among like-minded supporters – in a way as to ensure that the 
zone comes into being in a relatively short time span in order to keep momentum, though naturally 
with a very limited geographical scope.. 
The zone promoters should take influence on the intra-NAM discussion by conducting outreach activ-
ity towards the existing NWFZ and their 118 member states the very moment they go public with their 
project. This group would most likely take a positive attitude towards the project. Representatives or 
even member states of these zones should be invited to the deliberations and negotiations of the 
NWFZiE initiators, and later to review conferences to stimulate and solidify support.  
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The League of Arab States (LAS). Another critical factor will probably be the LAS, which shares most 
NAM-positions but adds a strong regional focus to the agenda. The Arab reaction to the European 
zone project could be ambivalent. On the one hand, some Arab countries might view the NWFZiE as a 
diversion of international attention to their core concern, the zone in the Middle East. On the other 
hand, others might welcome this step as it signals the possibility to overcome stalemate in nuclear 
policy in another difficult region. A positive attitude could be helped by early contacts between the 
initiators and regional actors in which the European initiators frame their project as supportive to the 
idea of zones anywhere and emphasize the importance of the specific circumstances in all regions; in 
that regard, Europe and the Middle East are different in several aspects. In Europe, the project aims at a 
NWFZ, in the Middle East at a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. In Europe there are several 
“official” NWS whose prompt accession to the zone is not expected. All European states are parties to 
the NPT (plus the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention) in good 
standing.  
For the same reasons, copying the European initiative in the Middle East is most probably out of reach, 
as most Arab states would – presumably rightly – fear that Israel would object to any agreement in 
whose creation it was not involved, and would also feel that a zone in which Israel is not included from 
the beginning is not worth the candle. The step-by-step approach envisaged for the European zone is 
thus no blueprint for the Middle East. Thus, it is rather likely that the Arab League might use a cam-
paign for the creation of a NWFZ in Europe for a shaming and blaming campaign against Israel – at 
least if there would be no progress towards the “Middle East Conference” (originally scheduled for 
2012 but postponed indefinitely) or other steps towards a zone in the Middle East. This might add to 
turning United States against the European zone initiative because of its timing. 
The initiators of the zone in Europe should seek contact with the Arab League and central Arab actors 
on the WMDFZ in the Middle East early on and establish regular talks. Quite apart from the current 
chances of realization, the two regions are neighbouring each other, and the activities, achievements, 
and failures in one part are bound to have effects on the other. Promoters of each zone should agree to 
support each other’s efforts, as appropriate. This would frame the two projects not as competitors, but 
as partners; this would probably help prevent any negative reactions from the Southern Mediterranean 
neighbours. 
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC). As for moderate middle powers within the NPT, the NAC will be 
a “natural supporter” of efforts to create a NWFZ in Europe. With Brazil, Mexico and New Zealand 
being states parties to three NWFZs, and Egypt having signed the treaty of Pelindaba and struggling for 
the creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, the New Agenda Coalition could offer an amount of 
expertise concerning the creation of such zones which could make it interesting to include it into the 
efforts to create a NWFZ in Europe. NAC members Sweden and Ireland are candidates for a zone in 
Europe and could be early members (which would require, in the Swedish case, most probably a 
change in government). Egypt might then feel encouraged, or forced, to renew its efforts in the Middle 
East, thereby reinforcing the Arab League effect just discussed. 
The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). The reaction of NPDI members would 
be ambivalent. Mexico would strongly sympathize with the zone project, as would Chile, and probably 
Nigeria and the Philippines. But the group of US allies – Australia, Japan, Netherlands, Germany, and 
Turkey would feel pressures from two sides. The three NATO members are not likely early signers of 
the zone Treaty, and Japan might fear a negative impact on US nuclear security guarantees beyond the 
region concerned.  
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6.6 Perspectives 
The summary of this chapter is just stating the obvious: The initiators of the NWFZ in Europe are up 
for the long haul, and for a battle against powerful interests. They can count on considerable media 
interest, on the sympathies of a majority of the people in the region not the least their own, and on 
enthusiastic support by a significant number of non-governmental organizations engaged in the issue. 
There will also quiet sympathy by a couple of governments who will not dare, at least not initially, to 
confess by “coming out”. At the same time, there will be objections by some governments believing 
that the survival of their countries depends on a continued, physically underlined nuclear guarantee, 
and there will be indignation by all, and outright hostility by some, NWS. Initiators thus need courage, 
stamina, and perseverance. An all-partisan domestic consensus would be greatly helpful. With these 
attributes, they have a chance of winning, if only in the long term. And they have a powerful defence 
for their initiative: the clear mandate for NNWS to take initiatives for nuclear disarmament enshrined 
in Art. VI of the NPT and specified for NWFZ in Action 9 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference’s final 
document. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of findings 
 The current international situation is no reason to drop all efforts to move forward nuclear dis-
armament. To the contrary, enhanced efforts are needed to prevent things from getting worse 
and to stabilise international peace and security. Nuclear disarmament which is, after all, a rec-
ognized ingredient of a process for enhancing international security cooperation and thereby 
promoting peace, needs new momentum. Beyond established concepts like bilateral strategic nu-
clear arms control or a fissile material cut-off treaty, thinking out of the box might open new 
roads that are worth considering. This study is an effort to contribute to such “thinking out of 
the box”. 
 The project of a NWFZ in Europe is justified by the realistic expectation that it will reawaken the 
dormant debate about the nuclear weapons problematique in Europe and carry this debate in the 
European NWS themselves. This effect would be most important to maintain the momentum of 
the disarmament discourse after the powerful pushes of the 2007 Wall Street Article and the 2009 
Obama speech in Prague. 
 NWFZs are time-honoured ways to create regional confidence and solidarity, to strengthen the 
non-proliferation regime, foster nuclear disarmament and delegitimate nuclear weapons. The 
pivotal function of this project, however, is its chance to stimulate civil society and create a mo-
mentum that is not easily controlled by the powers that be. 
 Procedurally, a combination of „closed shop“ negotiations among a small group of likeminded 
countries, and the more open Ottawa process model appears most conducive to fostering the 
project. This combination leaves the momentum in the hands of the initiators and prevents any 
veto position while offering inclusiveness. 
 An approach in which a few countries take the initiative and enhance the chances for future ac-
cessions through stimulating a national debate in potential parties to the zone necessitates waiv-
ing a clear geographic delimitation of the zone from the beginning and renouncing a condition-
ing of entry into force by all states principally eligible for membership. It would be wiser to make 
the scope of the zone conditional on the territory of the countries which are parties at any given 
moment (as temporarily discussed in the negotiations for the Tlatelolco Treaty). 
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 In order to create and maintain momentum, the unilateral self-declaration of a single country as 
a NWFZ is not advisable. It makes more sense to make entry into force contingent on the ratifi-
cation by a very small number of countries after careful preliminary consultations that make it as 
well as certain that this quorum will be reached. 
 Concerning the treaty undertakings, it is obvious that they can be minimalist or more far-
reaching. A minimalist treaty would make it easier for disarmament-minded NATO members to 
accede at an early date. Zone members that would like to go further might do so by way of na-
tional legislation. A compromise between the two approaches would be to put some of the more 
far-reaching clauses under an opt-out-option. Again, this might facilitate accession by some 
NATO members. 
 Verification will be more complex than in other regional zones, but only in the long run. The 
reason is the various types of states that are potential candidates for the zone (NWS, NATO 
NNWS with nuclear weapons on their territory, NATO NNWS which had formerly nuclear 
weapons on their territory). For the core that is to be expected to constitute the membership at 
entry into force, these complications will probably not exist. There remains still the reconcilia-
tion between the zonal verification system and that of the NPT in which already two organiza-
tions, the IAEA and EURATOM participate. Things may become difficult at this level if and 
when the participation of EURATOM in zonal verification is contested within the EU. 
 The treaty could contain, as a major innovative and mobilizing element, a way for non-state ac-
tors to associate themselves with the zone project in a (semi-)official, visible way. This could be 
done directly in the context of the zone treaty (protocol for sub-national political entities, signa-
ture list on the treaty organization’s website) or more indirectly (by tasking a NGO to collect and 
document the support, and to have this NGO report at member state conferences or review con-
ferences). 
 The zone initiators will face a wide spectrum of reactions. Besides enthusiastic report (probably 
from civil society and members of other zones) there will be strong opposition (from certain 
NWS and supposedly also from some non-nuclear NATO members). Governments wishing to 
promote the project must be aware of this situation and be determined to pursue the project for 
the long haul. Of course, in the perspective of the project’s major objective – rejuvenating and 
maintaining the debate on nuclear disarmament, controversial reactions are desirable as this is 
most likely to foster debate. 
7.2 First steps 
Initiators must bring together a small, but determined group of supporters of the zone project. This 
group might consist of like-minded governments, on the one hand, and committed civil society organ-
izations, on the other hand. Supporters should agree on the objectives of the initiative, on the core 
content of a future zonal treaty, and on the next steps to pursue. 
Initiators must also work on domestic support in their countries. As repeatedly stated, they need cour-
age and perseverance. This is hard to achieve if the home front is split. Support should be broad and 
supra-partisan, and the project should attract the sympathy of the public and the active support of civil 
society organizations. All the while initiators must be careful to mitigate internal differences that might 
come more to the fore as the project progresses (as experiences in other zones have shown). To keep 
coherence and solidarity in the group is key to the project’s success. 
The difficulties with the UNGA have been discussed above. A possibility to procure some legitimacy 
for the project would be to join forces with members of other zones and nonaligned leaders and to co-
sponsor a UNGA draft resolution praising existing zones, calling on those who have not ratified the 
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respective protocols to do so, and to urge states in regions not yet covered by a zone to take appropriate 
steps in the light of the specific conditions in the respective region to work towards the establishment 
of a NWFZ. It is likely that this will attract broad support, and it would create a fresh reference text on 
which the initiators can draw for justifying their project. 
If initiators are sufficiently satisfied that some momentum has been created, they may invite states that 
would be eligible for zone membership given the wider “aspiration” for a general consideration of the 
project. After this, a second meeting might discuss a draft text, and a third and last one a revised ver-
sion (this procedure is modelled after the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions). Working groups could be 
tasked in the intersessional periods to iron out differences. At and after the last conference, govern-
ments which are core supporters would sign and ratify, bringing the zone into force. 
7.3 Final thoughts 
Whether governments decide to pursue the road laid out in this study will be influenced by many fac-
tors some of which go clearly beyond the subject matter discussed here. Within the realm of nuclear 
disarmament, the key issue is whether promoters are willing to invest the political capital to make the 
project fly. They will have to compare the risks and benefits of this approach with other disarmament 
initiatives under way, calculate in the reactions of the NWS, and whether the initiative will make the 
latter ones more or less inclined to walk further down the disarmament road. They should not be shy 
of the possible indignation that NNWS take initiatives without asking first the NWS whether this is 
permissible. Article VI of the NPT is crystal clear on that point: nuclear disarmament is not only a 
matter of interest for those not having nuclear weapons, but it is their solemn undertaking to partici-
pate in the process. Taking initiative is a particularly bold mode of participation. 
It is unlikely that the initiative will weaken efforts by NWS to pursue their own disarmament agenda, if 
they have one. The disarmament record since the NPT entered into force is not a consistent story of an 
unambiguous NWS commitment to this cause. Even at present, no dispassionate observer would dis-
cover a determined rush towards a nuclear weapon free world. To the contrary, fears that the process 
be stalled are not without justification. Under these circumstances, it is not imperative for disarma-
ment-minded NNWS to sit idle lest their activities could hamper the progress of the disarmament 
train. 
The project of a NWFZ bears the risk to evoke resistance on a continent where an alliance that calls 
itself a nuclear one is part of the identity of many of its members and seen as indispensable for national 
security by most. At the same time, and partially for the same reasons, the project has the advantage of 
high political saliency and the ensuing potential to stimulate debate and create movement. For those 
concerned about the slowing down of the disarmament train, this might be reason enough to engage.  
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LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS 
ANZUS  Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty 
CEE  Central and Eastern European states 
COPREDAL Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America 
CPPNM  Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
CTBT  Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
DDPR  Deterrence and Defence Posture Review  
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community  
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles  
INF  Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
IS  Integrated Safeguards 
NAC  New Agenda Coalition 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCND  Neither Confirm Nor Deny 
NNWS  Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
NPDI  Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 
NPT  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSA  Negative Security Assurances 
NWFSH  Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas  
NWFZ(s) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone(s) 
NWS  Nuclear Weapon States 
OAU  Organization for African Unity  
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
SSAC  State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear materials  
TNW  Tactical Nuclear Weapons  
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly  
UNSC  United Nations Security Council  
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ANNEX: TABLE COMPARING NWFZ PRESCRIPTIONS AND STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS 
 T L A T E L O L C O  1967 
Latin America and Caribbean 
R A R O T O N G A  1985 
South Pacific 
B A N G K O K  1995 
Southeast Asia 
P E L I N D A B A  1996 
Africa 
S E M I P A L A T I N S K  2006 
Central Asia 
Negotiations 1964-1967 1984-1985 1986-1995  1991-1995 1997-2006 
Opened for 
signature 14 February 1967 06 August 1985 16 December 1995  11 April 1996 08 September 2006 
Entered into 
Force 25 April 1969 11 December 1986 28 March 1997 15 July 2009 21 March 2009 
State Parties 33/33 regional states 13/16 regional states 10/10 regional states 38/53 regional states 5/5 regional states 
Definitions      
“Territory” “Territorial sea, air space and any 
other space over which the State 
exercises sovereignty in accord-
ance with its own legislation”. 
“Internal waters, territorial sea 
and archipelagic waters, the 
seabed and subsoil beneath, the 
land territory and the airspace 
above”. 
“Land territory, internal waters, 
territorial sea, archipelagic 
waters, the sea-bed and the 
subsoil thereof and the airspace 
above”. 
“Land territory, internal waters, 
territorial seas and archipelagic 
waters and the airspace above 
them as well as the sea bed and 
subsoil beneath”. 
[no introductory definition for 
territory]  
"The scope of application of а 
Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zone is defined exclusively 
for the purposes of this Treaty as 
the land territory, all waters 
(harbours, lakes, rivers and 
streams) and the air space above 
them, which belong to the Re-
public of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the Republic of Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan and the 
Republic of Uzbekistan". 
“Nuclear 
weapon” 
[ = NW] 
/  
“Nuclear 
Explosive 
Device“ [= 
NED] 
“A nuclear weapon is any device 
which is capable of releasing 
nuclear energy in an uncon-
trolled manner and which has a 
group of characteristics that are 
appropriate for use for warlike 
purposes”;  
Excludes instrument for 
transport / propulsion of device 
if separable. 
“Nuclear explosive device means 
any nuclear weapon or other 
explosive device capable of 
releasing nuclear energy, irre-
spective of the purpose for which 
it could be used”, in unassembled 
and partly assembled forms; 
Excludes means of transport or 
delivery if separable. 
“Nuclear weapon means any 
explosive device capable of 
releasing nuclear energy in an 
uncontrolled manner”. 
Excludes means of transport or 
delivery of such device if separa-
ble. 
“Nuclear explosive device means 
any nuclear weapon or other 
explosive device capable of 
releasing nuclear energy, irre-
spective of the purpose for which 
it could be used”, in unassembled 
and partly assembled forms;  
Excludes means of transport or 
delivery if separable. 
“Nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device means 
any weapon or other explosive 
device capable of releasing 
nuclear energy, irrespective of 
the military or civilian purpose 
for which the weapon or device 
could be used”, in unassembled 
or partly assembled forms;  
Excludes means of transport or 
delivery if separable. 
“Stationing”   “Emplantation, emplacement, 
transportation on land or inland 
waters, stockpiling, storage, 
installation and deployment”. 
“Deploy, emplace, implant, 
install, stockpile or store”. 
“Implantation, emplacement, 
transport on land or inland 
waters, stockpiling, storage, 
installation and deployment”. 
“Implantation, emplacement 
stockpiling, storage, installation 
and deployment”. 
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Additional 
definitions 
    Radioactive material; radioactive 
waste; dumping. 
Nuclear installation, nuclear 
material. 
Nuclear material; radioactive 
waste; facility. 
Basic  
Obligations 
     
Prohibitions / 
undertakings 
Parties undertake “to prohibit 
and prevent in their respective 
territories:  
(a) The testing, use, manufac-
ture, production or acquisition 
by any means whatsoever of any 
NW, by the Parties themselves, 
directly or indirectly, on behalf of 
anyone else or in any other way, 
and (b) The receipt, storage, 
installation, deployment and any 
form of possession of any NW, 
directly or indirectly, by the 
Parties themselves, by anyone on 
their behalf or in any other way”; 
Also, “refrain from engaging in, 
encouraging or authorizing, 
directly or indirectly, or in any 
way participating in the testing, 
use, manufacture, production, 
possession or control of any 
NW”. 
Parties undertake “(a) not to 
manufacture or otherwise ac-
quire, possess or have control 
over any NED by any means 
anywhere inside or outside the 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone; 
(b) not to seek or receive any 
assistance in the manufacture or 
acquisition of any NED; (c) not 
to take any action to assist or 
encourage the manufacture or 
acquisition of any NED by any 
State”. 
Parties undertake “not to, any-
where  
inside or outside the Zone:  
(a) develop, manufacture or 
otherwise acquire, possess or 
have control over NW; (b) 
station or transport NW by any 
means; (c) test or use NW”; 
Also, “not to allow, in its territo-
ry, any other State to: (a) devel-
op, manufacture or otherwise 
acquire, possess or have control 
over NW; (b) station NW; (c) 
test or use NW”. 
Parties undertake “(a) Not to 
conduct research on, develop, 
manufacture, stockpile or other-
wise acquire, possess or have 
control over any NED by any 
means anywhere; (b) Not to seek 
or receive any assistance in the 
research on, development, 
manufacture, stockpiling or 
acquisition, or possession of any 
NED;  
(c) Not to take any action to 
assist or encourage the research 
on, development, manufacture, 
stockpiling or acquisition, or 
possession of any nuclear explo-
sive device”. 
Parties undertake “(а) Not to 
conduct research on, develop, 
manufacture,  
stockpile or otherwise acquire, 
possess or have control over any 
NW or other NED by any means 
anywhere; (b) Not to seek or 
receive any assistance in research 
on, development, manufacture, 
stockpiling, acquisition, posses-
sion or obtaining control over 
any NW or other NED; (с) Not 
to take any action to assist or 
encourage the conduct of re-
search on, development, manu-
facture, stockpiling, acquisition 
or possession of any NW or 
other NED; (d) Not to allow in 
its territory: (i) The production, 
acquisition, stationing, storage 
or use, of any NW or other NED; 
(ii) The receipt, storage, stockpil-
ing, installation or other form of 
possession of or control over any 
NW or other NED; (iii) Any 
actions, by anyone, to assist or 
encourage the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisi-
tion, possession of or control 
over any NW or other NED”. 
Peaceful uses “Nothing in the provisions of this 
Treaty shall prejudice the rights 
of the Contracting Parties, in 
conformity with this Treaty, to 
use nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, in particular for their 
economic development and 
social progress”. 
[no specific article; references 
throughout to parties’ “peaceful 
nuclear activities”] 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall 
prejudice the right of the States 
Parties to use nuclear energy, in 
particular for their economic 
development and social pro-
gress”. 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall be 
interpreted as to prevent the use 
of nuclear science and technolo-
gy for peaceful purposes”. 
“No provision of this Treaty shall 
prejudice the rights of the Parties 
to use nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes”. 
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Testing/ 
nuclear  
explosions 
[under Basic Undertakings] 
Parties undertake to prohibit and 
prevent testing.  
 
Peaceful nuclear explosions: 
“Parties may carry out explosions 
of nuclear devices for peaceful 
purposes — including explosions 
which involve devices similar to 
those used in nuclear weapons — 
or collaborate with third parties 
for the same purpose”. 
Parties undertake to prevent 
testing of NED in their territory; 
and not to assist and encourage 
testing by any state.  
[under Basic Undertakings] 
Parties undertake not to test or 
use NW;  
and not to allow this in their 
territory. 
Parties undertake not to test 
NED, to prohibit testing in their 
territory; not to assist or encour-
age testing by any state any-
where. 
Parties undertake, in accordance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty, not to carry out 
any nuclear test explosion or any 
other nuclear explosion; to 
prohibit such explosion any-
where under their jurisdiction or 
control; to refrain from encour-
aging or participating in carrying 
out such explosion. . 
Stationing  [under Basic Undertakings] 
Parties undertake to prohibit and 
prevent deployment. 
Parties undertake to prevent 
stationing of NED in their terri-
tory. 
Parties undertake not to station 
or transport NW, and not to 
allow stationing in their territory.
Parties undertake to prohibit 
stationing of NED in their terri-
tory. 
[under Basic Undertakings] 
Parties undertake not to allow 
stationing. 
Other  
Features 
      
Dumping/ 
disposing  
  Parties undertake not to dump 
radioactive waste and other 
radioactive matter at sea;  
Prevent dumping by anyone;  
No to assist or encourage dump-
ing. 
Parties undertake not to dump or 
discharge into the atmosphere 
anywhere in the zone any radioac-
tive materials or waste, and not to 
allow this in their territory.  
Disposal: dispose radioactive 
wastes and other radioactive 
material in accordance with IAEA 
standards and procedures. 
Parties undertake to implement 
the ban of import of hazardous 
waste into Africa, regarding 
radioactive waste;  
not to assist or encourage dump-
ing radioactive waste in the zone. 
Parties undertake not to allow 
disposal of radioactive waste by 
other states in their territory. 
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Transit   Decision on transit rights is 
explicitly left to the discretion of 
each state party.  
“Each Party in the exercise of its 
sovereign rights remains free to 
decide for itself whether to allow 
visits by foreign ships and air-
craft to its ports and airfields, 
transit of its airspace by foreign 
aircraft, and navigation by for-
eign ships in its territorial sea or 
archipelagic waters in a manner 
not covered by the rights of 
innocent passage, archipelagic 
sea lane passage or transit pas-
sage of straits” [under “Preven-
tion of stationing of nuclear 
explosive devices” clause] 
 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall 
prejudice or in any way affect the 
rights, or the exercise of the 
rights, of any State under inter-
national law with regard to 
freedom of the seas” [under 
“Application of the treaty” 
clause] 
Decision on transit rights is 
explicitly left to the discretion of 
each state party.  
“Each State Party, on being 
notified, may decide for itself 
whether to allow visits by foreign 
ships and aircraft to its ports and 
airfields, transit of its airspace by 
foreign aircraft, and navigation 
by foreign ships through its 
territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters and overflight of foreign 
aircraft above those waters in a 
manner not governed by the 
rights of innocent passage, 
archipelagic sea lanes passage or 
transit passage” [under “Foreign 
ships and aircraft” clause] 
 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall 
prejudice the rights or the exer-
cise of these rights by any State 
under the provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 1982, in 
particular with regard to freedom 
of the high seas, rights of inno-
cent passage, archipelagic sea 
lanes passage or transit passage 
of ships and aircraft, and con-
sistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations ” [under “Appli-
cation of the treaty” clause] 
Decision on transit rights is 
explicitly left to the discretion of 
each state party.  
“Without prejudice to the pur-
poses and objectives of the treaty, 
each Party in the exercise of its 
sovereign rights remains free to 
decide for itself whether to allow 
visits by foreign ships and air-
craft to its ports and airfields, 
transit of its air-space by foreign 
aircraft, and navigation by for-
eign ships in its territorial sea or 
archipelagic waters in a manner 
not covered by the rights of 
innocent passage, archipelagic 
sea lane passage or transit pas-
sage of straits” [under “Preven-
tion of stationing of nuclear 
explosive devices” clause] 
 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall 
prejudice or in any way affect the 
rights, or the exercise of the 
rights, of any State under inter-
national law with regards to 
freedom of the seas” ” [under 
“Application of the treaty” 
clause] 
Decision on transit rights is 
explicitly left to the discretion of 
each state party.  
“Without prejudice to the pur-
poses and objectives of this 
Treaty, each Party, in the exercise 
of its sovereign rights, is free to 
resolve issues related to transit 
through its territory by air, land 
or water, including visits by 
foreign ships to its ports and 
landing of foreign aircraft at its 
airfields” [under “Foreign ships, 
aircraft, and ground transporta-
tion” clause] 
 
 
Providing 
nuclear  
material 
  “Not to provide source or special 
fissionable material, or equip-
ment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of 
special fissionable material for 
peaceful purposes” to NNWS 
unless subject to Safeguards 
according to NPT; and to NWS 
unless subject to IAEA Safe-
guards, in order to ensure exclu-
sively peaceful non-explosive use.
“Not to provide source or special 
fissionable material, or equip-
ment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of 
special fissionable material” to 
NNWS except under Safeguards 
as required by NPT, and to NWS 
except in conformity with appli-
cable Safeguards. 
“Not to provide source or special 
fissionable material, or equip-
ment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of 
special fissionable material for 
peaceful purposes to any NNWS 
unless subject to a comprehen-
sive safeguards agreement con-
cluded with IAEA”. 
Not provide: “(i) source or 
special fissionable material or (ii) 
equipment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of 
special fissionable material, to 
any NNWS, unless that State has 
concluded with the IАЕА а 
comprehensive safeguards 
agreement and its Additional 
Protocol”. 
77 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 27 
T L A T E L O L C O  1967 
Latin America and Caribbean 
R A R O T O N G A  1985 
South Pacific 
B A N G K O K  1995 
Southeast Asia 
P E L I N D A B A  1996 
Africa 
S E M I P A L A T I N S K  2006 
Central Asia 
Nuclear safety 
/ physical 
protection  
    Peaceful nuclear energy pro-
grams subjected to rigorous 
nuclear safety assessment con-
forming to IAEA guidelines and 
standards. 
Physical protection of nuclear 
materials and facilities according 
to Convention on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material. 
Physical protection of nuclear 
materials and facilities according 
to Convention on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material. 
Withdrawal 
clause 
Denunciation: state can notify 
general secretary if in its opinion 
circumstances connected with 
the content of treaty and proto-
cols have arisen that affect its 
supreme interests or the peace 
and security of contacting par-
ties.  
Denunciation will take effect 3 
months after notification. 
Withdrawal: parties have the 
right to withdraw in the event of 
a violation by a party of a provi-
sion essential to achieving treaty's 
goals. 
Withdrawal takes effect 12 
months after notice. 
Withdrawal: parties have the 
right to withdraw in the event of 
a violation by a party of a provi-
sion essential to achieving trea-
ty's goals. 
Withdrawal takes effect 12 
months after notice. 
Withdrawal: each party, in 
exercising its national sovereign-
ty, has the right to withdraw if it 
decided that extraordinary events 
have jeopardized its supreme 
interests.  
Withdrawal takes effect 12 
months after notice.  
Withdrawal: each party has the 
right to withdraw if it decided 
that extraordinary events have 
jeopardized its supreme interests.  
Withdrawal takes effect 12 
months after notice.  
Additional 
features 
    *The zone includes the territories 
of relevant regional states, as well 
as their respective continental 
shelves and exclusive economic 
zones.  
*Requires accession to Conven-
tion on Early Notification of a 
Nuclear Accident.  
*Remedial measures – see below 
under “Control System”. 
 
*Reversal of nuclear weapons 
programs offered by the Treaty 
for state signatories (‘come clean’ 
clause): parties undertake to 
declare capability for manufac-
ture of NED; dismantle and 
destroy devices manufactured 
before entry into force; destroy 
facilities for manufacture or 
convert to peaceful uses; permit 
IAEA and the Commission to 
verify.  
*Acquisition of components for 
NED in unassembled or partly 
assembled form prohibited.  
*Armed attack against nuclear 
installations prohibited.  
Parties undertake to assist in 
efforts toward environmental 
rehabilitation of territories 
contaminated by past nuclear 
activities. 
Control 
system 
     
Bodies  
Established 
Agency for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean 
(OPANAL) 
 Commission for the Southeast 
Asia NWFZ 
African Commission on Nuclear 
Energy (AFCONE) 
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Control system 
for verifying 
compliance 
*IAEA Safeguards.  
*Reports (to OPANAL and 
IAEA), as well as special reports 
with additional information on 
matters related to compliance, if 
requested by OPANAL’s General 
Secretary.  
  
*Reports and exchange of infor-
mation (through the Director of 
the South Pacific Bureau for 
Economic Co-operation);  
*Consultations; 
*Application of IAEA Safeguards 
to peaceful nuclear activities;  
*Complaints procedure. 
*IAEA Safeguards.  
*Reports and exchange of infor-
mation.  
*Request for clarification on 
ambiguous matters which may 
give rise to doubts regarding a 
party's compliance. 
 
*IAEA Safeguards.  
*Reports and exchange of infor-
mation (to AFCONE). 
*Consultation.  
*Complaint procedure. 
*IAEA Safeguards and Addition-
al Protocol.  
*Annual and extraordinary 
consultative meetings, to review 
compliance. 
Special  
inspection 
At the request of a state party, 
OPANAL’s Council shall arrange 
a special inspection (to be 
carried out by OPANAL; 1992 
revised – by IAEA). 
 
A party can complain before the 
Director of the South Pacific 
Bureau for Economic co-
operation against another party 
that it is in breach of its treaty 
commitments. The Director shall 
convene the Consultative Com-
mittee (incorporating representa-
tives of all parties), which can 
decide on a special inspection, 
comprised of three qualified 
inspectors, to be appointed by 
the Committee. 
If a fact finding mission is 
requested by a state party and 
found necessary by the Commis-
sion’s Executive Committee, the 
latter shall set up the mission, to 
be manned by three IAEA in-
spectors. 
If a complaint on a possible 
breach cannot be settled, the 
Commission may request the 
IAEA to conduct an inspection 
in the territory of the party 
suspected of violation (this 
includes regional parties, as well 
as parties to Protocol III – extra-
regional states with responsibility 
to territories within the zone). 
 
Procedures in 
case of non-
compliance 
Report of special inspection shall 
be transferred to all parties, to 
UN Secretary General for trans-
mission to UN General Assembly 
and Security Council. 
A special session of OPANAL’s 
General Conference may be 
convened to consider reports of 
special inspections, at which the 
General Conference may pro-
duce recommendations to con-
tracting parties and a report to 
UN Secretary General for trans-
mission to UN General Assembly 
and Security Council.  
 
Inspectors' report is submitted 
with conclusions to the Consul-
tative Committee, which informs 
the South Pacific Forum of its 
decision as to whether the party 
complained against is in breach.  
In case a breach has been decid-
ed, all parties shall convene 
promptly at a South Pacific 
Forum meeting.  
In case Executive Committee 
concludes there is a breach of 
compliance by a party, and that 
party refuses to address the 
concerns accordingly, the Com-
mittee shall request the Commis-
sion to convene a meeting, at 
which appropriate measures for 
dealing with the situation shall 
be decided upon. Such measures 
may include referral to IAEA, 
UN Security Council or General 
Assembly.  
The Committee can also call a 
special meeting of the Commis-
sion in the event of a Protocol 
breach (by NWS), in which 
appropriate measures shall be 
decided. 
IAEA's conclusion of the inspec-
tion shall be transferred to the 
Commission, which shall report 
to all parties its decision on 
whether there is a breach of 
commitments.  
In case a breach has been decid-
ed, all parties shall convene 
promptly in an extraordinary 
session to discuss the matter, and 
may make recommendations to 
the breaching party or the Or-
ganization of African Unity. The 
latter can refer the matter to the 
UN Security Council. 
  
Protocols       
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Protocol for  
extra-regional 
states 
Protocol I –extra-regional states 
with territories in the region: 
undertake to apply Treaty provi-
sions “in territories for which, de 
jure or de facto, they are interna-
tionally responsible and which lie 
within the limits of the geograph-
ical zone established in that 
Treaty.”  
Protocol I – extra-regional states 
with territories in the region: 
undertake to apply Treaty provi-
sions to their territories in the 
region. 
  Protocol III – extra-regional 
states with territories in the 
region: undertake to apply Treaty 
provisions to their territories in 
the region. 
  
Extra-regional 
states ratifica-
tion status 
France, Netherlands, UK, US – 
all ratified.  
France, UK – ratified; US – 
signed (submitted to Senate 
2011).  
  France – ratified; Spain – not yet 
signed.  
  
NWS Protocols  Protocol II – NWS undertake 
not to threaten or use nuclear 
weapons against state parties to 
the Treaty.  
Protocol II – NWS undertake 
not to threaten or use NED 
against state parties to the Treaty. 
Protocol III – NWS undertake 
not to test NED in the region. 
Protocol – NWS undertake not 
to threaten or use nuclear weap-
ons against state parties to the 
Treaty, or anywhere in the zone.  
Protocol I – NWS undertake not 
to threaten or use nuclear explo-
sive device against state parties to 
the Treaty.  
Protocol II –NWS commit not 
to test nuclear explosive devices 
in the zone established by the 
Treaty. 
Protocol – NWS undertake not 
to threaten or use nuclear weap-
ons against state parties to the 
Treaty. 
NWS  
Ratification 
Status 
All five NWS ratified. Protocol I: ratified by France and 
the UK; US signed (submitted to 
Senate 2011) 
Protocols II and III: except the 
US, all NWS ratified; US signed 
(submitted to Senate 2011).  
None signed/ratified Protocol.  Protocols I and II: China, France, 
UK and Russia ratified; US 
signed (submitted to Senate 
2011). 
All five signed, China, France 
and the UK ratified. US submit-
ted to Senate 2015. 
 
Treaty texts and status of ratifications (including lists of member states) are available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/treaties.htm
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